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PREFACE
The following International Relations study is 
an effort to provide a new classification tool for the 
examination of big power-small power relationships. The 
purpose of the study is to provide definitive categories 
which may be used in the examination of relationships 
between nations of varying political power. The rela­
tionships of India with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal were 
selected for these reasons.
Three different types of relationships each of 
a distinct and unique nature are evident. Indian- 
Sikkimese relations provide a situation in which the 
large power (India) controls the defenses, foreign rela­
tions and internal affairs of the small power. Indian- 
Bhutanese relations demonstrates a situation in which 
the larger power controls the foreign relations of the 
smaller power, but management over internal affairs and 
defenses remains in the hands of the smaller nation. 
Indian-Nepalese relations is characterized by a situation 
in which defenses, control over foreign and internal 
affairs; remain in the hands of the smaller power, yet
there exists strong historical and cultural ties between 
the two nations.
My second reason for selecting the nations involved, 
is the fact that in all three relationships the big power, 
namely India, remains constant. Hence, the policy making 
environment of the big power in all three cases remains 
the same. By the policy making environment is meant such 
internal factors as public opinion, interest groups, legis­
lative blocs, political parties, the executive establish­
ment, press, policy making processes, etc. The same would 
be true for external pressures which might effect the 
policy making environment. The relative geographical 
isolation of the small powers under consideration and 
resultant limited foreign relations contacts (especially 
in the case of Bhutan and Sikkim) also makes them excel­
lent specimens for study.
In the third place, the special relationships 
existing between India and the three Himalayan Kingdoms 
are unique, and as yet no specialized attempt to study 
these relationships has been attempted. Hence this work 
seeks to add to the body of knowledge of Indian foreign 
policy. It is sui generis in that it attempts to provide 
a definitive category scheme designed in the first 
instance to explicate the special relationships which 
India has with the Himalayan States of Bhutan, Sikkim, 
and Nepal. This writing also endeavors to maks a
iv
contribution to the field of international relations in 
that the definitive categories arrived at are intended to 
provide a means of defining the relationships of nations 
of divergent political power throughout the international 
scene.
I hope that this dissertation will provide an 
interesting and enlightening insight into the foreign 
relations of India with the Himalayan Kingdoms under 
study, and that the new classification scheme will purvey 
another tool in the never ending search for knowledge 
about the relations between nations.
I am most grateful to the Embassy of India, and 
in particular to Secretary G, V. Shukla of that embassy 
for his generous cooperation in supplying requested data 
for this work. Without that cooperation this disserta­
tion could not have been written.
Special mention must also be given to assistance 
rendered from:
1. Mr. Lester S. Jayson, Director- of the Legis­
lative Reference Service of the Library of 
Congress.
2. Mrs. Mai-y Lee DeVilkiss, of the Interlibrary 
Loan Service of &he University of Oklahoma 
Library.
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THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF INDIA WITH BHUTAN, SIKKIM 
AND NEPAL BETWEEN 1 9^7 -1 9 6 7: AN ANALYTICAL
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POWER-SMALL POWER RELATIONS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Several approaches could be taken in a study of 
the four nations involved.
The Snyder, Paige Decision Making Process utilizes 
a generalized conceptual scheme whereby researchers may 
look at international relations policy decisions accord­
ing to the following model:
State A State B
Internal SettingInternal Setting
Decision
Makers
Decision
Makers
ACTIONACTION
1
The nature and disposition of the decision making 
body, organizational structure, internal and external 
communications network are all examined in detail, in 
an effort to determine the manner in which a nation 
arrives at a given policy decision. Decision Making 
consists in the translating of attitudes, information, 
perceptions, situations, and above all values into a 
particular choice of action. Snyder and Paige emphasize 
the importance of motivation (the willingness of the 
decisional unit to act), information (types, adequacy, 
relevance, quantity, etc.), and the organization of the 
group as important factors for consideration in attempting 
to discern a nation's policy decision on any given matter.^ 
The realist theory of international politics 
makes power and interest the fundamental means of analy­
sis and the basis of explanation. Hans Morganthau, a 
leading proponent of the realist theory, refers to nations 
being motivated by their national interests in terms of 
power. To him, international relations become the struggle 
for power. By power, Morganthau means man's control over 
the minds and actions of other men. He recognizes that 
many kinds of activities may transpire between two 
nations such as legal, economic, humanitarian and cultural
■"Richard C, Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United 
States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Appli­
cation of an Analytical Scheme," Administrative Science 
^uart^erljT, Vol. 3, December,
3intercourses. But truly in the Morganthau scheme, the 
struggle for poîjor occupies the center of the stage. This 
is so because to Morganthau, the laws of politics are rooted 
in human nature (which is similar to a kind of Nietzchean 
concept). To Morganthau, power comprises anything that 
establishes and maintains the control of man over man, 
from pure brute physical violence to the most subtle of 
psychological ties. According to his scheme a nation may 
pursue only three basic choices. Those are:
1. Status quo (a political policy which seeks 
to keep power).
2 . Imperialism (a political policy which seeks 
to increase power).
3. Prestige (a political policy which seeks to
2
demonstrate power).
Systems theories of international relations 
create a focus on transactions and relationships occur­
ring in the flow of events between two or more nations.
To Bachrach and Baratz, power is relational and becomes 
only one kind of relationship in international trans­
actions. To them, power exists as only one of a set of 
seven behavioral categories. These include:
1. Relationship of power. For this to exist, 
three prerequisites are required.
2
Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations; The 
Struggle for Power and Peace \î«ew York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1966)7 PP* 25-94.
a. A conflict of interests must exist between 
the parties involved.
b. One of the parties of the conflict must
be made to comply with the other nation’s
demands.
c. One nation must be able to invoke threats
of sanctions on the other.
2. Relationship of Influence. This is similar 
to the power relationship, except no threat of sanctions 
exists.
3 . Relationship of Authority. In this relation­
ship, the compliant nation yields to the desire of the 
influencing nation, because the former recognizes that 
the command is in its own best interests.
4. Relationship of force. In this relationship, 
the influencing nation secures the compliance of another 
by the actual application of sanctions, coercion and 
force.
5 . Manipulative Relationship. The influencing 
nations achieve compliance through measures of which 
the affected party remains unaware.
6 . Probing Relationship. These consist of 
preliminary encounters to seek opportunities, and pro­
vide fresh information about one nation on the part of 
another.
7 . Maintenance Relationships. These comprise 
all transactions that keep situations in a non-decision 
state meant to preserve the status quo and create the
5effect of perpetuation and reinforcement.
Hence, to Bachrach and Baratz, power turns out 
to be merely one kind of transactional relationship, 
and not a pervasive force running through the universe
3
of all international diplomacy and statecraft, David 
Singer has suggested a model with particular reference 
to power and influence relationships. Ho attempts to 
answer the problems as to why nations seek to influence
each other on the international scene. To Singer, nations
exhibit an interdependence in their relations with one 
another, but that the scarcest commodity on the inter­
national scene is security. Lack of security produces 
anxiety, hence nations seek to influence each other in 
order to obtain security. Singer alleges that a nation's 
decision makers must consider three basic criteria:
1, The perceived present behavior of what another
government is presently doing.
2, The preferred future behavior for that gov­
ernment ,
3* The predicted future behavior of what the 
other government is likely to be.
These three factors provide the setting within 
which the influencing nation is to act in the manner of 
persuasion or disuasion on the target nation. Persuasion 
or disuasion by reinforcing or modifying the behavior of
3
Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and 
Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework," American Politi­
cal Science Review, Vol. 57» September, 19o5i pp. o32-o*2.
tliô Other nation by punishments, rewards, threats or 
promises, according to the following model:
Persuasion 
Situations :
Dissuasion
Situations:
A prefers X A prefers 0
1 2 3 k 5 6 7 8
Preferred Future 
Behavior V V V VA 0 0 0 0
Predicted Future 
Behavior X X 0 0 0 0 X X
Perceived Present 
Behavior X 0 X 0 0 X 0 X
Reinforce or Modify? R M R M R M R M
Punish? No P* No Yes No P* No Yes
Reward? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Threaten? P Yes Yes Yes P Yes Yes Yes
Promise? Yes Yes Yea Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
•P is probably,
The four aforementioned methods are all useful
in the study of international relations. They are all
\
similar in that they seek to shed light upon the rela­
tionships between nations via some model or scheme. They 
are all dissimilar in that they focus upon different 
aspects of national relationships. The method developed 
in this project attempts to establish new categories by 
focusing upon control of various elements essential to 
the internal and external sovereignty of a nation state.
David J. Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A
Forman Model," American Political Science Review, Vol. 57» 
«June, lÇw3, PP
By doing so it is designed to shed new light and provide 
a new focus for the investigation of Big Power, Small 
Power relations.
Robert A. Dahl has devised a model utilizing the 
Aristotelian classification by which political systems 
are classified by the nature and end for which the state 
exists and the various kinds of authority to which men 
and their associations are subject. Dahl expands Aris­
totle's scheme in establishing a model providing for 
comparing nations based on l6 different categories defined 
in terms of his concept of power rule and authority:
Dahl's Classification
Legitimate Systems Tyrannies
power
over
decisions 
of govern­
ment exer­
cised by:
Sub-system Autonomy
Low
(unitary)
High 
((pluralistic )
One
Few Î
4-
Sub-system Autonomy
Low j High 
(unitary) ((pluralistic)
Many [
I
Mixed [
I
i
L
8The Dahl scheme is especially useful as an index 
of measurement for comparative government studies. It is 
helpful to the political scientist endeavoring to generate 
hypotheses about political systems.
Because an important aspect of this study seeks 
to measure the nature and degree of Big Power control 
over the internal relations, external relations, and 
defenses of the Small Powers involved; the Dahl scheme, 
as a comparative government tool, is useful in providing 
an analytical framework and inducing influence for the 
development of a new investigative construct.
It is my hope in this study to design a model 
based on delimiting classifications which will aid the 
political scientist to categorize big power-small power 
relationships into specific groupings. The tentative 
categories, which seem feasible and essential for use, 
are control over defenses, internal relations, and external 
relations. Consideration must be given to a crucial 
factor: whether or not big power control is with or
against the will of the government of the small power 
nation. A model of the proposed scheme is shown on the 
following page:
^Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Engle­
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 19&5), pp. 25-38.
TABLE 1
THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF BIG POWER CONTROL OVER THE 
DEFENSES, EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND INTERNAL 
RELATIONS OF THE SMALL POWER
Big Power Control 
with Small Power 
Permission
3ig Power Control 
without Small 
Power Permission
Autonomous
Control
Absolute
Control
Partial
Control
Absolute 1 Partial 
Control 1 Control
Absolute Partial
Defenses
...... .........
External Relations !>
(internal Relations
1
....... J  . . 1
vO
10
In order to determine the degree and nature of 
control by a big power over the internal relations, 
external relations and defenses of a small power, it is 
first necessary to ascertain what in actuality consti­
tutes the essential elements of these three categories. 
Internal Sovereignty; Robert A. Dahl has asserted that 
any group which exercises power, rule and authority 
over a given geographical area is in effect the sovereign 
authority of that area,^ David Easton has put it in 
terms of which group makes an authoritarian allocation
7
of values. Almond and Coleman became more definitive 
in listing three elements for determining the same, namely
Q
rule making, rule enforcement and rule adjudication. It 
does seem reasonable that with reference to big power- 
small power relationships a determination of which of 
two powers actually exercises control over these functions 
in a de facto sense, and to what degree that control is 
exercised, is of considerable importance in determining 
the amount of big power control over a small power's 
internal relations. However, it also seems inconclusive.
^Ibid., pp. 4-13.
7
David Easton, The Political System; An Inquiry 
into the State of Political Science (New York), 1953* 
p. 1 3 0 .
Q
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The 
Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 19&0), pp. 52-58.
11
since it would seem that other factors though not of a 
prime consideration nevertheless also affect to a dogroe, 
the internal sovereignty of any political system. Two 
such elements are the internal transportation and com­
munication network of the small power. It would seem 
specious at best to say that a small power exercised 
sovereignty over its internal affairs merely because 
its governmental machinery exercised de facto rule 
making, rule adjudication and rule enforcement functions, 
if all the communication and transportation media of 
that country were controlled by another larger power.
The larger power could at any given moment stifle the 
smaller power by simply terminating these facilities.
Two other elements of less importance but of some con­
sequence are the amount of foreign aid and investments 
which the big power extends to the small power; and the 
degree of dependence of the small power upon these economic 
reinforcements.
The threat of curtailing or terminating needed 
foreign aid, which may not be available from any other 
source could act as a potent influencing factor upon the 
decision makers of an economically backward nation. A 
small power whose economic life depended upon businesses 
with main offices located within the territory of a 
big power would again be vulnerable to economic pressures. 
The government of the big power by passing laws, increasing
12
taxes, etc., affecting its companies would also affect 
the economic life of the smaller nation, where branch 
offices were located. This is not to say that the com­
munication-transportation-economic factors under con­
sideration constitute sovereignty, but rather that 
control over them can give the regulating authority 
enormous leverage as a persuading influence over govern­
mental decision makers who do exercise sovereignty. It 
may perhaps also be significant to note whether or not 
the small power possesses its own currency or uses the 
currency of the larger power as a medium of exchange. 
Currency appreciation and depreciation, control over 
the amount of coinage, etc. could all have an impact on 
the economy of the smaller country.
External Relations; Knowledge of which power negotiates 
with other countries on behalf of the smaller nation is, 
of coui’se, of prime facie importance. The degree of 
foreign trade between the big power and small power could 
be an influencing factor.
Defenses : Knowledge of which country's armed forces
defend the borders of the small power nation and to 
whom the armed forces of the smaller power owe their 
allegiance is essential for a proper understanding of 
the relations of the two nations.
Tentative elements which will be used to deter­
mine tne degree of big pc
13
relations, external relations and defenses of the smaller 
power are as follows;
I k
TABLE 2
ELEMENTAL COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNAL RELATIONS, 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND DEFENSES 
OF ANY GIVEN NATION
I. Internal Relations
A. Main categories
1. Control over rule making functions of the 
small power*
2. Control over the rule adjudication functions 
of the small power.
3. Control over the rule enforcing functions of 
the small power.
B. Influencing categories
1. Amount and exclusiveness of foreign aid, 
and foreign investment programs.
2. Amount of control over the communication and
transportation networks of the small power.
3. Whether or not the small power coins its own
currency or uses the currency of the larger 
power.
II. External Relations
A. Main categories
1. Control over the political? economic and
financial relations of the small power.
B. Influencing category
1. The amount and exclusiveness of foreign trade,
III. Defenses
A. 1. Control over the defense and territorial
integrity of the small power.
2. Control over the allegiance of the armed
f m r r a a  nf - fVi o  B m « 1 1  n n w A T ' .
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TÀaLti 3
DEFINITIVE CATEGORIES DESIGNED TO DESCRIBE 
BIG POWER-SMALL POWER RELATIONSHIPS
Function of the Small- 
i Power Controlled
Method of Big Power Control
Voluntary
Treaty
Involuntary 
Treaty or 
Imposition
1 . Defenses. I| a u p . r i » t . n d . . c y  
1 all controlled. |
Subjugation
.
I 2. Defenses,
1 external relations, 
1 controlled;
* Internal relations, 
1 autonomous.
i
Protectorate I Satellite
j!
i
) 3« External relations, 
] controlled;
1 Defenses,
internal relations, 
I autonomous.
[  4. Defenses,
1 external relations, 
j internal relations,
1 all autonomous.1
i
1
Tutelage j Restr&inment
I
i
Autonomous ] Autonomous
1
The terms in Table 3 were selected to indicate varying 
degrees of Big Power control over the internal relations, 
external relations, and defenses of the Small Power involved. 
The definitive categories were, where possible, selected to 
be compatable with those used in standard International 
Relations texts.
Fenwick's book. International Law, and the "Plano-Alton" 
book. The International Relations Dictionary, were helpful.
When necessary, new terms were introduced to represent 
relationships in which no adequate descriptive terminology 
currently exists.
The terms used in Table 3 are not designed to denote 
legalistic relationships, but are meant rather to specifi­
cally indicate the absence or presence of Big Power political 
control over the external relations, internal relations and 
defenses of the Small power involved.
l6
For the purposes of this paper, by internal 
sovereignty is meant control over the rule making, rule 
adjudication, and rule enforcement functions of a given 
national state. By external sovereignty is meant control 
over the political, economic and financial relations of 
a given national state. By Defense Control is meant con­
trol over the defenses, territorial integrity of a given 
national state, with due consideration of to whom the 
allegiance of the armed forces of that state are given.
The seven broad definitive categories may be 
distinguished as to partial or total control by the large 
power to form l4 more specific classifications:
1. Partial Superintendency
2. Total Superintendency
3. Partial Subjugation
4. Total Subjugation
5* Partial Protectorate
6 . Total Protectorate
7. Partial Tutelage
8 . Total Tutelage
9. Partial Satellite
10. Total Satellite
11. Partial Restrainment
12. Total Restrainment
13. Partial Autonomy
l4« Total Autonomy
17
À relationship ci Total Autonomy is one in which 
the Small Power exercises unqualified control over its 
internal relations (rule making, rule adjudication and 
rule enforcing functions), external relations (political, 
economic and financial) and defenses.
A relationship of Partial Autonomy is also one in 
which the Small Power exercises control over its internal 
relations, external relations, and defenses. However, in 
this relationship, Small Power control is qualified by 
Big Power domination of certain influencing categories 
(foreign aid and investments, foreign trade, currency, 
and the communication and transportation networks), to 
such an extent that it constitutes a consistent, persuasive 
and comprehensive influence over the policy decisions of 
the Small Power regarding its defenses, internal relations 
and external relations.
Finally, the l4 sub-categories may be further 
defined by the development of a second classification scheme. 
By cultural categories such as religious, linguistic, ethnic, 
and racial similarities or dissimilarities as well as 
traditional economic and historical ties trichotomized 
into three broad classifications we may form 52 definitive 
categories. The three broad cultural categories would be 
as follows:
1, Cultural Synergism--65-» 100?^  of the citizens 
of the small power exhibit culturally similar
18
characteristics to 6 5-1 00% of the large power.
2. Cultural Amorphi8m--40-60% of the citizens of 
the small power exhibit culturally similar 
characteristics to 6 5-100% of the citizens
of the large power.
3. Cultural Divergency-~0-35% of the citizens of 
the small power exhibit culturally similar 
characteristics to 6 5-100% of the citizens of 
the large power.
To cite an example of how the 52 definitive cate­
gories could be used, the following example is used:
Country A, a Large Power, controls completely the 
foreign relations of Country B, a small power by voluntary 
treaty on the part of both countries. However, Country B 
possesses full autonomy over its own defenses and external 
relations. 80% of the citizens of Country B exhibit cul­
turally similar characteristics to 75% of the citizens 
of Country A. Utilizing the developed categorization sys­
tem, the relationship of Country A to Country B would be 
classified a Culturally Synergistic Total Satellite.
Each of the chapters which follow are designed to 
provide a systematic development of the classification 
scheme ascribed to in this introduction. Chapter II 
provides background information about the countries under 
study. Chapter III is designed to furnish an understanding 
of the genesis of the current relations of India with the
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three Himalayan kingdoms, and the role of Communist China 
in accounting for these relations. Chapter IV describes 
the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy, the foreign 
policy similarities of the three Himalayan kingdoms and 
concludes by narrowing the scope of exploration to India's 
Himalayan defense strategy. The chapter thus provides a 
platform upon which to build the more specialized rela­
tionships which follow. Chapters V through VII deal with 
a particularized study of the political, economic and 
defense relationships of India with Bhutan, Sikkim, and 
Nepal, and is designed to develop the first phase of a 
definitive category scheme based on the internal, external 
and defense relations of India with each of the Himalayan 
States. Chapter VIII is an exploration of the cultural 
similarities and dissimilarities between India and each 
of the three Small Powers under study in order to develop 
the second phase of the categorization plan. The categories 
of phase two are based on ethnic, racial, religious, and 
linguistic considerations ; with attention also given to 
the traditional economic and historical ties of India with 
the Small Powers under study. Chapter IX concludes the 
work by converging the two classification systems into one 
definitive categorization for each of the three relation­
ships under study, and describes the general implications 
of the study for the field of international relations.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
NEPAL
Geography
Nepal is a landlocked country depending for access 
to the sea on Indian ports far removed from its borders.
It occupies an area of $4,345 square miles and supports 
a population of about 10 million people.^ The country 
extends for approximately 5 00 miles from east to west. 
Within the 100 miles between its southern and northern 
borders, its topography ranges from a low plain to the 
world's highest mountain range, the Himalayas.
With the exception of the Katmandu Valley, the 
eastern section of the Terai is better developed economi­
cally than the other regions of Nepal and contains about 
30 percent of the country's population. Grain is culti­
vated on 60 to 90 percent of the arable land. Rice, corn, 
wheat, millet, potatoes, and oilseeds are among the most 
important food crops; Jute is the most important industrial
"Background Notes— Nepal," U.S. Department of 
State Publication 7904, October, 196? (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, I9 6 7), P- 1»
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crop; and there are also large forest reserves in this 
area.
The Katmandu Valley, though geographically part
of the hill country, is of such importance that it warrants
separate consideration. Only some 230 square miles in
extent, the valley is the political and cultural heart
of the nation. Drained by the Baghmati River, its rich
soils are intensively cultivated to produce a wide variety
of grains, vegetables, and fruits. With irrigation as
many as three crops a year can be grown. About 450,000
people live in the valley, 1 1 0 ,0 0 0 of whom are concen-
2
trated in Nepal's capital city, Katmandu.
Demography
The Nepalese people are descendants of three major 
migrations from India, Tibet, and central Asia. The 
intermarriage of these various groups has resulted in a 
uniquely Nepalese group in addition to various groups 
which exhibit the characteristics of the diverse strains 
which make up the population.
Many diverse tribal and caste groups in Nepal 
maintain their social cohesion. Many western authors 
have used the term "Gurkha" to refer to members of so- 
called "military tribes" of Nepal from which British
2
All of the above data was taken from "The Sub­
continent of Asia," U.S. Dept, of State Publication 7410 
1 96 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, Nov. I9 6 2),
pp. 5 3-5 5 .
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recruited soldiers for their "Gurkha battalions," Correct 
usage of the term restricts it to designate a number of 
western Nepalese tribes which conquered and brought national 
unity to Nepal under the leadership of the Gurkha dynasty 
which has ruled the country since the latter part of the l8th 
century.
In the past, Sanskrit and Pali served the educated 
class of Nepal in handing down cultural and religious 
tradition. Today in addition to Nepali, which is the 
national language, Newari, Marthili, and Bhojpuri are 
widely used. Hindi or Hindustani is also extensively used 
in the Terai areas bordering India. The isolation of the 
country has made the progress of education extremely slow, 
and only five percent of the people can read and write.
Hinduism is the official religion practiced by the 
majority, and, under the Gurkha dynasty until the 1950 
revolution, it was the state religion. However, Buddhist 
influences are strong, and throughout the country there 
is an intermingling of the two religious traditions. Some 
time in the sixth or seventh century Hinduism began to grow 
in strength as a result of migrations and conquests from 
India, bringing with it the worship of Hindu gods, Brah­
manism, and the caste system. Despite the conquest of 
Nepal by Hindu kings. Buddhism continued to flourish, the
3
two religions exerting an influence upon one another.
•^ Ibid. , pp. 5 5-5 6 ,
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Political History
Nepal was foionded in the latter half of the l8th
century when Prithvi Narayan Shah, the ruler of the small
principality of Gurkha, forged a unified country from a 
number of mountain states. The country was frequently 
called the Gurkha Kingdom, and when recruitment of Nepalese 
soldiers for the British Indian Array began in the early 
1 8 0 0's the British called them "Gurkhas." The name 
remained and became world famous due to the bravery of 
Nepalese fighters in the First and Second World Wars.
Today Nepal permits both India and Britain to recruit 
Nepalese nationals for their armies.
After 18 0 0 the heirs of Prithvi Narayan Shah
proved unable to maintain firm political control over 
Nepal, and a period of internal turmoil ensued. Sta­
bility was restored in the l840's when the Rana family 
gained power, entrenched itself through hereditary Prime 
Ministers, and reduced the monarch to a figurehead.
A tightly centralized autocracy, the Rana adminis­
tration pursued a conscious policy of isolating Nepal from 
external influences. This policy helped Nepal maintain 
its national independence during the colonial era, but at 
the same time kept it in an economically underdeveloped
I
state.
Democratic currents set in motion by the inde­
pendence movement in neighboring India had their impact
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on Nepal, and opposition to Rana rule grew in the 1930's 
and 194c s. In 1950 and 1931* shortly after India became 
independent, a popular revolution toppled the Ranas, 
restored King Tribhuvan to power, and paved the way for 
a non-Rana to become Prime Minister. The decade of the 
1 9 5 0 's saw a period of quasi-constitutional rule during 
which the monarch assisted by leaders of fledgling politi­
cal parties governed the country. At times Prime Ministers 
from these parties were in office and represented a wide 
spectrum of views. During other periods the throne 
ruled directly. King Tribhuvan was succeeded after his 
death in 1953 by his son, King Mahendra, who is the present 
ruler.
Throughout the decade efforts were made to frame 
a constitution for the country that would establish a 
representative form of government, presumably patterned 
on a modified British model. In early 1939 such a consti­
tution was issued by the King, and shortly afterward the 
first democratic elections were held for a national assem­
bly.
The Nepali Congress Party, a moderate socialist 
group, gained a substantial victory and its leader,
B. P. Koirala, was called upon to form a government and 
serve as Prime Minister.
In December I9 6O King Mahendra dismissed the 
Koirala government, suspended the constitution; and
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resumed direct rule. The King charged the Nepali Contress 
government with corruption, misuse of power, and an ina­
bility to maintain law and order throughout the country. 
King Mahendra declared that Nepal was not yet ready for 
Western parliamentary institutions and needed a democratic 
political system closer to Nepalese traditions. To meet 
this need the King initiated a partyless system of
•i
"panchayat," or village council democracy. The move may 
have been the only solution feasible to quell growing rural 
disturbances between liberal minded peasants demanding 
greater land reforms, and conservative land owners who were 
recalcitrant to change.
Contemporary Political Scene 
The new constitution promulgated by King Mahendra 
in February 1959 had provided for a constitutional monarchy 
with a bi-cameral Parliament and a Cabinet responsible to 
the Lower House.
During the parliamentary period the major political 
parties were represented in the lower house of 1 0 9 members 
as follows:
4
""Background Notes--Nepal," U.S. Department of 
State Publication 7904, October, 196? (Washington: Govern­
ment Printing Office, pp. 1 , 3.
"The Subcontinent of Asia," Department of State 
Publication 7410, November 1 9 6 2, p. 59-
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The Nepali Congress Party 74 seats
The Gorkha Parishad Party 19 seats
United Democratic Party 5 seats
Communist Party 4 seats
Independents 7 seats
With the banning of political parties and activi­
ties in December I960, these parties became inactive pub­
licly.^
All the political parties had promised land 
reform, development o f  unexploited resources, hydro­
electric power, industry, improvement of health, education 
and communications. In foreign affairs, all professed a 
neutral policy of nonalignment with power blocs, friendly 
relations with other countries, and promotion of interna­
tional peace. The Nepali Congress formerly led by 
B. P. Koirala laid great emphasis on achieving national 
socialism by democratic evolutionary means (a kind of 
Nepalese Fabianism). The party gave high priority to 
redistribution of land and improvement of agriculture, 
village development, cottage industries and improvements 
in health, education and communication. The United Demo­
cratic Party led by former Prime Minister K . I. Singh was
^"The Subcontinent of South Asia,” pp. 59-60.
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more radical, proposing to liquidate the landed aris­
tocracy. Singh had been critical of Communist China and 
opposed the communists in the election campaigns. The 
Communist Party itself was always weak, being confined to 
the Katmandu Valley and the young labor movements in the 
Terai- The right wing Gurkha Parishad Party was supported
7
mostly by Ranas and aristocrats.
Currently, the King exercises broad powers over 
Nepal's "panchayat" system of government. The panchayat 
system draws its theoretical inspiration from the tradi­
tional local government institution found in parts of 
Nepal--the v liage panchayat. Under a constitution promul­
gated in 1 9 6 2 four tiers of government were established: 
village or town panchayats; district (country) panchayats; 
zonal (provincial) panchayats; and, at the apex, a national 
panchayat which is the national legislature. Members of 
the village or town panchayats are elected indirectly by 
the panchayats immediately beneath them in the hierarchical 
order.
The Council of Ministers is the executive arm of 
the Government and gives policy advice to the King. The 
Ministers are appointed by the King from the membership 
of the National Panchavat.
7
Pradyumna P. Karan, Nepal, A Physical and Cul- 
tural Geography (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1 oAn \ 11
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Elections were held in lÿOj and the new national 
legislature (the National Panchayat) held its opening 
session in April 1 9 6 3. One-half of the seats in the 
National Panchayat became vacant in 1967 under the pro­
vision for staggered 6 -year terms of office for Panchayat 
members. Elections were held in April I967 to fill these 
seats.
In the past few years the Government has initiated 
a number of significant social reforms, including a pro­
gram of land reform and a modernization of the legal code 
removing legal sanction for caste discrimination. However, 
Nepal still faces challenging political and social tasks 
in order to develop stable governmental institutions that 
can meet the needs of a modern society. The Government 
also faces the problem of reforming social institutions 
and customs so that the society itself can keep abreast of
g
political and economic changes under way.
BHUTAN
Geography
Bhutan, whose capital is Thimbu, is in the eastern 
part of the Himalayan chain. The rectangularly shaped 
country occupies an area of 1 8 ,0 0 0  square miles and is
All of the above data was taken from "Background 
Notes— Nepal," U.S. Department of State Publication 7904, 
October, 1967, p. 3-
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approximately 200 miles long from east to west, and 100  
miles wide from north to south. It is situated north of 
West Bengal and Assam, and west of the North East Frontier 
Agency of India. Its northern boundary runs along Eastern 
Tibet, and its western boundary partly along the Chumbi 
Valley in Tibet and partly along Sikkim.
In the west the Tula la range, mountain range 
separates Bhutan from Siklcim. In the northeast, the moun­
tains of Towang separate Bhutan from the Towang area in 
the North East Frontier Agency. The Black Mountain Range 
runs through the center of Bhutan between the Punakha and 
Tongsa Valleys, influencing the development of two different 
regions, each possessing different languages, character­
istics and customs.
There are five main rivers in Bhutan which include 
the Toorsa, Raidak, Sankosh, Tongsa and Manas. The Toorsa 
rises in Tibet and all the others rise in the high moun­
tains of Northern Bhutan. All five rivers flow into 
Indian Territory, eventually joining the Brahmaputra River 
of that country. The Manas and its tributary, the Kuru 
River, drain the whole of Eastern Bhutan.
The country is known to have considerable mineral 
wealth as yet largely unmined. Preliminary surveys carried 
out by the Indian Government indicate that Bhutan has sub­
stantial deposits of dolomite, limestone, copper, graphite, 
gypsum, coal, pyrites and gold. The nation also has
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uunûluex-aule forest wealth and hydroelectric potential.
Demography
The etlinic composition of the population is com­
plex. It includes the Bhote majority, a large number of 
Nepalese, a few Indians of various castes, and at least 
two tribal groups; the Lepcha, an indigenous people: and 
the Santal, whose ancestors migrated from the northern 
part of India's Bihar State.
Because much of the northern area is uninhabitable, 
the population is distributed mainly along the country's 
southern border and in the high valleys to the north, par­
ticularly those near the western end of the east-west 
lateral route.
At least two-thirds of the population speaks one 
or another of a variety of Tibetan dialects, among which 
there is a high degree of mutual intelligibility. The 
written language is identical with Tibetan. The only 
minority languages of much importance are Nepali, spoken 
by the Nepalese settlers, and Bengali and Hindi, spoken 
near the Indian border. To what extent the native speakers 
of any of these tongues are able to use any of the Tibetan 
dialects in their limited contacts with the Bhote is not 
known. A number of educated Bhote have a good knowledge
9
All of the above data was taken from G. V. 
Shukla, "Bhutan," Information Service of India (Wash­
ington: Embassy of India, February, 1969)» pp. 1-2.
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of Hindi or English, both of which are taught in the
, , 10 schools.
Political History 
Bhutan's early history is shrouded in obscurity, 
but as fai as is known, the country's past resembles that 
of rural medieval Europe. The consolidation of Bhutan 
began 300 years ago when Sheptoon La-Pha, a traveling 
lama from Tibet, became king and acquired the title of 
Dharma Raja. His successor Ooopgein Sheptoon, strengthened 
his power by appointing penlops (Governors of territories) 
and jungpens (governors of forts). Sheptoon La-Pha exer­
cised both temporal and spiritual power. His successor, 
however, appointed a minister, the Deb Raja, to exercise 
temporal power. The Deb Raja soon became the predominant 
power and reduced the Dharma Raja to a position of revered 
spiritual leader.
By the l8th and 19th centuries, however, the local 
penlops had grown increasingly powerful, and the Deb Raja
Ÿ ^
was frequently a mere figure-head of the most powerful 
penlop, usually the Faro or Tongsa penlop. In I885 the 
Deb Raja requested and received Chinese aid in crushing 
these two powerful penlops. To neutralize the Chinese
All of the above demographic data was taken from 
U.S. Army, Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sikkim and 
Bhutan), Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550“53 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1964),
pp. 4l2-4l3.
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threat, Ugyen Wangchulc, head of the Tongsa penlop, 
encouraged a British presence in the area. In I906 the 
Dharma Raja died, and the following year the Deb Raja 
stepped down, thus facilitating Ugyen*s consolidation of 
power. He became Bhutan's first hereditary king. In I9IO 
King Ugyen signed the Pnnakha Treaty between Bhutan and 
Britain. This treaty provided that Bhutan's foreign rela­
tions were to be guided by the advice of the British, 
though Bhutan retained full control over its internal 
affairs. The present King, Jigme Dorji Vangchuk, is the 
third in King Ugyen's line.^^
A treaty signed with India in 19^9 placed Bhutan's 
foreign affairs under Indian control. The invasion of 
Tibet in 1950 by Communist China raised the question of 
that country's intention toward Bhutan and the other Hima- 
layem states. The threat to Bhutan seemed particularly 
serious as early as 1954# when the Peiping authorities 
distributed maps showing extensive areas in northeastern 
and northwestern Bhutan within Communist China. As late 
as 1 9 6 4 , the communists had refrained from entering 
Bhutanese territory, and Bhutanese authorities had con­
sistently rejected Peiping's offers for aid and its pro­
posals to enter unilateral negotiations regarding the 
demarcation of Bhutan's northern boundary.
"Background Notes— Bh»’tan," U.S. Department of 
State Publication 8334, December I967 (Washington: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1 9 6 7)*
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Contemporary Political Scene 
Traditionally a loose theocracy and since 1907 an 
autocracy, Bhutan is slowly adopting a rudimentary system 
of representative government. The King of Bhutan governs 
his country through a National Assembly, personal coun­
cillors, a Central Secretariat and administrative officers 
located throughout the country.
The eight Royal Councillors include the Chief 
Secretary, the Deputy Chief Secretary, the Thimbu Thrimpon, 
the Punakha Trimpon, one representative of the Lamas, 
one representative of the public, and The Agent to the 
Government of Bhutan. The Secretariat is headed by a 
Chief Secretary who oversees the work of the subordinate 
adminis trative officers.
The Tsongdu (National Assembly) has a membership 
of 1 2 6 , 90 of whom are elected, and the remainder appointed 
by the King. The system of election to the Assembly is 
that each village or group of small villages elect, on the 
basis of one vote for each family, a person for nomination 
as the Headman who is formally appointed as Headman by 
the Maharaya for a 5 year term. Headmen so appointed, in 
turn, elect the representative to the assembly. The 
Tsongdu constituencies which olect the Headmen are made 
up of representatives from local villages elected for 
three year terms. The nominated members of the assembly 
consist of important government officials, influential
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lamas, and the priest of Punakha. The Chief Secretary 
acts as the Speaker of the Assembly which meets semi­
annually.
There are no political parties in the country. 
However, the lack of popular mass representation has led 
to the creation of the Bhutan National Congress Party. A 
shadow political party that exists only outside Bhutan, 
the Congress represents the Nepalese settlers of southern 
Bhutan who have only 13.8 percent of the Tsongdu seats 
although they compose an estimated 25 percent of the popu­
lation. The party operates from bases in Assam and 
Siliguri in West Bengal. The principal demands of the 
National Congress set forth by its leader D. B. Gurung 
include abolition of discrimination against the Nepalese, 
repeal of a 1959 law prohibiting further immigration into 
Bhutan, liberalization of the Maharaja's rule, and an 
increase of elected representatives in the government. 
However, the majority of Bhutanese citizens are largely 
apathetic toward political issues. Living standards ar@ 
better than those of neighboring countries, there are no
overcrowded and impoverished settlements, and almost all
12families possess their own lands. The fact remains that 
Bhutan is essentially an absolute monarchy.
12 "Bhutan," Embassy of India, p. 5i "Background 
Notes--Bhutan," Department of State Bulletin 8334, p. 3«
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SIKKIM
Geography
Sikkim lies in the North-East Himalayas, bordered
by Nepal in the west, Tibet in the north, India in the
south, and Bhutan in the east. The country is situated
on the shortest route between the Tibetan plateau and the 
13Indian plains. The almost rectangularly shaped country
occupies an area of 2 ,7^5 square miles and is 70 miles
long and kO miles wide. In the north it stretches up to
the great Himalayan range, which is the watershed between
Tibet and Sikkim. In the east, the Oongya Range stands
between Sikkim and the chumbi valley of Tibet. This range
has a number of passes, the most famous of which are Nathu
la and Jelep la, just over l4,000 feet. In the south
there is no natural feature between Sikkim and India,
except in the center of the boundary where it runs along
the Tista and Rangit Rivers.
Cardamon, which is one of the most important
Sikkimese exports, is grown in this sector, and Singhik
and rice are grown in the lower Tista and Rangpo valleys.
The southwestern quarter of Sikkim is the most fertile,
l4due to the Rangit River and its tributaries. Sikkimese
13,Doig Desmond, "Sikkim," National Geographic 
Magazine, Vol. 123, no. 3, March 19^3» p. 407.
G. V, Shukla, "Sikkim," Information Service of 
India (Washington: Embassy of India, February 1969),
pp. 2-3.
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oranges, rice, pulse, wheat, barley, apples, potatoes, 
paddy and buckwheat are grown here. Domestic animals 
include cattle, buffalo, yak, sheep, goats, pigs, mules 
and poultry. Sikkim also has deposits of copper, coal, 
graphite, gypsum and iron.^^
Demography
Persons of Nepalese origin make up an estimated 65  
to 80 percent of the population. The remainder is com­
prised largely of Bhote, some Lepcha and a few strongly 
Indian-Influenced groups on the southern frontier, such 
as the Tharu (Mechi subgroup), Ohimal and Rajbansi. None 
of these ethnic groups is found exclusively within the 
borders of Sikkim.
As in Nepal these varied ethnic communities fall 
into two large groupings on the basis of cultural orienta­
tion: those influenced by Tibetan culture and those
influenced by Indian culture. The Indian oriented group, 
by far the larger, is made up almost exclusively of persons 
of recent Nepalese extraction whose ancestors entered 
Sikkim within the past century.
Nepali is spoken with varying degrees of fluency 
by nearly everyone. It is the common medium of communi­
cation not only among the Nepalese but also between them 
auid the Bhote and Lepcha, each of which has a native tongue
l^Desmond. "Sikkim, " National Geographic Maga^ne,
p. h 0 7 •
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of its own. The use of English, however, is being en­
couraged by the current Maharaja.
Considerable discord has existed between the Hindu 
settlers of Nepal and the country's Bhote and Lepcha 
groups. The Nepalese tend to feel that the government 
does not adequately represent their interests as the 
largest element in the population and resent the discrimina­
tion practiced against them. Nepalese settlers traditionally 
have not been allowed to become village headman and for 
some time have been forbidden by law to settle north of 
the Dikchu River, above Gangtok. They can apply for 
citizenship only after 15 years’ residence, and their 
citizenship can be revoked at any time by the Maharaja 
for disloyalty to or dissatisfaction with the monarch.
Only about one-third of the people are adherents 
of Tibetan or Lamaist Buddhism, the state religion. The 
remainder are Hindus who undoubtedly have retained the 
beliefs and practices that characterize the popular religion 
of their caste or ethnic group in Nepal, including their 
own form of shamanism.
The present Maharaja, Palden Thondup Namgyal, is 
a strong supporter of the Buddhist faith, deeply interested 
in preserving its cultural and moral influence on the life
Foreign Affairs Studies Division, Special Opera­
tions Research Office, The American University, "U.S. Army 
Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," pp. 370- 
371.
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of the country. In October 1958 he founded the Naragyal 
Institute of Tibetology at Gangtok, with the aim of pro­
moting research and knowledge of Buddhism, particularly 
in its Tibetan form. He is also president of the Mahabodhi 
Society--an Indian organization devoted to the propagation 
of Buddhism.
Political History 
The Lepcha migrants from the Assam hills, are 
thought to be the earliest inhabitants of Sikkim. Definite 
control by the Tibetans was acquired during the first half 
of the 1 7th century when several lamas fled from the 
Chinese in Tibet. They made Buddhist lamaism the state
religion of Sikkim and established government under a
10Tibetan King, Pencho Namygal in l64l. The boundaries 
of the country fixed at the tima of Namygal*s coronation, 
extended beyond their present outlines on the east across 
the Chumbi Valley to the Ha Valley of Bhutan, on the south 
to the plains of India just below Darjeeling and Kalimpong, 
and on the west across the Ilam province of Nepal. During 
the eighteenth century, Sikkim was attacked first from the 
east, later from the west, and lost much of its territory. 
The Bhutanese invaders struck during the reign of the third
^^Ibid.. p. 3 7 2.
18Foreign Affairs Studies Division, Special Opera­
tions Research Office, The American University, "U.S. Army 
Area Handbook for Nepal (with Sikkim and Bhutan)," p. 3o9«
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Maharaja Chakdor Namgyal, who ascended to the throne in 
1 7 0 0. Having occupied the country and forced the Maharaja 
to flee to Lhasa, they were eventually expelled with Tibetan 
help, but the terms of the settlement allowed the Bhutanese 
to retain the Kalimpong area. The Bhutanese attacked again 
in 1 7 8 0 , but this time were turned back.
Greater territorial losses were suffered by Sikkim 
as a result of the Gorkha invasion of the late l8th cen­
tury, when the Nepalese conquerors seized the entire
western and southern portions of Sikkim, up to the banks
19of the Tista River. Sikkim remained a Tibetan dependency 
until the end of the l8th century when British expansion 
in India changed the situation. Under a British Nepalese 
Treaty (1 8 1 6) Nepal was obliged to return the Terai or 
submontane portion of Sikkim to the Sikkimese. In l8l7* 
the Treaty of Titalia signed between Britain and Nepal, 
established the current boundary between Sikkim and Nepal.
To safeguard its interests the Government of British India 
in 1861 imposed the Treaty of Tumlong under which Sikkim 
was forced to recognize British authority and responsi­
bility in its internal and foreign affairs. An annual 
subsidy of 3,000 Indian Rupees was also paid the Maharaja 
by the terms of the treaty. In 1 S9O, the British in 
a convention with the Chinese acquired conclusive
^^G. V. Shukla, "Sikkim," Information Service of
x n a x a ,  p .  6 .
ko
acknowledgement of Britain's protectorship of Sikkim and 
the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim was formally de­
limited. A British political officer was appointed to
20"assist the Maharaja." In 19^7» after independence, 
India "inherited" the responsibilities of the British in 
Sikkim, and in 1950, India entered into a new treaty with 
the Kingdom. The treaty makes India responsible for 
Sikkim's external affairs, defense and strategic communi­
cation. Just as in the British period, India by treaty,
has a representative permanently resident in Gangtok,
21the capital.
Contemporary Political Scene 
An Indian-appointed dewan (quasi-prime minister) 
shares power with Maharaja Palden Thondup. The Maharaja 
is assisted by an executive council and by a state council 
whose 20 members are partly elected and partly appointed 
by the Maharaja. The subjects which the members of the
state council are permitted to discuss are restricted, and
22the Maharaja retains a veto over all their decisions.
Sildcim has five political parties. These include:
a. Sikkim State Congress
2°Tbid.
“^"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," issued in 
Gangtok on December 5» 1950* Texts of Documents, 1947-1964, 
Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 170.
22Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. , p. S08.
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b. Sikkim National Party
c. Sikkim National Congress
d. Sikliim Rajya Praja Sammelan
23e. Sikkim Scheduled Caste League.
The popular opposition to the vaguely defined legislative, 
judicial and administrative powers accorded by the Maharaja 
to large landholders created the basis for Sikkim's first 
widespread political movement. A coalition of three 
political groups on December 3» 194? formed the Sikkim 
State Congress Party, an offshoot of the Indian National 
Congress. The group composed largely of young Nepalese 
pressed for three major reforms; a) abolition of the 
landlord system, b) formation of a democratic government 
with the Maharaja as constitutional monarch, and c) admis­
sion of Sikkim to the Republic of India, but with reten­
tion of internal autonomy.
The Sikkim National Party, financed largely by 
the Maharaja, represents the Bhote and Lepcha communities 
and favors retention of the Maharaja's powers as sovereign 
head of state. The Sikkim Raja Praja Sammelan Party is 
composed almost entirely of Nepalese who favor dethronement
of the Maharaja and tightening ties with India as a means
24of acquiring increased recognition in government.
V. Shukla, "Sikkim," Information Service of
India, p. 4.
24Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American 
University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan 
and Sikkim)," pp. 385-386.
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The Sikkim National Congress was formed by dissi­
dents from former Sikkim National Party and Sikkim State 
Congress members. This group expresses somewhat radical 
political aims and demands a broad based elected govsrn-
25
ment.
In 19581 the strength of the State Council was 
raised from 17 to 20 seats which were distributed as 
follows ;
Bhutias and Lepchas 6 seats
Nepalese 6 seats
Nominees of the Maharaja 6 seats
Monasteries 1 seat
General seat 1 seat
In November I9 6 2 , the Silckim People’s Consultative
Committee was created by the Maharaja with a view to
organizing the people's participation in strengthening the
security of Sikkim. The Consultative Committee consists
of l4 members of the Sikkim National Party, 5 from the
Sikkim State Congress, 12 from the Sikkim National Congress,
1 from the Scheduled Caste League, 1 from the Sikkim Rajya
Praja Sammelan, 2 members from the Christian Community,
3 Indians and one official representative. The committee
meets monthly under the chairmanship of the Principal 
Administrative Officer.
2*5
'Karan, The Himalayan Kingdom, p. 75*
V, Shukla. "Siklcim." Information Service of
India, p. 4.
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The Indian dewan is nominated by India and has now
become an essential part of the kingdom's administrative
machinery. As prime minister he is the chief adviser to
the Maharaja. There is also an Indian financial adviser,
chief engineer, and an Indian director of the state dis-
27tillery--an important source of revenue.
The Executive Council, State Council and People's 
Consultative Committee, are advising bodies only, with 
final judgment power in all cases retained by the Maharaja.
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide 
background information about each of the Himalayan kingdoms 
including geography, demography, political history, and 
the contemporary political scene. Chapter III is designed 
to furnish an understanding of the genesis of the current 
relations of India with those countries and the role of 
Communist China in helping to promote these relationships.
G. V. Shukla, "Bhutan and Sikkim," Information 
Service of India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim,
July 5, I9 6W, pp. 14-15»
CHAPTER III
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES INVOLVING COIiMUNIST CHINA, 
INDIA AND THE HIMALAYAN KINGDOMS
Chinese claims and designs on portions of the 
Himalayan region and India itself have had a profound 
impact upon the relations of India with Bhutan, Sikkim 
and Nepal. The treaties and foreign relations which 
India has established with each of these nations has been 
to a large degree a response to Chinese aggressions and 
designs in the himalayan area and portions of Indian 
territory. China has been instrumental in instigating 
the very relationships upon which the classification 
scheme depends. Some elucidation of Chinese activities 
and ambitions in the area is thus essential.
China has exercised preponderance over many parts 
of Asia in the past two thousand years. Invariably, 
Chinese rulers became expansionists whenever China had a 
strong central government. The Chinese viewed China as 
the center of world civilization and felt a sense of 
mission to civilize the "barbarian" peoples surrounding 
China. The concept of sovereign equality among nations
44
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was entirely alien to traditional Chinese leaders until 
the end of the Manchu dynasty. Many small Asian nations 
were at one time or another tributary states of the 
Chinese Empire.^ Like Tibet, Nepal was at one time a 
contributory state of China, and Sikkim and Bhutan were 
tributaries of Tibet. In his dispatch to the Secretary 
of the government of Bengal dated April 8, I8 6I, Ashley 
Eden, the British Envoy and Special Commissioner to Sikkim, 
wrote: "Nepal is tributary to China, Tibet is tributary
2to China, and Sikkim and Bhutan are tributary to Tibet."
The 1 9 5 0 Invasion of Tibet 
Tibet and Nepal were both successfully invaded 
during the Manchu dynasty. Tibet was invaded in 1?20 by 
Chinese imperial armies and compelled to allow the sta­
tioning of Manchu garrisons within the country.
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was thus established. 
When the Manchu Empire became corrupt and began faltering, 
it was unable to give Tibet effective protection against 
the 1855 Gurkha invasion. China's tributary states of 
Burma, Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan were made dependents of 
Great Britain. Tibet was invaded by a British expeditionary 
force in 1904, but under the Anglo-Russian convention
*George P. Jan, Government of Communist China (San 
Francisco: Chandler, 1 9 6 6), p. 5 6I.
O
P. C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy (Bloom­
ington; Indian University Press, I9 6 2), p. 154.
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influence and stipulated that neither Russia nor Great
3
Britain would send representatives to Lhasa. In Oct­
ober 1 9 1 3 t a conference was held in Simla at which the 
Chinese Republic, Tibet and Great Britain were represented. 
The convention provided for a division of Tibet for admin­
istrative purposes into two sections, Inner Tibet and 
Outer Tibet. Inner Tibet was to be administered by China 
while Outer Tibet was to be autonomous. China repudiated 
the action of its commissioners and never signed this 
agreement. It was signed, however, by British and Tibetan 
representatives on July 3* 1914,^
Britain transferred to India its relations with 
Tibet in 194? and a British mission in Lhasa and two 
trading agencies were taken over by Indian representa­
tives. Chinese Communist troops invaded Tibet in October 
1950. India condemned the Chinese invasion and asserted 
its determination to protect the border states of Sikkim, 
Bhutan and Nepal.^
An agreement signed between the two nations in 
May 1951 recognized the Dalai Lama as spiritual and
^Tsepan W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet a Political History 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 19^7), pp. 205, 223*
Ibid., pp. 246-259*
^"The Defense of India's Northern Borders," India 
Quarterly. Vol* XXII, No. 1, January-March I9 6 6 , p* 3 6.
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temporal ruler but made Tibet virtually a Chinese province. 
In March 1959» autonomous government in Tibet was sup­
pressed by Communist China, and the Dalai Lama fled to 
India.^ The Tibetan rebellion and Chinese suppression 
stirred Indian public opinion. There had always been 
historical and sentimental ties between India and Tibet.
The Indian outcry infuriated Peking and the chain of 
events thereafter was one of accusation and counter-
7
accusation. The Chinese government and press remained 
silent about the development in Tibet until March 28, 
when it was announced that the Tibetan Local government 
had been dissolved by the Central Government in Peking.
It stated that a rebellion had broken out in Lhasa on 
March 10, 1959» which had been inspired by imperialists 
and reactionaries. Tifo points in the Chinese statement 
affected India. In the first place it was alleged that 
the Tibetan rebellion was being directed from Indian soil. 
Secondly a reference to Tibetan developments in the Indian 
Parliament was characterized as interference in the Internal
o
affairs of China. The suggestion that the Tibetan rebel­
lion had been conducted from the territory of India was
^George Ginsburgs, Communist China and Tibet (The 
Hague: Martinus Nyhoff Press, 1964), p. 117.
^Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World (New 
York: Praeger, I9 6 6 ), p. 1 9 0.
O
S.C.Se, "Indian Reactions to the Crisis in Tibet,"
1 ^  1 C  7 V T / C  T «««* M  n C  Q  O  O
vwh wk. V» v / f  V  (AA.XO f JL. 7  ÿF ^  jgf m ^  Zf ^
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prcnsptly disavowed by Prirne Minister Nehru. On March 30, 
1959» the Prime Minister said that Parliament certainly 
had the right to discuss any topic it considered proper, 
though it might be difficult for people trained in a 
different tradition to understand the way of parliament­
ary democracy. On April 3» the Lok Sabha was informed 
that in response to his own request, the Dalai Lama
n
had been granted political asylum in India.
All the major political parties of India with 
the exception of the Communist Party condemned the Chi­
nese action in Tibet. The Government had been quite 
restrained in its references to developments in Tibet, 
and this restraint was generally reciprocated by the 
Indian press and public. The Chinese government and 
press, however, maintained that the Dalai Lama was under 
duress in India, and also levelled charges that India 
had "expansionist aims" with regard to Tibet.
In a statement to Parliament on August 25, 1959» 
Prime Minister Nehru declared that India would go to the 
defense of Bhutan and Sikkim if they were attacked by any 
foreign power. The Prime Minister stated: "We know that
it is our responsibility to defend them in case of any
Ibid., p. 24c. 
l°Ibid.. pp. 244-245.
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a t t a c k . M a r s h a l  Chon Yi, foreign minister of Commu­
nist China, speaking at a North Vietnamese National Day 
reception at which the Indian Ambassador and Premier Chou 
En-Lai were present on September 3, 1959, replied to the 
Indian statement. Tlie Foreign Minister stated: "In inter­
national affairs, we (China) always stand for settlement
12of disputes between nations through peaceful negotiations."
In the same speech the Foreign Minister accused 
India of imperialistic aims toward Tibet and the Himalayan 
Kingdoms.
The Sino-Indian Border Disputes
After the occupation of Tibet, there followed the
13problem of the demarcation of the Sino-Indian frontier.
The Chinese border with India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim
extends along the formidable mountain barrier of the
Himalayas, inaccessible to motorized traffic and crossed
l4only by a few caravan routes.
Hardly had excitement over Tibet subsided than a 
much more serious situation affecting India's northern
"Nehru Asserts India Has Duty to Defend Bhutan 
and Sikkim," New York Times. Vol. CVTII, No. 37,104, 
August 26, 1959, pp. 1, 6 .
12"Red China Denies Any Encroaching," New York 
Times « Vol. CVIII, No. 37,112, September 3, 1959, p=
^^Guy Wint, Communist China's Crusade (New York: 
Praeger, 1 9 6 5), p. 93.
^^Chiao-Min Hshieh, China Ageless Land and Count­
less People (New York: Van Nostran^, p. 5«
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frontier developed. For some years, Indian opinion had 
been disturbed by Chinese maps depicting parts of Indian 
territory as belonging to Communist China, a subject on 
which correspondence had taken place between the two Gov­
ernments. In the northeast, the border, according to India, 
followed what was known as the McMahon Line, which was 
fixed at a meeting in Simla in 191^ between representa­
tions of the Governments of India, China, and Tibet under 
the Chairmanship of Sir Henry McMahon. Tlie agreement, 
however, was later repudiated by China, who refused to 
ratify it on the ground that it was an unfair arrangement 
imposed on a weak China. Accordingly, the concordance 
was signed only by the British and Tibetan representatives.^^ 
In the northwest, the border of Ladakh, a barren and moun­
tainous part of Kashmir, was examined in l84? by a joint 
commission of British, Indian, Chinese and Tibetan offi­
cials, but the Chinese merely said it was too well known 
to require definition and the Indian Government recognized 
it as "that fixed from ancient times."
If the invasion and suppression of Tibet by China 
disenchanted the Government of India, and placed a great 
strain on Sino-Indian relations, the massive Chinese 
invasion of October 20, 1962 severed all effective rapport 
between the two nations. Although the Indian Government
^^Alastan Lamb, The McMahon Line (London: Raut-
ledae fie Kejzan Paul, 196677" on. 507-566.
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like the British before independence was prepared to 
recognize Chinese overlordship over Tibet, that govern­
ment had been greatly concerned about Chinese expansion 
along the Himalayan border immediately after the Chinese 
invasion of Tibet.
On October 20, 1 9 6 2 , China launched a full scale 
attack on two fronts in Ladakh and in the NEFA, and quickly 
seized much of the border territory it had earlier claimed, 
especially in the northwestern Sector. The Government of 
India sent an urgent request to the United States and 
Britain for military aid. Both responded quickly.
On November 2 1 , 1962, the Chinese Government issued 
a statement to foreign correspondents announcing a cease­
fire from November 22, 196 2 and that beginning on Decem­
ber 1, 1 9 6 2 , Chinese "frontier guards" would withdraw to 
positions 20 kilometers (1 2 , 5  miles) behind the lines of 
actual control which existed between China and India on 
November 7$ 1959. China also announced that she would 
take unilateral action even if there were no response from 
the Government of I n d i a . S h e  called upon India to nego­
tiate. But India had refused to accept Peiping's terms 
unless the Chinese forces pulled back to the line of 
September 8 , I9 6 2 , which China had seized in late 1959
S. H. Ahmend, "Chronology of the Sino-Indian 
Border Dispute," International Studies, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, 
July-October I9 6 3 , p. 220.
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and India had subsequently regained some of the territory 
previously lost in Ladakh* Î-Ir, Nehru made a statement in 
the Parliament making India’s position clear:
(1 ) . * . that cease-fire and withdrawal declaration 
by China was unilateral one, but India would do 
nothing to impede the implementation of the 
cease fire declaration;
(2 ) that negotiations with China would be possible 
only on the basis of undoing the further aggres­
sion committed by the Government of China on 
Indian territory since 8 September 1962;
(3 ) that India does not agree to the so-called line
of actual control immediately prior to 8 September 
1 9 6 2 , and that on 7 November 1959, as defined by 
the Chinese Government, there is a difference of 
about 2 , 5 0 0  square miles of Indian territory
which China has occupied as a result of the ^_
aggression during the last three months. • • •
In December I9 6 2 , six nonaligned nations, Ceylon, 
Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Central Arab Republic, 
and Ghana met at Colombo to seek ways of resolving the dis­
pute between India and China. They developed proposals
for a renewal of negotiations which the Prime Minister of
Ceylon, Sirimaro Bandaranaike, took to New Delhi and Peiping, 
The essential features of the Colombo proposals were:
1. With regard to the Northwestern Sector, the 
Conference appealed for the withdrawal of both Indian and 
Chinese troops to positions 12.5 miles behind the lines of 
actual control which existed on November 7, 1959*
2. The administration of the demilitarized zone 
would be bilaterally controlled by the two governments by
l?Ibid.. p. 220.
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setting up civilizn posts* As for the Northeastern Sector, 
tho conference proposed that the line of actual control 
in the areas recognized by both governments could serve
x8as a cease-fire line to their respective positions. In 
addition, the Conference noted that two spots, Chedong 
or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area, would 
require settlement of differences of opinion about the 
line of actual control. With regard to the Middle Sector, 
the Colombo Conference asked that the status quo in this 
area should be maintained, as there had been no hostili­
ties there. India accepted the proposals after clarify­
ing them sufficiently to meet its minimum demands. despite 
vigorous non-communist political opposition in Parliament, 
which described the proposals as an offense to India’s 
honor and dignity. Peiping’s response was so conditional 
as to amount to a rejection. Apart from the Colombo 
proposals, Nehru suggested that India was prepared to 
refer these frontier disputes to the International Court 
of Justice at the Hague or to arbitration.
Despite the early withdrawal, China was now a 
confirmed enemy in India's eyes. India’s defense budget
18Upon Indian inquiry, the clarification given by 
the delegations of Ceylon, the UAR and Ghana indicated 
that the Indian forces would be free to move up to the 
McMahon line— a feature which would presumably be repug­
nant to the persistent Chinese move to repudiate the 
existing McMahon Line altogether.
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more than doubled to 1.8 billion dolors within two years, 
as New Delhi attempted to develop a military machine 
capable of facing China and Pakistan at the same time. 
India's policy against acceptance of military arms was
altered as New Delhi attempted to secure a continued flow
19of western and Soviet arms. An uneasy truce has per­
sisted which has lasted until the end of our 20 year 
period of concern.
Disputes Involving the Himalayan Kingdoms
Imperial China claimed suzerainty over Nepal,
Bhutan and Sikkim in extension of similar claims over
Tibet. Bhutan and Sikkim were described as southern
gateways to the celestial empire. The Chinese emperors
granted seals of offices and patents of investiture to
the rulers of Bhutan and Sikkim. However, they never
tried to annex these states even when their hold over Tibet
was relatively firm. In 1939, Mao Tse-tung has said:
"In defeating China in war, the imperialist states 
have taken away many Chinese dependent states. . . .  
England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong.. . ."21
To Mao, this was the first dismemberment of the
19Barnds, "India in Transition: Friends and
Neighbors," p. 554.
20Jain, Panchsheela and After. p. Ip3.
23George N. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi (London: 
Taber and Taber, I9 6 3 ), p. l49.
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Chinese empire. in 195^» Chinese officers in Tibet
proclaimed that they would before long "liberate Sikkim, 
Bhutan, Ladakh, and the NEFA, which were wrongfully being 
held by the 'Indian imperialists*’" Vital border areas 
were similarly saturated with propaganda and people were 
told in 1959 that if Tibet was the p>^ lm of China's hand, 
Bhutan, the NEFA, Sikkim, Nepal and Ladakh were its 
fingers.Presumably now that the palm was restored to 
China, the fingers must go with it. A Peking radio broad­
cast on September 3i 19^9 commenting on the dependency 
status of Bhutan with respect to India stated: "Suzerainty
stands for the dark vassal state system, the protective
system and is another name for foreign oppression and
24 _enslavement." On September lb, 1959; Peking announced:
"Under the standing influence of British imperialism, 
the bourgeoisie of India, of whom Nehru is the repre­
sentative, have learned the ways of the imperialists, 
and are harboring intentions against Tibet and Sikkim 
as well as Bhutan."25
Significantly the Chinese Communists have con­
sistently refused to discuss with India the issue of 
their frontiers with Bhutan and Sikkim. They have taken 
recourses to the pi-et ext that China regarded these as
29Dutt, China and the World, p. 30.
^^Chakravarti, India's China Policy, p. 99»
24 nJain, Panchsheela and After. p. lo.
2^Ibid.. pp. 7-8
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frontiers of peaco and friendship, though China does not 
appear to want to accept India's power to negotiate on 
behalf of Bhutan and Sikkim* Peking also has said that 
it respects the "proper relationship" between India and 
these countries. Apparently Peking reserves the right to 
decide what constitutes a "proper" relationship and will 
refuse to accept any relationship between these countries 
and India which it does not deem proper.
Nepal
Chinese travelers began writing about Nepal in the 
seventh century, and in 643 A.D, a Chinese mission visited 
Nepal for the first time.^^ Between 64o and 703 A.D.
Nepal was regarded as a vassal state of the vast Tibetan 
Empire, and as late as 1730, the small principalities of 
Nepal paid tribute to the Manchu Emperors. The Gurkha 
Kings who conquered the Katmandu valley in 1769 ceased to 
pay tribute and in I788 subjugated Tibetan territory near 
Nepal's borders. In 1791» Nepalese forces marched on 
Tibet causing the Emperor of China to send his army to 
repel the invasion. The terms of a treaty of 1792 which 
Nepal signed with China required her to send tribute to 
Peking every five years :
^^Dutt, China and the World, p. 227.
27'Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, p. 131.
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It was stipulated that Nepal's tribute status was to 
be like that of various other dependencies of China 
such as Annam, Korea, Siam and Burma, and an inscribed 
stone was set up in Lhasa to commemorate the con­
quest.2°
In 1 8 5 4 , the Gurkhas again attacked Tibet, this 
time successfully, and in the peace negotiations of I8 5 6 ,
29Tibet agreed to pay an annual tribute to China. Article 1
of the treaty states: "The Tibetan Government agrees to
pay the sum of ten thousand Rupees annually in cash to the
30Gurkha Government." This treaty also gave Nepal certain 
privileges in Tibet and regulated the rights of Nepalese
31and Tibetan merchants traveling between the two countries. 
The Tibetan tribute was paid regularly until 1953*
On September 20, 1950, Nepal and the People's 
Republic of China had signed an agreement to maintain 
friendly relations. The agreement primarily concerned 
trade and intercourse between Nepal and the "Tibet region 
of China." However, Article 111 stated: "All treaties
and documents which existed in the past between Nepal and
og
Ibid.. p. 1 3 1 . (See Appendix A for full text 
of the Treaty.)
29Pradyumna P. Karan, Nepal: A Cultural and
Physical Geography (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, 1 9 6 0 ;, p. 1 3.
^*^"Peace Treaty between Tibet and Nepal (1 8 5 6 )*” 
Texts of treaties, agreements and certain exchange of 
notes relating to the Sino-Indian Boundary: Indian Soci­
ety of International Law (New Delhi, I9 6 2 ), p. 10. (See 
Appendix B for full text of the Treaty.)
5 pp. 1 0-1 2 .
58 32the Tibet region of China are hereby abrogated»'
On August 1, 19551 Nepal and the People’s Republic
signed an agreement providing for the establishment of
diplomatic relations on the basis of Panch Shila.^^
Apparently realizing the strategic values of Nepal, China
has sought her friendship by peace missions, cultural
delegations and in aid programs. Nepalese leaders have
seemingly sought to take advantage of Nepal’s position
between India and China to balance her relations with the
34two more powerful Asian countries. On September 20, 
1 9 5 6 , a new treaty aimed at "establishing friendly rela­
tions between the Chinese People’s Republic and the King­
dom of Nepal and regulating trade between Nepal and the 
Tibetan part of China" was signed at Katmandu. Under 
this treaty Nepal lost certain privileges in Tibet and 
recognized Tibet as "an integral part of China."
Article 5, par. 2, states:
The Government of Nepal will be pleased to withdraw 
completely within s i x  months after the exchange of 
notes its military escords in Lhasa and other places 
in the Tibet Region of C h i n a . 35
32 "China - Nepal Boundary," International Boundary 
Study No. 5 0. The Geographer U.S. Dept, of State, Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research, May 30, 19&5, p. 4.
O O
(Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), Jain, 
Panchsheela and After, p. 154.
34Karan, Nepal; A Physical and Cultural Geogranhv.
p. 1 3 .
5^'*Sino-Nepal Treaty 1956," Texts of treaties, 
agreements and certain exchanges of notes relating to 
the Sino-Indian boundary, Indian Society of International 
Law (New Delhi, I9 6 2 ), p. 48.
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Nepalese nationals in the Tibet region of China . . . 
shall be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Govern­
ment of the country of residence observe the laws 
• • • pay taxes to that Government. . . .3*
Nepal, however, was given permission to trade at 
four points on Tibetan territory on condition that she 
give China similar rights on Nepalese territory.
Paragraph 2 states:
The High Contracting Parties agree that traders 
of both countries may trade at the following places:
1. The Chinese Government agrees to specify 
(l) Lhasa, (2) Shigatse, (3) Gyantse and
(4) Yatung as markets for trade;
2. The Government of Nepal agrees that when with 
the development of Chinese trade in Nepal, it has 
become necessary to specify markets for trade in 
Nepal, the Government of Nepal will specify an equal 
number of markets for trade in Nepal.37
The treaty was supplemented by an agreement on 
economic assistance signed on September 25, 1956, in 
Peking in which China was to give Nepal 60 million Indian 
rupees worth of aid, one-third to be paid in cash install­
ments and the remainder in the form of machinery and other 
goods. In January 1957» Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai 
declared during an official visit that China was prepared 
to give further economic aid to Nepal. He disclosed that 
the first cash installment of ten million rupees had been 
paid under the previous year’s agreement. Nepal received
Appendix cT7
^^Ibid.. p. 48 (for full text of the treaty see
^^Ibid., p. 64.
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a further payment of ten million rupees shortly there­
to
after. In addition to regular economic aid, the Chinese 
have made token gifts from time to time; for exampl*, in 
1 9 5 7 Chou on a state visit to Katmandu, donated 4,000 
dollars for a Buddhist shrine, and the Nepalese Premier 
received a lump sum during his official exchange visit 
to Peking.
Despite the official "friendship," the position
of Nepalese citizens in Tibet steadily worsened. In
March 1959» the Nepalese press reported that as a result
of the Tibetan uprising many of the approximately 25,000
Nepalese in Tibet were returning home. In August 1959»
Nepalese traders in Tibet were disenchanted when the
Chinese authorities declared the Tibetan currency to be
invalid and refused to listen to official and unofficial
40protests against this measure. In addition to this, 
a disagreement regarding the status of the 5 00 mile unde­
marcated line between the two countries began to cause 
difficulties.
In 1 9 5 8, the century old dispute had erupted in
38A. Kashin, "Nepal— Chinese Stepping Stone to 
India," Bulletin. Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.« 
Vol. XII, No. 7, July, 1 9 6 5» p. 2 3.
39Karan, Nepal; A Physical and Cultural Geo­
graphy. p. 1 3 .
40Kashin, "Nepal— Chinese Stepping Stone to 
India," p. 23.
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regions of Lamogabar, Kodari and Khojanat. In its second 
issue for 19.58» the Peking English language journal "Ever­
green" published a map showing the whole of Mount Everest
as being in Chinese territory. In 1959» Chinese Commu­
ainists began infiltrating into Nepal.
On August 3 0 , 1 9 5 9» the Reuters press agency 
reported that Chinese agents were distributing portraits 
of Mao Tse tung and Chou En-Lai in the northern part of 
the country, particularly among that part of the population 
ethnically related to the Tibetans. Reuters also disclosed 
that Chinese agents in the Solu Ehumbo region, not far 
from Mount Everest, were getting local inhabitants to sign 
a petition to the effect that they considered themselves 
to be Tibetans. On August 12, 1959» the Katmandu news­
paper "Motherland" reported that the Nepalese government 
had protested against such activities and on September 4a 
the Nepalese Prime Minister, Mr. B. P. Koirala, announced 
in parliament that the government was watching develop­
ments on the Tibetan frontier "very closely." Koirala 
stated that a strengthening of Nepalese frontier posts 
was in effect. On December 6, 1959» the Katmandu newspaper
"Iwatandra Samachar" announced that Chinese detachments
42had entered the western part of the country and hoisted
41Ibid.. p. 23; Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms : 
Bhutan. Sikkim, and Nepal, p. 8é.
42Kashin, "Nepal— Chinese Stepping Stone to 
India," p. 24,
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two Chinese flags. For the apparent purpose of settling 
the boundary dispute and increasing China's participation 
in Nepalese economic development, the Chinese government 
invited Koirala to Peking in March I9 6O. Koirala arrived 
in Peking on March 11, I960 for an eleven day visit.
On March 21, I9 6O, it was announced that Koirala 
had invited Chou En-Lai to Nepal to sign a treaty of 
peace and friendship which had been proposed by the Chinese. 
On the same day, the two statesmen signed a border treaty 
whose main points were as follows :
1 . In areas where the boundary line between the 
two countries was shown to be identical in the maps of 
both, the frontier was to follow that line. A special 
commission was provided for, composed of an equal number 
of persons from both sides to resolve all points of dis­
pute.
2. In cases where the maps did not agree but 
"the situation as regards actual control by one or the 
other side leaves no room for doubt," the course of the 
frontier was to be based on geographical factors such as 
waterways, valleys and mountains.
3. In cases where the maps did not agree and the 
situation as regards "actual control" was disputed, joint 
Chinese-Nepalese groups of investigators were to make an
43
Dutt, China and the World, p. 179*
63
on tho spot examination of the situation and adjust the 
frontier in accordance with the principles of "equality, 
mutual advantage, friendship and t r u s t . C h o u  En-Lai 
and Koirala also signed a new economic agreement. By the 
terms of the agreement China would give to Nepal within 
three years of its signing "a free grant" of economic 
assistance of 100 million Indian rupees without any con­
ditions of privileges attached. This was in addition to 
the 40 million rupees worth of machinery and other goods 
promised under the 1 9 5 6 economic aid agreement, and not 
yet used by the Nepalese Government. The amount, it was 
stipulated, would be spent on the acquisition of equipment, 
machinery, materials, techniques and other commodities 
from China. China also agreed to dispatch the necessary 
number of technicians and experts to help in the con­
struction of items specified under the agreement. A 
protocol signed in Katmandu on September 5, I961 mentioned 
a cement plant, a paper mill, and a leather and shoe 
factory as among the items to be constructed with Chinese 
a s s i s t a n c e . I n  1 9 6O, there were numerous incidents on 
the Nepalese-Chinese frontier. In the Mustant region, 
a Chinese armed detachment opened fire on a group of
44"Nepal-China Border Treaty, March 21, I9 6O," 
International Boundary Study No. 50. U.S. Department of 
Research, Department of State, May 30, I9 6 5 , pp. 6-7 
(for text of actual treaty see Appendix D).
China and the World, p. I80.
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Ncpalsse sent to make investigation of the border situa­
tion and arrested them» On July 2, I9 6O, Chou En-Lai 
apologized to the Nepalese government for the incident, 
explaining that the Chinese had taken the Nepalese for 
Tibetan bandits, but had handed then over to the Nepalese 
frontier authorities as soon as they had realized their 
e r r o r . O n  April 26, I9 6O, Chou En-Lai visited Katmandu 
to discuss the border dispute. A great deal of confusion 
had existed on the number of places in dispute and their 
location. Almost every discussion on the boundary listed 
three points of dispute, but the places were rarely the 
same. The Joint Commission held four sessions:
a. First, from August 12, to October 26, I96O in 
Katmandu.
b. Second, January 1, to February 15, 1961, in
Peking.
c. Third, July 31, to August 24, I9 6I, in Katmandu.
d. Fourth, October 1 to October 5, 196l, in Peking. 
Tlie Commission and its subsidiary Joint Survey
Teams produced a detailed delimitation based upon common
agreement for the entire frontier. The position of Mt*
Everest was regarded as special and was left to the heads
4?of government for decision. King Mahendra arrived in
46Kashin, "Nepal-Chinese Stepping Stone to India,"
p. 2 5.
47"China Nepal Boundary," International Boundary 
Study No. 5 0. p. 4e
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Peking on September 2 9 , I9 6I f r o m  an iS day stats visit.
In a speech at a banquet he gave in honor of the King,
Liu Shao-chi praised the King's role at a recent Belgrade
conference of nonaligned nations saying: "In the face of
foreign aggression and pressures, the heroic Nepalese
people remained firm and unyielding and always maintained
their independence and dignity, this deserves great 
kP.
admiration."
He also expressed China's pleasure that with 
regard to Tibet "Nepal firmly adhered to a correct stand 
for noninterference in China's internal affairs."
On October 5* 19^1, Liu Shao and King Mahendra 
signed a frontier agreement. The agreement allowed each 
party the right of access to the summit of Mount Everest 
and meant in effect that one half of the mountain was 
recognized to be Chinese and the other half Nepalese.
1, The complete delimitation of the boundary 
created by Joint Commission became article I.
2, Article II defined the boundary in ail streams 
as the median line and provided for the continuation of 
that line in the event of a change of river course.
3 , Article III directed the Joint Commission to 
draft a demarcation protocol to be incorporated into the
4 0
Dutt, China and the World, p. 182.
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La
treaty.*"' King Mahendra expressed his satisfaction that:
"The entire boundary line between the two coun­
tries has been formally delimited on the basis of the 
traditional, customary boundary in accordance with 
the principles of equality, mutual benefit, friendship 
and mutual accommodation. . , ,"50
A joint communique issued on October 15, 1961, by 
Mahendra and Liu Shao-chi, "agreed that national peace 
was the urgent demand of the people throughout the world 
and for this it was necessary to oppose wars of aggres­
sion.
The King supported China's rights in the U.N. and 
the Chinese reaffirmed that they fully respected the inde­
pendent policy of peace and nonalignment pursued by his 
Majesty's government of Nepal and solumnly declared that 
all nations must treat each other as equals and that "China 
would never adopt an attitude of great national chauvinism 
toward Nepal.
On October 15, 19^1, the foreign ministers of the 
two countries concluded an agreement under which China 
was to build a macadam road from the Tibetan frontier to 
Katmandu at a cost of 5,500,000 pounds sterling during
La
"Boundary Treaty between the People's Republic 
of China and Kingdom of Nepal, October 5, 1961," Inter­
national Boundary Study No. 50. p. 4. (For treaty text
see Appendix E.)
^^Outt, China and the World, p. 185.
^^Ibid.. p. 184.
^^Ibid.= n, 185.
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the period July I962 to June I966 and to extend the road
to the Tibetan capital of Lhasa« The details were reported
by Hsinhua on October 28, I9 6I, In actual fact, as Reuters
disclosed on October 29 the latter section had long been 
53completed.
On October 5» 1 9 6 2 , at the first anniversary of
the signing of the Sino-Nopalose boundary treaty Chen Yi,
Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic
of China, gave a firm pledge to Nepal on behalf of the
Chinese Government : "The Nepalese people can rest assured
that should any foreign power dare to attack Nepal, the
Chinese Government and people . . .  will stand by Nepal."
During the Sino-Indian border crisis in I9 6 2 ,
Nepal adopted an official posture of neutrality toward
the border dispute, and limited its public statements to
expressions of hope that the two countries could settle
55their differences peacefully.
On January 2 3 , I9 6 3 , the final demarcation work 
of the joint commission created by the I9 6I Sinc-Nepal 
Boundary Treaty was embodied in the Protocol. Part one
^^Kashin, "Nepal--Chinese Stepping Stone to India,"
p. 2 5.
^^"Sino-Nepalese Boundary Treaty," Peking Review. 
Vol. V, No. 4l, October 12, I9 6 2 , p. 6 .
^^"Background Notes--Nepal," U.S. Department of 
State Publication 7904, October I967 (Washington: Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1 9 6 7 )1 p. 1.
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concerned general arrangements ; part tt?o contained the 
final detailed delimitationj part three, the details of 
the erection of the demarcation pillars; part four main­
tenance of the pillars; and part five, a concluding 
section. The protocol has not been made public, as is 
apparently often typical with technical demarcation docu­
ments,^^ In 1 9 6 3 , almost 20,000 Tibetans were scattered 
along Nepal’s northern border;
Almost half of the former rebels, who fought against 
the Chinese during the 1956-59 revolt • • • should 
they become a nuisance to China in their marauding 
raids on convoys in West Tibet as they have been 
doing. • • • or should the situation in Nepal not 
develop to Peking’s liking, then the presence of 
these larger armed attacking force on Nepal’s northern 
border could give Peking the excuse it wanted to take 
direct action to absorb the country.57
In April 1 9 6 5 t China expressed willingness to pro­
vide additional economic aid for Nepal’s next five year 
plan. According to a joint communique issued at the end 
of a five day visit by the Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal 
Chen Yi and Nepal’s Foreign Minister K. N, Bosta, "The two 
countries had agreed to utilize the unallocated balance of
c O
Chinese aid for the development of transport to Nepal."
Chinese experts were to assist in the effort.
^^"China-Nepal Boundary," International Boundary 
Study No. 50. p. 5.
^^Patter-son, Peking Versus Delhi, p. 15-.
^^"China Offers Nepal New Economic Help," New 
York Times. Vol. CXIV, No. 39,152, April 4, I9 6 5 , p. 9.
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In 1 9 6 5f Nepal and China began to u s e  the rinished part 
of the Katmandu-Kodari Highway for the direct exchange 
of mail between the two countries. The exchange has 
been taking place at the village of Kodari on the Nepal- 
Tibet border. An account of alleged subversive activi­
ties being carried out in Nepal by the Chinese under the 
guise of activities permitted by the Peace and Friendship 
Treaty and the Economic Aid Agreement was given at a 
press conference in Taipei on June 26, 1964 by Huang 
Jung-Sheng. This individual was a refugee from Commu­
nist China who had graduated from the Chungking Transport 
Academy, and worked on the construction of the road from 
Tibet to Katmandu between April 1962 and April 1964. He 
said:
• • ■ the bridges along the Kodari-Katmandu road are 
secretly being built to accommodate heavy vehicles 
such as 60 metric tons rather than 8 metric tons 
specified by the Nepalese government. They are large 
enough to accommodate heavy trucks and tanks. Tech­
nical personnel working on this road have been obliged 
to spy for the Chinese military attache in Katmandu.59
The London Daily Telegraph had written on June I6 , 
1964: ”. . . the four hundred road technicians, to judge
from their unwillingness to face the camera, are probably 
military engineers.*'^—
^^Singh, "India and the Future of Asia," p. 199? 
Free China Weekly. Taipei, June 28, 1964; Kashin, "Nepal-- 
Chinese Stepping Stone to India," p. 2 5.
^^Kashin, "Nopal--Chinese Stepping Stone to India," 
p. 2 6 s Daily Telegraph London, June I6 , 1964; Singh, India 
and the Future of Asia, p. 200.
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The Times of India unofficially reported on July 28, 
1964 that the presence of Chinese workers in Nepal was being 
used to smuggle small arms into the country. Relations 
between the People's Republic of China and Nepal remained 
overtly friendly and cooperative through December 1967*
On June 26, 1966, Nepalese Crown Prince Birendra Bir Bikram 
Shah Deva visited China at the invitation of the Peking 
Government. Referring to "the deep friendship" between 
the Chinese and Nepalese peoples. Vice Premier Chen Yi 
said: " . . .  Today, the relations between our two coun­
tries, based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, 
have become still closer and more friendly than before.
The Nepalese crown prince praised the People's 
Republic of China for the significant progress it had 
achieved in economic and other spheres under the leader­
ship of the Chinese people's great leader Mao Tse tung.
"He refuted the 'two Chinas' doctrine, dismissing it as 
rediculous.
Also in 1 9 6 6 China completed a survey for another 
road to be built by the Chinese joining Katmandu with the 
Nepalese town of Pokra. The highway linking Katmandu 
with Lhasa remained under construction. Through December 
1 9 6 7» Nepal continued its apparent policy of seeking to
^^"Nepalese Crown Prince Visiting China," Peking 
Review. Vol. 9, No. 28, July 9» 1966, p. 43.
*^Ibid.. p. 4 3 .
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maintain a balance between India and China* seemingly
attempting to develop and maintain a policy of close and
61friendly relations with both. In May I967 the highway 
between Kodari and Katmandu had been completed. King 
Mahendra cut the ribbon for the highway at an impressive 
ceremony on May 2 6 , 19&7 marking its completion.China 
has also agreed to construct a hydro-electric project 
yielding 10,000 kilowatts on the Sun Kosi River in east­
ern Nepal. Despite the official cooperation and friend­
ship between the two nations, a dissatisfaction of at 
least certain segments of the Nepalese populace with the 
Chinese regime was evidenced in Katmandu on July 2, 196? 
when Nepalese students pulled down a Chinese flag and 
burned pictures of Mao Tse tung that were on display at 
a Chinese stall in a local trade exhibit.
Bhutan
No formal diplomatic relations exist between 
Bhutan and the People's Republic of China. By the 19^9 
Treaty of Friendship between the Government of India, 
Bhutan has agreed to be guided by the "advice" of India
"Background Notes Nepal," p. 3»
^^"China Nepal Friendship Highway Completed," 
Peking Review. Vol. 10, No. 23, June 2, 1 9 6 7 » p. 46.
^^"Demonstrations in Nepal," New York Times. 
Vol. CXVI, No. 3 9 ,9 7 2 , July 3, I9 6 7 , p. 3.
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r r
in foreign affairs m a t t e r s . H e n c e  all formal diplomatic 
messages between the People’s Republic and Bhutan go 
through the India Foreign Office. Article 2 of the treaty 
permits India to control Bhutan's foreign relations and 
much of its defenses.
Between the seventh and tenth centuries the ter­
ritory known as Bhutan was completely overrun by Tibetans. 
In 1 7 2 0 a Chinese imperial army invaded Tibet and estab­
lished suzerainty over both Tibet and Bhutan. After the 
defeat of the Dzungarian Mongols, one of the Tibetan 
ministers appointed by the Chinese had extended his con­
quest into Bhutan, and claimed suzerainty over it for 
China. Overlordship was officially accepted by the Chi­
nese emperor in 1728. The Government of Bhutan thence­
forth was required to pay an annual tribute to China 
through Tibet as an intermediary.^®
On November 11, I863 Bhutan had signed a treaty 
with Britain, ceding to that nation the althara passes 
in the foothills, as well as those in Assam, Bengal and 
eastern Bhutan. Bhutan also agreed to British mediation 
in disputes between Bhutan and the tribal chiefs of
"Text of Indian-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship," 
Issued in Darjeeling on August 8, 1949# Texts of Documents, 
Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, I9 6 3 , p. 4.
G^Ibid.. p. 5.
®®Patterson, Peking versus Delhi. pp. 200-207.
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Cooch-Behar, and Sikklin. Tlie treaty negotiations pro­
ceeded without the participation of the Chinese or
Tibetan governments, thereby weakening their claim to 
69suzerainty. The definitive end of that suzerainty came
in January I9IO when King Ugyen of Bhutan signed the Punakha
Treaty with Britain. This treaty provided that Bhutan's
foreign relations were to be guided by the advice of the 
70British. The Tibetan-Bhutanese boundary is undefined. 
Here, the customary boundary follows the crest of the 
Great Himalayan Range which is also the watershed in this 
section, but China does not recognize this traditional 
watershed boundary as valid. The Chinese claim about 
300 square miles of northeastern Bhutan and a substantial 
area to the north of Punakha, the old Bhutanese capital.
The Chinese claim is based mainly on ethnic similarity 
with Tibet. In the Bhutan Himalayas, people have settled 
up to the water parting of the rivers and, since ancient 
times, the watershed range has served to separate the 
sphere of influence of the Bhutanese principality from 
the northern Tibetan tribes. The watershed range (the 
crest of the Great Himalaya) has thus evolved in Bhutan 
as the frontier with Tibet through settlement, custom,
60
"Singh, India and the Future of Asia, on. 201-
202.
^^"Backgroxind Notes— Bhutan, " p. 1.
7k
7Xand tradition. Discussing the Himalayan boundaries, 
the preface to the report of the Pamir Boundary Commis­
sion of 189 5 states that!
. . .  geographically, politically and ethnographic- 
ally watersheds . . .  are the only true and stable 
boundaries in these regions. . . .  the possession 
up to the headwaters of each system by one people 
constitutes the only frontier that has survived the 
lapse of t i m e . 72
Soon after the communists came to power, they 
published various maps of the Himalayan frontier region 
on which the southern boundary included large areas such 
as the Tashi Gang Ozong district in northeastern Bhutan 
and a sizable strip of territory in northwestern Bhutan 
as being within Chinese territory. The New York Times 
reported in May 1954 that "maps recently have been pub­
lished in Peiping showing parts of Nepal, Bhutan and
Assam on the northern borders of India as belonging to
73Communist China.
In October 1954 when Prime Minister Nehru ques­
tioned the Chinese leader Chao En-Lai regarding the maps, 
Chao replied that they were only reproductions of old "pre
71Pradyumna P. Karan, "Sikkim and Bhutan: A
Geographical Appraisal," The Journal of Geography, Vol. 
LX, No. 2, February, I9 6I, pp. 5 8-6 5.
^^fieport on the Proceedings of the Pamir Bound­
ary Commission," Government of Calcutta4 India, 189?.
73"Maps published in Peiping show Parts of Nepal, 
Bhutan and Assam as belonging to China," New York Times, 
Vol. CIII, No. 3 5 ,1 7 0 , May 10, 1954, p. 15.
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liberation maps" and that his government had not had time 
to revise them.
In May 1955t thirty-two Indian labor leaders 
affiliated with the Indian National Trade Union Congress 
visited China for the Annual May Day celebration. They 
reported seeing a map hung on an office wall in Shanghai 
showing as a part of China, the kingdoms of Bhutan and 
N e p a l . M a p s  published in 1958 and I9 6O by Peking con­
tinued to show large tracts of Bhutanese territory as 
part of Tibet.
In July 1 9 5 8, these were published in the "China 
Pictorial" and also in the Soviet "New Times.
On August 21, 1 9 5 8, the government of India 
addressed a note "drawing the attention of the Govern­
ment of the People's Republic of China again to this 
matter." The rote asserted:
In appears that the entire Tashi gang area of Eastern 
Bhutan and a considerable portion of territory in 
northwest Bhutan have also been included as Chinese
territory. 78
In a memorandum given by the foreign office of
^^Indian White Paper I (1954-1959), p. 49,
M, Rosenthal, "Indian Labor Men Rebuff Red 
China," New York Times. Vol. CIV, No. 35,547, May 22,
1 9 5 5. p. 1 0.
^^Background Notes--Bhutan," p. 3.
"^^Chakravarti, India's China Policy, p. 6 7 .
7 V £  ^ 0  ^0m t. .0 ^  ^\xnaxan wnxxe raper ju p# 'to.
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China to the counsellor of India dated November 5» 195o,
Peking replied:
The Chinese Government has not yet undertaken a sur­
vey of China’s boundary, nor consulted with the coun­
tries concerned, and that it will not make changes 
in the boundary on its own.’°
In a letter from Prime Minister Nehru to the
Prime Minister of China dated î-îareh 22, 19591 the Prime
Minister again warned that the continuing publication of
Chinese maps "showing considerable parts of India and
Bhutanese territory as if they were in China," was not
in accordance with long established usage as well as
treaties and "is a matter of great concern to us." The
Prime Minister warned that it would be most unfortunate
if the frontier question were to adversely effect the
"friendly relations" existing between India and the
80People's Republic. In early August 1959» China occu­
pied eight villages within the Tibet region of China 
over which Bhutan had been exercising administrative con­
trol for more than 300 years. The villages had been pre­
viously immune to Tibetan law and taxes. In an August 19» 
1959 note given to the Foreign Office of China by the 
Government of India, at the request of the Government of 
Bhutan, India protested the seizure. The note also 
decried that the local Chinese authorities had "seized
79lbid.. p. 47. 
An
Ibid:: p= 57:
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all arms, ammunitions and ponies belonging to the Bhutan
officers who were in charge of these enclaves at the vil-
8llage of Tarchen."
The Indian Government urged that the Peking 
leaders return the articles and animals and to "ensure 
respect in the future by the local authorities for Bhutan's
82jurisdiction over the villages."
In an August 20, 1959 note given to the Foreign 
Office of China by the Government of Indian on behalf of 
the Government of Bhutan, India charged alleged mal­
treatment of Bhutanese courriers crossing through Tibetan 
territory. The note asserted:
The Government of India who are responsible for the 
external relations of Bhutan protest against the 
arrest and ill-treatment of Bhutan's courriers and 
against restrictions being placed without notice on 
Bhutan nationals. In particular we protest against 
Bhutan courriers being prevented from approaching the 
Indian trade agency.®^
The Indian note alleged that the system of Bhutan 
courriers crossing through Tibetan territory had been 
prevalent traditionally for a long time and no regula­
tions were prescribed requiring permission or possession 
of any special kind of papers. Asked in August 1959 
about recent Chinese assertions that Bhutan is a part
^^Ibid., p. 9 6. 
G^Ibid.. p. 9 6. 
^^Ibid.. p. 9 7.
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"If they (the Chinese) try to take over Bhutan, we will
OK
stand and fight,"
On August 31» 1 9 5 9 » 400 armed Chinese Communists 
invaded several square miles of Bhutanese territory. Fol­
lowing the "invasion" Prime Minister Nehru charged Com­
munist China with penetration of Indian territory. The 
Indian leader told Parliament that Chinese troops had 
penetrated Indian border regions at two points opposite 
Tibet in recent weeks and that an Indian checkpoint was 
in Chinese hands. Mr. Nehru also made it clear that he 
had no intention of going to war with Communist China 
"over bits of jungle in northeastern India." Asked by 
members of the Indian Parliament what the government pro­
posed to do about the Communist intrusion» Mr. Nehru 
replied: "Send more reminders. We hope this will be
settled by discussions and conferences, and we do not
Û C
propose to go to war."
This was in contrast with his statement of August 
2 8 » 195 9 that "India had no alternative but to defend out 
borders," and that "any aggression against Bhutan and
86Sikkim will be considered an aggression agains India."
84"Bhutanese Criticizes China," New York Times, 
Vol. CVIII, No. 37,102, August 24, 1959» p. 4.
85«Thrust in Bhutan by Reds Reported," New York 
Times. Vol. CVIII, No. 37,110, September 1, 1959, p. 1.
~~Ibid., p. 10.
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India was obviously retreating from its earlier statement.
In a letter from the Prime Minister of China to
the Prime Minister of India, dated September 8 , 1959,
China added another dimension to the discussion:
The boundary between China and Bhutan . . .  does not 
fail within the scope of our present discussions;
. . .  China has always respected the 'proper'8?
relationship between tiieui (Bhutan and Silvîciîn) and 
India. 8 8
India replied in disagreement:
The rectification of errors of Chinese maps regarding 
the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a 
matter which has to be discussed along with the bound­
ary of India.89
In a note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of China to the Embassy of India in China dated December
26, 1959, China stated that with regard to Bhutan China
had every intention of living in friendship with that
nation and had no intentions of aggression against that
country. The Chinese note went on to say:
. . .  concerning the boundary between China and Bhu­
tan, there is only a certain discrepancy between 
the delimitation of the maps of the two sides in 
the sector south of the so-called McMahon line.9
For centuries there had been trade between Tibet
8 7The quotations are the writer’s.
88
p. 29<
p. 77.
White Paper 11 (September-November 1959)$
89 Ibid., p. 41.
^^Indian Wîiite Paper 111 (Nov. 1959-March I9 6O),
8o
and Bhutan. An average cf 20,000 tens of rice %ere_ sold
91to Tibet annually. In addition to rice, Bhutan's
chief exports to Tibet consisted of fine fabrics, vege-
92table dyes, and brass utensils.
Bhutanese merchants brought back salt, soda, wool, 
and Chinese silver dollars from Tibet in exchange. During 
the late 1930's the Chinese had forced the Bhutanese to 
accept paper currency which was worthless in Bhutan. A 
constant harassment of Bhutanese traders also ensured.
As a result of the border dispute and other abuses, in 
1959» Bhutan stopped all trade with Tibet. Bhutan with­
drew its trade representatives from Lhasa in I9 6O. Now
93only a trickle of refugees pass between the two countries. 
The Bhutanese economy suffered initially because of the 
stoppage of trade with Tibet. Premier Dorji announced 
in i960 that the price of rice had dropped "practically
in half" to ten to fifteen rupees ($2-@3 ) a mound (8 2 lbs.).
q L
The rice price had risen from 150 to I80 rupees in Tibet. 
India now provides an export market for Bhutanese rice and 
other Bhutanese exports.^^ In I9 6O, Peking published still
^^"Bhutan Bars Tibet Trade," New York Times «
Vol. CIX, No. 3 7 ,3 8 6, June 3» I960, p. k t  Karan, Bhutan, 
p . 8 1 .
Karanf Bhutan♦ p. 8l 
^^Ibid.. p. 11; New York Times, June 3» I9 6O, p. 4. 
^^New York Times. June 3» I960, p. 4.
O K
'■'Karan, Bhutan. p. bl.
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another map showing Bhutan %*ithin CcRununist China = Mean- 
•while during a major propaganda effort mounted in Lhasa, 
senior Chinese army officers and civilian officials 
threatened to "liberate" Bhutan and other Himalayan fron­
tier states "■wrongfully held by imperialist India," and 
suggested that military actions might be taken to occupy 
these areas, Bhutan had set up armed guards at check 
posts on the Chinese border and declared that "if there 
is any violation of the border area we will certainly 
fight."9*
Bhutan is more vulnerable to infiltration than
Nepal, and Sikkim. Fourteen passes leading into Bhutan
from Tibet make the kingdom more accessible to the Chi-
97nese than to the Indians.
A road from Lhasa to the Bhutanese border north
of Thunkar was completed in I9 6 5. Also, there are in
Tibet incarnates of the Shabdungs, once powerful Dharma
Rajas. The reverence in which they are held by the
98Bhutanese could be exploited by the Chinese. The 
Maharaja of Bhutan and his acting Prime Minister Jlgme 
Dorji visited Delhi in February I9 6I. While in Calcutta
9*Ibid., p. 11.
97"Remote Bhutan Is Vital to India as a Passage 
to Frontier Areas," New York Times, Vol. CXII, No. 38*256, 
October 26, 1962, p. 7-
98Karan, Bhutan, p. 21.
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they announced at a press conference that China had been
in touch with them, offering aid for development projects
as well as recognition of her sovereignty and diplomatic
recognition abroad. In September 1 9 6 2 , new Soviet atlases
issued at the time showed India's international border
to be south of Sikkim and Bhutan, instead of north of
99these principalities as India claimed. During official 
talks at Peking, Delhi and Rangoon, Chinese officials 
persistently refused to discuss the borders of Sikkim and 
B h u t a n . M r .  Nehru again rejected the Chinese minis­
ter's suggestion that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan 
did not fall within the scope of discussion. The prime 
minister said, ”. . .  The goveznment of India was the 
only competent authority to take up matters concerning 
Bhutan's external relations.
In 1 9 6 2, Dorji was again approached with a Com­
munist Chinese proposal. This one recommended a "con­
federation of Himalayan states” composed of Sikkim,
Nepal, the North East Frontier Agency (NEPA) and Nagaland. 
China also suggested exchanging some territory with 
Tibet, and merging the area with Sikkim to make a viable 
economic unit. Bhutan was not included in the Chinese 
proposal. Perhaps this is so because China looks upon a
^^Patterson, Peking versus Delhi, p. 219.
^^^Chakravarti, India's China Policy, p. I5 8 . 
^^^Jain, Panscheela and After, p. 1?4.
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large portion of Eastern Bhutan as being part of Chinese
102territory. The Maharaja rejected these overtures.
In November I9 6 2 , a month after the Chinese Communist 
military action had begun against India, the Peking 
authorities published a series of five maps which with­
out explanation included within Bhutan, those areas pre­
viously indicated to be within Communist China.
Requests by Prime Minister Dorji for Bhutanese partici­
pation in negotiations with Peking relating to Bhutan 
were rejected by India. This clearly demonstrates the 
preponderant control which India exercises over the 
foreign relations of Bhutan. Peking occasionally still 
makes indirect and unofficial approaches to Bhutanese 
leaders, perhaps to perpetuate controversial discussions 
regarding Bhutan's lack of autonomy in foreign relations.
During the summer of 1 9 6 6, Bhutan expressed con­
cern at a number of border intrusions by Chinese troops 
and Tibetan graziers. The "intrusions" occurred in the 
high mountain pasture area near Sinchel La, which lies 
south of the traditional boundary in southern Chumbi.
On April 13» 1966, a patrol of the Bhutanese army allegedly 
observed a Chinese patrol of 13 men about three miles
"U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sik­
kim and Bhutan)," Department of the Army pamphlet No, 
550-35 (Washington: Government Printing Office, July
1964), p. 4 0 9.
^^^Peking Review, November 30, 1962, pp. 3-15-
84
southwest of Sinchel La, and on July 28, I9 6 6 , a party of 
five Tibetans with approximately 300 yaks were reportedly 
encamped about two miles south of Sinchel La. On Septem­
ber 8 , 1 9 6 6, Tibetan graziers were again reported in the 
Sinchel area. In addition, Chinese troops were cited 
setting up two heaps of loose stones, possibly to set 
up a territorial chaim south of the traditional border.
On September 13, I966 a Bhutanese patrol found that 
Tibetan graziers were continuing to use the pastures,
despite repeated warnings, and that a party of Chinese
104troops had dug fresh trenches in the Sinchel area. 
Repeated unsuccessful attempts were purportedly made by 
local officials to secure withdrawal of the Tibetan 
graziers and Chinese troops.
India made a formal complaint to the Chinese 
Government on behalf of B h u t a n . T h e  Chinese are 
reportedly continuing to build strategic roads along 
the border and are continually improving their air 
capability, particularly with the installation of new 
facilities in the Lhasa area. They have also put new 
radar equipment into use at several points along the 
Tibetan-Bhutanese border.
io4Foreign Affairs Studies Division- The American 
University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sik­
kim and Bhutan)," p. 409.
^^^Karan, Bhutan, p. 11.
•*-^°Ibid., p. 84.
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Tibetan refugees are a potential source of fric­
tion between Bhutan and China. When the refugees began 
arriving in 1950, the Bhutanese Government, to preclude 
misunderstandings and disputes with the Peking regime, 
adopted a policy of refusing them the privilege of per­
manent asylum. The refugees were, however, allowed the 
right of transit on the way to India. In early I96I,
India declined to accept more refugees, leaving about
1074,000 awaiting permits to enter India still in Bhutan.
It can be readily discerned that Chinese designs 
upon the Himalayan region have had an enormous motivating 
influence upon Indian foreign policy in the area. Imperial 
China exercised suzerainty over the region for centuries 
and has continuously sought to reimpose its influence by 
means of infiltration and subversion as well as economic, 
military, and propagandistic tactics. The 1950 Chinese 
invasion of Tibet, the Sino-Indian border dispute, and the 
October I962 Chinese invasion of Ladakh and the N£FA were 
stimuli of an enormous magnitude, and could not help but 
influence Indian policy toward the Himalayan States. Also, 
the influence of Britain in the area cannot be discounted. 
From 1 8 5 8 the administration of India was formally trans­
ferred to the British crown and this control lasted until 
India became a sovereign democratic republic in April 1949.
^^^Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American 
ty, "U.S. Army Ar< 
kim and Bhutan)," p. 409.
oiixVoreX u D # ea Handbook for Nopal (Wrth Sxk
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The example of British policy and British treaties with 
each of the Himalayan states, has provided a formidable 
mold from which Indian foreign policy toward Nepal, Bhutan, 
and Sikkim has been shaped.
Sikkim
Sikkimese history like that of Bhutan is closely 
identified with Tibet, and because of that, with China. 
Definite control of Sikkim by the Tibetans was acquired 
during the first half of the l?th century when several 
lamas fled from the Chinese in Tibet. They made Bud­
dhist lamaism the state religion of Sikkim, and in l642 
established a government under a Tibetan king, from \diom 
the succeeding line of Maharajas claimed descent. In 
the l8th abd 19th centuries strife between Sikkim and Tibet, 
invasions of Sikkim by Nepal and Bhutan, and disputes 
within Sikkim's ruling family, led the British to inter­
vene in 1 8 2 6, and again in 1 8 5O. Britain had seized 
the Terai area and some outer hills. The trouble re­
sulting from this matter was settled by a treaty which 
Britain had forced on Sikkim in I8 6I. This treaty estab­
lished British suzerainty over Sikkim, but this was 
not accepted by the Tibetans vdio continued to engage in 
official activities in Sikkim. In I8 8 8, a British mili­
tary expedition drove the Tibetan army out of Siklcim and 
purused it into the Chumbi valley in Tibet. The Chinese 
suzerains of Tibet ordered their resident in Lhasa to
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make peace, but disagreement regarding suzerainty over 
Sikkim delayed a treaty until 1 8 9 0 , when Sikkim's bor­
ders were finally defined, and China recognized British 
control over Sikkim's internal administration and foreign 
relations. A convention between Great Britain and China 
relating to Sikkim and Tibet was signed at Calcutta on
March I7 , I8 9O by the representatives of the Chinese
JL 0 Ôand British Indian Governments. Articles one and two
of the treaty specifically defined the boundary of Sik­
kim and Tibet and defined Britain's control:
The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest 
of the mountain range separating the waters flowing 
into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other 
rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gysmochi 
on the Bhutan frontier and follows the abovementioned 
waterparting to the point where it meets Nepal terri­
tory.
2. It is admitted that the British government, whose 
protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recog­
nized, has direct and exclusive control over the 
internal administration and foreign relations of 
that state and except throu^ and with the permission 
of the British Government, neither the Ruler of the 
State nor any of its officers shall have official 
relations, of any kind, formal or informal, with any 
other country. 109
In a book entitled A Brief History of Modern 
China, by Liu Pei Hua, a Communist Chinese author, Sik­
kim is listed as a "Chinese Territory" taken by imperi­
alists "in the old democratic revolution period.
1 o A
Singh, India and the Future of Asia, pp. 203=204.
109"Convention Between Great Britain and China 
Relating to Sikkim and Tibet (1 8 9O)," Indian Society of 
International Law, New Delhi, 1 9 6 2 , pp. 13-15*
^Singh, India and the Future of Asia, p. 206.
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In 1959 Chinese officers in Tibet proclaimed that 
they would before long "liberate" Sikkim being wrongfully 
held by "Indian imperialists. When the Tibetan Dalai 
Lama fled Tibet and Civil War broke out in that country, 
five thousand Tibetans entered Sikkim. In I9 6 1 , sev­
eral hundred Tibetan refugees were settled in Western 
113Sikkim. Repeated proposals by Chinese authorities to
form a federation of Himalayan states evoked little
1 1^interest even among Sikkimese opposition leaders. On
March 22, 1959» the Indian Prime Minister addressed a
communication to Chou En-Lai. The note asserted:
"The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India, 
with Tibet region of China, was defined in the 
Anglo-Chinese Convention of I8 9O and jointly demarca­
ted on the ground in 1 8 9 5»
Chou replied in a letter to the Prime Minister of
India dated September 8 , 1959* The letter said:
"In your excellency's letter, you also referred to 
the boundary between China and Sikkim. . . .  this 
question does not fall within our present discus­
sions . "II6
^^^Indian White Paper 11, p. 43.
^^^Harrison E. Salisbury, Orbit of China (New 
York: Harper & Row, 196?)» P* 102.
^■^^Karan, The Himalayan Kingdom, p. 76*
Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The Ameri­
can University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With 
Sikkim and Bhutan)," p. 387*
^^^Indian White Paper (1954-1959), P* 55*
^^^Indian White Paper 11 (September-November, 
1 9 5 9), P* 30.
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»
Chou assured the Indian government that China
was willing to live together in friendship with Sikkim
and has always respected the "proper relations" between
117Sikkim and India. In a letter from the Prime Minis­
ter of India to the Prime Minister of China dated Sep­
tember 2 6 , 1 9 5 9 • Prime Minister Nehru asked the Chinese 
to clarify what they meant by the statement that "the 
boundary of Sikkim did not fall within the scope of dis­
cussions." The letter repeated assertions made in an 
earlier March 22, 1959 letter that the Chinese Government 
recognized as far back as 1 8 9O that the Government of 
India "has direct and exclusive control over the internal 
and foreign relations of that state. . . . there is thus 
no dispute regarding the boundary of Sikkim with that 
of Tibet.
In a note g ven by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of China to the Embassy of India in China, dated Decem­
ber 2 6 , 1959, the Chinese Government stated: "The
boundary between China and Sikxim has long been for­
mally delimited and there is neither any discrepancy
119between the maps nor any disputes in practice."
The Government of India in a February 12, 1 9 6O
ll?Ibid., p. 3 0 .
ll^Ibid., p 4l.
119^ "Boundary Question," Peking Foreign Languages 
Press, November, 1 9 6 2 , p, 88: Indian White Paper III 
(November 1959-March I9 6 0), p. 77»
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The Chinese Consuls in Sikicim were also expelled, and 
Sikkim's trade with Tibet terminated. Sikkim had pre­
viously depended upon Tibetan trade for a steady supply
123
of animals, wool, hides, and meat.
Sino-Indian Confrontation over Sikkim
On October 27, 1962, the Chinese Mainland Press
charged that the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru
were preserving the legacy of the British colonial rulers
with regard to Sikkim. The report stated:
India is the only country in Asia that has a protec­
torate. The Indian ruling circles have used every 
means to interfere in the internal and external 
affairs around India, to control their economy and 
trade, and demand their absolute obedience.^2*
In the mid-1 9 6 0's Pulitzer Prize winner Harrison 
£. Salisbury, managing editor for the New York Times news­
paper, visited the kingdom of Sikkim. He reported upon 
returning that :
They (the Indians) did not bother to conceal their 
wish that Sikkim be incorporated into India. They 
looked with hostility and suspicion on the Chogyal's 
(Maharaja's) determination to maintain Sikkim's inde­
pendence, and to increase, if possible, her area of 
sovereignty. Sikkim, they said, was too small, too 
poor, too backward to handle its own affairs. It 
was hinted, a possible security risk as well. After 
all, there are well-known links of the Sikkim ruling 
house to Tibet. 125
^^^Karrison E. Salisbury, Orbit of China (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1 9 6 7 ), p. 102.
124Chou En-Lai, "The Sino Indian Boundary Ques­
tion," pp. 9 7-9 8 .
^^^Salisbury, Orbit of China, p. 102,
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By 1963 most of the refugees from Tibet had been
X ^ 6interrogated and passed into India, “ and Sikkimese 
sentiments toward Communist China appeared to become more 
cordial. At a news conference at the Overseas Press 
Club in New York in September 1964, the Maharaja of Sik­
kim voiced confidence in the relations between Sikkim 
and Communist China. The Maharaja also related that this
country was attempting to export silver, woodwork, tents, 
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and clothing. “ However, the mood was soon to change
fcr on September 28, 1964, the Foreign Ministry of the
People’s Republic of China sent a note to the Indian
Embassy in China protesting alleged intrusions by Indian
troops crossing the China-Sikkim border. The note asserted
that Indian troops had time and time again intruded into
China's territory across passes on the China-Sikkim
boundary and listed the following specific examples ;
'*• • .as early as September I962 Indian troops 
intruded into the Chinese side of Natu La pass and 
up to now have unlawfully entrenched themselves 
there and refused to withdraw. . . .
2 , Up to August 1 9 6 4, Indian troops crossed Tung- 
chula pass and intruded into China's territory.
They have built I8 aggressive military structures
on the Chinese side of the pass on the boundary line.
3 . Indian troops intruded into China's territory 
on August 1 2 , 1 9 6 4 , at Tagi Pass and on August l4,
1 9 6 4 , four Indian soldiers crossed the Peilunga Pass
1 P Arniy Hâiitibcoxi fox* NopoX (Wxuîi
Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 338.
127nsikkinj Ruling Couple Voice Confidence in 
Red China," New York Times. Vol. CXIII, No. 38,953» 
September 1 7 , 1964- p. 2 .
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(West of Tagi Pass) and intruded into China’s terri­
tory for reconnaisance. "128
In addition to charging the Indian government 
with border intrusions Peking accused Delhi of "ground­
lessly slandering China as "concentrating troops," build­
ing bases along the China-Sikkim border, and penetrating 
deep into Sikkim. Peking urged India to put ar; immediate 
atop to its "aggressive activities" and withdraw its
troops which "are unlawfully entrenched on Chinese tor-
129r i t o r y . " A  Chinese threat to Sikkim occurred on 
September 17, 1965. On that date, a Chinese ultimatum 
demanded that India demolish structures allegedly built 
by that nation on the Tibetan side of the Sikkimese border, 
India replied that if any structures were found on the 
Tibetan side of the Sikkimese border, there would be no 
objection to their being demolished. The Indian note 
offered:
joint inspection of those points of the Sikkim- 
Tibetan Indian frontier where Indian personnel are 
alleged to have set up military structures in 
Tibetan territory. The Government of India on its 
part is prepared to arrange such an inspection as 
early as possible.1.^
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a note
1 "China Strongly Protests Against Indian Troops’ 
Intrusion into Chinese Territory," Peking Review, Vol. VII, 
Noe 4l, October 9, 1964, p. l8 .
129ibid.. p. 1 8 .
^^^Singh, India and the Future of Asia, p. 195»
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of May 4, 1 9 6 6, to the Indian Embassy charged that India 
had not only stationed large numbers of troops in Sikkim, 
but had constantly crossed the delimited China-Sikkim 
boundary to intrude into Chinese territory and provoke 
conflict. The Chinese government accused India of impos­
ing a protectorship on the people of Sikkim, and "inheri­
ting the mantle of aggression from British imperialism." 
The note went on to say:
"Frankly speaking, such unequal relationship in 
which a big country bullies a small one and encroaches 
upon its sovereignty, has long been spurned by the 
people of the world. . . . Talking about military 
pressure on Sikkim, it is not China that applies it, 
but precisely India, who is tightening her military 
control over Sikkim on the pretext of defense."^31
On September 12, I9 6 7 , the Chinese began an artil­
lery barrage at Natu La pass in Sikkim in an attack that
132lasted intermittently until October. China charged
in a broadcast monitored in Tokyo that India "attacked
133Chinese forces to get more U.S. aid."
The first clash started when the Chinese fired 
upon Indian troops as they were erecting a barbed wire 
barricade on the border. On October 1, 1 9 6 7 i Indian
 ^ "India Slanders Cannot Cover Up Its Intrusions 
into Chinese Territory," Peking Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 1 , 
May 20, 1 9 6 6, p. 4 3.
Joseph Lelyneld, "India Asks China for Sikkim 
Truce," New York Times, September 13« 19G7, p. l4.
^^^Bernard D. Nossiter, "Shots Traded Again on 
Sikkim Frontier," Washington Post. September l4, I9 6 7 »
p. 2 6.
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narrow pass on the border about three and a half miles 
northwest of Natu La Pass. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
said at a public meeting in Bombay that she hoped the 
flare up would not expand, but if it did, "we must keep 
ourselves ready to face it."
The Prime Minister stated: "We will not do any­
thing to worsen the situation. . . .  the clashes are not
134of our seeking."
Just what was behind these border "flare ups" 
was not known, but the New Delhi government and defense 
officials agreed that they were local actions. The 
Chinese shooting began the day the Maharaja of Sikkim 
and his American born wife returned from a visit to India. 
It may have been a warning to Sikkim that too close a 
friendship between its government and India would not be 
tolerated. Another theory is that Peking wanted India 
to keep up its heavy defense expenditures by staging a 
shooting incident at the border. The hostilities came 
at a time when Indian Deputy Prime Minister Mararji Desai 
was in Washington, and it was said that the Americans had 
suggested India reduce its defense budget since the 
country could ill afford high military expenditures 
during its current economic recession. Any thought of a
^^^"New Fight Flares at a Sikkim Pass," New York 
Times, October 8 , 196?, p. 4.
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cutback appeared ended when the Chinese opened their 
barrage. After the border incidents an undisclosed num­
ber of Indian troops moved into Sikkim. The Christian 
Science Monitor reported in January I9 6 8: "Uniforms
(Indian) are everywhere in the city, with soldiers buy­
ing souvenirs for the folks back homo in Rajasthan,
Bombay, or New Delhi,
Chinese Designs on the Himalayan States 
From 1 9 5 8 to I9 6I the Chinese had asserted 
emphatically and frequently over the Peking and Lhasa 
radio systems that Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the 
North East Frontier Agency were "fingers of the hands of 
China," If Ladakh is the little finger by China's rea­
soning, both in position and relative importance, then 
Nepal is the fourth finger. This might seem surprising 
in view of Nepal's relatively large (ten million) popu­
lation, international importance and present position of 
influence in the Himalayas, However, China is having some 
success with its present policies, and can afford to wait 
for Nepal to fall further under Chinese influence by 
methods which Hans Morganthau would call economic and 
cultural imperialism and which Bachrach and Baratz would 
call relationships of influence and manipulation. In
Everest Weatherall, "Peking Jab at Sikkim 
Border Still Mystifies Indian Soldiers," Christian Sci­
ence Monitor. January 6, 1968, p. 13-
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1956, a treaty was signed between China and Nepal per­
mitting an exchange of diplomatic representatives and an 
offer of Rs six crores in Chinese aid to Nepal. Since 
then, China's economic aid has been extended to Rs 23 
crores. She has built a vitally strategic road from 
Lhasa to Katmandu, and a network of roads in an area to
the north and east. The Nepal communist party now under-
1 6ground, has only about 10,000 members, but it is quite 
cohesive and well organized.
Sikkim, the middle finger, was formerly described 
by Sir Charles Bell, a British officer, as a "dagger 
pointed at the heart of India." Modprn military strate­
gists in the Indian army agree with this statement. The 
Chinese could launch a major assault down the Teesta 
Valley into Bengal and Bihar and the port of Calcutta 
'^ 00 miles away. The proximity of the Chinese army located 
in the Tibetan passes, 50 miles from Gangtok, has created 
great tension in the area. Since the Sino-Indian border 
clash in 1962, China has protested several times about the 
movement of Indian troops on Sikkim's northern border.
Bhutan is the first finger of the Chinese hand.
By occupying Bhutan, China would not only be able to domi­
nate the NBFA but the whole of Assam and invoke a blockade 
on India's trade of tea, oil, and jute from the area.
1. 36George Patterson| "The Five Fingers of China," 
The Indian Sevier, Vol* 5^, No# 2, Fohmary, jî» *
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Chinese agents operate in Bhutan, disguised as Tibetan
refugees, attempting to create unrest among the citizenry
against the Maharaja and his regime. The Chinese view
the NEFA, the thumb, as a political problem and an impor-
137tant supply route from China to Assam. It is against
this awesome background, then, that the foreign relations 
of India with the Himalayan kingdoms must be viewed.
Chapter III has dealt with Communist Chinese aggres­
sions and designs on the Himalayan frontier and parts of 
India itself as a great influencing factor upon the rela­
tionships of India, with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. The 
Indian reaction to Chinese advances as well as the particu­
larized relations which ensue are explored in detail in 
Chapters V through VII. Chapter IV provides a platform 
upon which to build the specialized relations of India 
with the three Himalayan kingdoms by exploring the basic 
tenets of Indian foreign policy, and the foreign policy 
similarities of the three kingdoms. Chapter IV also 
focuses upon the importance of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal 
to the Indian Himalayan defense strategy.
^^?Ibid., p. 5 8 .
CHAPTER IV
BASIC TENETS OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
AND THE HIMALAYAN STATES
Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1962 
The foreign policies of the British Indian Govern­
ment were based on preventing outside attack and keeping 
open the line of communications with Great Britain. The 
Afghan campaigns, the British expedition to Tibet, and 
the efforts to maintain British influence in Persia were 
designed to make India secure against penetration from 
Russia. The creation of buffer states along the northern 
borders, along with a foothold on the border areas in the 
northeast, was part of a defensive belt against Russia 
and China. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Suez, the 
Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, British policy was aimed 
primarily at keeping the trade routes open.
However, many Indians felt that certain aspects 
of the British foreign policies were not in their best 
interests. The Indian National Congress, foundec. in 1333 
to build a nationalist movement and later to act as spokes* 
man for the people, disapproved from the very beginning 
the annexation by the British of Upper Burma and in
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1897 deplored "frequent (British) military expeditions 
beyond the present limits of the British Indian Empire." 
In a similar vein, the Congress in 1904 protested against 
the British expedition to Tibet and other ventures into 
Afghanistan and Persia, fearful that they might "involve 
India in foreign entanglements." Beginning in 1 9 2 1, 
the foreign policies of the Congress became much more 
vocal, when it formally proclaimed that "the present 
government of India in no way represents Indian opinion."
In 192 0 Gandhi had written:
Common lot no less than territorial homogeneity 
and cultural affinity is bringing the Asiatic races 
wonderfully together, and they now seem determined 
to take their fullest share in world politics.%
In subsequent resolutions the party encouraged 
and Supported the struggle of dependent peoples for free­
dom and independence from the grip of foreign imperialism 
and continued to condemn the racial segregation in South 
Africa. Ths horizons of the Congress were further broad­
ened by the establishment in I928 of a Foreign Department 
under Jawaharlal Nehru, who has had an enormous impact in 
the formulation of the principles of Indian foreign 
policy. Even while the Indian National Congress was 
struggling against the British it was formulating a stand 
in foreign affairs under Nehru's leadership, that bore a
^Patwant Singh, India and the Future of Asia 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, l ^ è é ), p. 116 ; Ÿ oiTng India,
April 14, 1 9 2 0.
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great resemblance to India's future foreign policy. 
Nehru's aim seems to have been to avoid being drawn into 
any groups or configurations of power, and this was 
associated in his mind from a very early date with the 
methods of anachronistic empire?, which he labeled poli­
cies of the balance of power, or simply power politics. 
India was to refuse to tie her policy to the interests 
of any great power so that she was free to cultivate 
friendly and cooperative relations with all powers. At 
the same time, Nehru believed that the system of national 
independent states, without any empires, and extended to 
the rest of the world, was not viable in itself, so that
peaceful and friendly cooperation under some sort of
2
world association or federation was inescapable*
Vflien in 1939, India was declared a belligerent 
country by (ireat Britain the Congress refused coopera­
tion "in a war which is conducted on imperialist lines 
and which is meant to consolidate imperialism in India 
^nd elsewhere." This refusal culminated in the famous 
"Quit India" resolution of August 19^2, passed by the 
Congress against British colonial administration. As 
a result, the Congress was outlawed, and most of its 
leaders imprisoned until the war was nearly over. The
p.
“A. R. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of 
India's Nonalignment," The Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, February, 1 9 6 9, pp. 302-303,
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numerous resolutions of the Congress failed to influence 
the policies of Great Britain to any appreciable extent. 
However, after independence on August 15* 19^7, the 
Indian National Congress, led by Nehru, became the ruling 
political party of India.
As early as 1946, Nehru as Minister for External
Affairs in the interim Government had spelled out the
objectives of the future foreign policy of India:
"In the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow 
an independent policy, keeping away from the power 
politics of groups aligned with or against the other.
. . . India will uphold the principle of freedom for 
the dependent peoples and will oppose racial dis­
crimination wherever it may appear. . . .  Towards 
the United Nations, India's attitude is that of 
whole-hearted cooperation and unreserved adherence, 
in both spirit and letter, to the Charter governing 
it. To that end, India will participate fully in 
its various activities, . . ."3
In 1948, the Congress declared that the foreign
policy of India must be based on the principles which had
guided the Party in past years. The main objective of
foreign policy as pronounced by Nehru on various occasions
was the preservation of world peace:
In foreign affairs we had no interest other than to 
cultivate friendly cooperation with all countries 
and to help keep world peace as the sine qua non of 
everything else,4
3
Singh, India and the Future of Asia, p. 119; The 
Indian Annual Register 194& i Calcutta: Annual Register
Office, 1 9 4 7), II. pp. 2 5 2-2 5 3.
4
Jawaharalal Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 4l, No. 3* April, 1963. pp. 453» 4&5.
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Nehru explained that this attitude had been shaped 
by India's own struggle for freedom, as well as by "the 
accumulated experience of centuries and above all by 
Mahatma Gandhi's teachings."^ Beyond the pursuit of 
peace, although in many instances strictly subordinate 
to it, the major objectives of Indian foreign policy were 
declared by Nehru in his Columbia University address in 
the United States on October 1?» 19^9. In explaining 
India's foreign policy as an attempt "to combine idealism 
with national interest" Nehru listed the following foreign 
policy objectives:
1. The liberation of subject peoples.
2. The maintenance of freedom, both national
and individual.
3. The elimination of racial discrimination.
4. The elimination of want, disease, and ignor­
ance affecting the greater part of the world's population.^
The foreign policy of India, like that of any 
other country, has in part boon conditioned by certain 
basic factors, such as geographic, strategic, and histori­
cal considerations, as well as domestic pressures and 
influences, and basic characteristics of national life. 
Other factors affecting the course of a country's foreign
^Ibid., p. 4 5 6 .
^Ross N. Berkes, The Diplomacy of India (London: 
Oxford University Press, 195S), p. 1, 140*
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policies are the policies and attitudes of other states 
and the general course of international developments. In 
geographic and strategic terms, India occupies a vital part 
of the earth's surface. Since relations with Pakistan are 
unsettled, there is a strategic problem within the natural 
frontiers of the Indian subcontinent. India is directly 
concerned with the security of the Indian Ocean area, 
but has no immediate problem in this respect, so long as 
the defense of the region depends essentially upon 
British and American sea power, with such collateral 
support as the Indian Navy can provide. With Nepal,
Bhutan and Sikkim within its strategic frontiers, India 
has the largest border which any non-communist state 
shares with a communist state, and the greatest of the 
Communist powers is not far to the northwest. In count­
less ways, India's long historical experience has shaped 
its policies as an independent state. Its leaders have 
been made particularly sensitive to foreign domination in 
a cultural and psychological sense as well as a political 
one, and they are especially concerned with remaining 
aloof from great power politics in order to concentrate 
on serious internal problems. India has struggled to act 
externally as well as internally, in keeping with its 
traditions add beliefs. The policy of nonalignment may 
not be explained solely in terms of current weaknesses 
and opportunities as related to the existing international
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situation. The careful student of Indian society and 
history is likely to conclude that the policy has even 
deeper roots in the Indian past and that it is linked 
with the great traditions of Indian philosophy and experi­
ence, such as the Buddhist teaching of the middle way, 
the ancient faith in Ahima--meaning nonviolence in more 
than a physical sense— and other Gandhian teachings based
7
on Indian values, Gandhi's emphasis on truth and purity
of means from which he evolved his creed of nonviolence
was but another aspect of his deep humanism, for it
insisted that men in their fight for rights, whether as
individuals or as groups, should never violate their basic
obligation to respect life. Gandhi had said:
"I do not want the freedom of India if it means the 
extinction of England or the disappearance of English­
men. . , as man has not been given the power to 
create, he has not the power to destroy the smallest 
creature that lives.”®
The deep humanism and preoccupation with peace 
which Gandhi felt and which greatly influenced his thoughts 
on foreign policy are inherent in the Hindu philosophy of 
India.
From the Aryans stemmed the Hindu religious phil­
osophy, the oldest of the world's surviving religions.
George M. Kahin, Major Governments of Asia (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1963J, pp. 389-390.
o
Indira Rothermund, "The Individual and Society 
in Gandhi's Political Thought,” Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. XXVIII. No. 2, February, 1 9 W 7 ^  i M T
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Some mention should be made of Hinduism as to its effect 
on the political climate of India since the Republic 
is the home of more than 9 5% of the world's adherents
Q
of Hinduism* Traditional Hinduism has led to a deep- 
rooted tendency toward mysticism and monistic philosophy. 
It also has helped to foster a stratified system of 
social classes, generally called castes which have been 
given religious sanction; and a propensity to assimilate 
rather than to exclude* The whole scheme of life of the 
Hindus is governed by their religious rules* These 
rules effect health, clothing, food, and occupations.
In traditional Indian society members of separate castes 
were forbidden to marry or even eat together and occupa­
tions were categorized according to caste*
In the sixth century B*C*, Gautama, the Buddha, 
born in the foothills of the Himalayas, branched off 
from Hinduism in his search for means of escape from 
the wheel of life and the endless succession of birth 
and rebirth. Tliree centuries later the Maurya Emperor 
Asoka became a convert to Buddhism, making it the state 
religion of his great empire. Until the mid-sixth 
century A,D*, Buddhism flourished in India and flowered 
in works of art and literature* Then, though it con­
tinued to become strong in other parts of Asia, in
^Statesman's Yearbook 1968-1969, p* IO6 8 ,
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India it declined steadily and was largely absorbed
by H i n d u i s m . T h e  influence of Hinduism upon Gandhi's
political thought with particular reference to the Hindu
belief that all living things are the same in essence,
and a part of the Universal essence known as Brahma is
evidenced by his statement that,
Willing submission to social restraint for the sake 
of the well being of the whole society, enriches 
both the individual and society of which he is a 
member. . . .  if one man gains spiritually, the 
whole world gains with him, and if one man fails, 
the whole world fails to that extent.H
The influence of Gandhi and Hinduism on Nehru's
foreign policy is also evident in the letter's sympathy
that "some sort of world association or federation is 
12inescapable," as well as his development of the prin­
ciples of Panch Shila.
The guiding rules in the formulation and execu­
tion of Indian foreign policy in an ideal sense are par­
ticularized by Panch Shila (Five Principles). They are:
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.
2 . Mutual nonaggression.
"The Subcontinent of South Asia," Dept, of 
State Publication 7410 (Washington: Government Print­
ing Office, November, I9 6 2 ), pp. 36-37*
^^Rothermund, "The Individual and Society in 
Gandhi's Political Thought," pp. 315-316.
I p
"'A, R. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of 
India's Nonalignment," p. 303.
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3. Mutual noninterference in each other’s 
internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
135 . Peaceful coexistence.
The Panch Shila was first,enunciated in the pre­
amble to the Sino-Indian agreement of Tibet of 1954 and was 
reaffirmed later in the year in a joint statement by the 
two Prime Ministers, Nehru and Chou En-Lai. The Indian 
government had since adopted these principles as its 
idealistic creed in foreign relations. As will be pointed 
out later India's foreign policy toward Bhutan, Sikkim and 
Nepal has been based on far more pragmatic considerations 
such as national interest and national security.
The "five principles" are based on the traditional 
belief that truth is not confined to one person ox' one 
people or even to one country, because truth is viewed 
to possess too many aspects for anyone to presume that 
he knows all.
Most Indian leaders have felt strongly that the 
most pressing problem in the world is not that of commu­
nism versus democracy but peace versus war. They did not 
commonly accept the idea that the struggle between the
13 "Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and 
Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and 
China 1954-1959»*' Indian White Paper I (New Delhi, 1959), 
p. 105.
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West and the Communist powers is between the forces of 
good and evil. In their view, the East-West conflict 
tends to discount the value of peace because of the growing 
tendency on the part of the great powers to stress the 
primacy of military strength rather than the importance 
of creating a climate for peaceful discussion. Conse­
quently, the leaders have disagreed with the theory of 
"peace through security," as manifested in the military 
pacts subscribed to by the Western as well as Communist 
bloc nations, because in their view, contending parties 
will go on increasing their respective strength, causing 
further fears and tensions.
Also, India's national self-interest has required 
peace since it is economically backward and militarily 
weak. Its leaders have felt that the urgently needed 
rapid economic development could be undertaken only in 
a climate of peace and this required that India be sur­
rounded by friendly neighbors. India's determined efforts 
to cultivate friendly and peaceful relations with its 
powerful Communist neighbors, the Soviet Union and China, 
were based partly on this pragmatic appraisal of both 
external and internal factors.
India's national interests also required that it 
maintain a complete freedom of maneuver, uncompromised 
by adherence to any pacts or blocs. It has believed 
therefore that nonalignmant was the most expedient means
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of assuring continued economic and technical aid from
l4both the Western and Corainunist-bloc nations.
India's hatred of imperialism has its roots in 
the nation's long domination under the British. British 
ideas and political examples had an enormous impact upon 
Indian foreign policy, for as will be shown later, the 
current treaties which India has with Bhutan, Sikkim 
and Nepal were all patterned after treaties which Britain 
had made with these Himalayan kingdoms prior to Indian 
independence•
Indian Foreign Policy 1963-1967
Since October 1962, the principle of peaceful
coexistence has become subject to vigorous attack in
India. Nehru hiAself came to the conclusion that:
"We will now already have to give considerable more 
attention to strengthening our armed forces and to 
the production within the country, to the extent 
possible, of all weapons and equipment needed by 
them. . . .  in the world today it is not enough to 
be devoted to peace, or to mind one's own affairs, 
but it is also necessary to have adequate armed 
strength . . .  and above all, to conserve and con­
solidate national unity."^5
After the Sino-Indian War of I9 6 2 , advice and assistance 
were sought in developing India's armed forces. Arrange­
ments were made with the United States, Great Britain and
^^Michael Brecher, Nehru's Mantle (New York: 
Praeger, I9 6 6 ), pp. 6-20.
^^Neliru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, April,
1 9 6 3 , pp. 462-463.
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the Soviet Union, among others, for help in an Indian arms
buildup. To many, clear evidence of the declining favor
of the Congress Party as demonstrated in the election of
May 1963 was a result in part of Nehru's foreign policy.
In that election three important Congress Party candidates
were defeated in Lok Sabha elections. Though detailed
studies of these elections have revealed that factors
other than government policy had been more important, the
opposition parties, the press, and the Congress Party
itself tended to perceive these defects as a protest
17against its foreign and domestic policy.
Since Prime Minister Nehru's death in 1964, India 
has been reorganizing its foreign policy, a modus operand! 
that did not succeed in reaching its major goals. Nehru's 
attempt to establish cordial relations with Communist 
China, even at the expense of Tibetan aspirations for inde­
pendence, appeared to terminate with the border war of 
1 9 6 2. The Sino-Soviet split complicated the Indo-Chinese 
discord by dividing the Communist party of India into Mos­
cow and Peking factions, thereby adding internal politi­
cal cleavage to the circumstances of external confrontation.
^^For an excellent analysis of the factors respon­
sible for theçe defeats see the Economist Weekly, XVII 
(May 22, May 2 9 , and June 19» 1 9 6 5'» PP» 845~85o, 893*902,
9 8 7-1 0 0 0.
^^Stanley A. Eochenek, "Post Nehru India: The
Emergence of the New Leadership," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, 
No. ‘3. Mav 1966. n. 292.
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As of 1 9 6 4 , India's relationships with other immediate 
neighbors such as Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal and Burma were 
inconstant. The war with Pakistan in I965 revealed the 
depth of the bitterness that existed between the two 
countries over Kashmir and other matters.
Nehru's successors, Prime Ministers Lai Bahadur 
Shastri and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, have not abandoned his 
policies, although they have altered the emphasis. They 
have continued to advance the search for peace, while at 
the same time strengthening and modernizing the Indian 
defense establishment. Nonalignment is still the corner­
stone of India's diplomacy and the United States and the 
U.S.S.R, compete with aid, as the circle of bilateral 
agreements widens to include more support from West and 
East Germany, Japan, East Europe and others. At the 
United Nations and in world forums generally, India main­
tains a search for the nonviolent solution of major world 
disorders.
President Savepalli Radhakrishsnan, addressing
Parliament on March I8 , 1 9 6 7 , underlined the continuity
of India's policy;
"The foreign policy of India has stood the test of 
time. The concept of peaceful co-existence, which 
India has done so much to sponsor, is now accepted 
by the leaders of the two groups. With both the 
United States and the Soviet Union, we have the
18„.Richard L. Park, "India Foreign Policy, 1964-
rant Hiatarv. ATir--i 1 A . T:_ .^  f t ^  AM M, AM Jd CJF M  ... ^  *« ,MA M  . . . .  .Ad.yyj'O ^ w u x 'x ' t a j i i .  2» ^  % •rvpo. o . 7 w w f  ^  » * < > •
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friendliest of relations. Our policy of non-align­
ment stands vindicated. Government will do every­
thing possible to strengthen non-alignment and pur­
sue the positive aspects of this policy with rigor 
and determination.”
Radhakrishnan added: ”It will be Government's special
endeavour to strengthen India's relations with our neigh­
bours .
The conflict with India's most immediate neighbor, 
Pakistan, is as heated as it was in 1964. One should 
take note of the restraint shown by India in her relations 
with Pakistan, and the extent of the public and private 
effort made to appreciate the Pakistani viewpoint, even 
on Kashmir. Prime Minister Lai Badahur Shastri gave a 
great deal of attention to the settlement of long-standing 
disagreements with Ceylon, and Mrs. Gandhi has continued 
the dialogue. The Agreement on the Status and Future of 
Persons of India Origin in Ceylon, signed on October 30, 
1 9 6 4, did much to set a new tone for Indo-Ceylonese rela­
tions. The understandable desire for independence in 
Nepal has led that government to seek a judicious middle 
ground between India and China, but Indian influence-- 
and, to a degree, popularity— remains dominant. Burma 
and other areas of Southeast Asia also have been approached 
for improved ties of commerce and friendship.
What has changed since 1964 is an improvement in 
the craftsmanship of India's diplomacy, the planned
^^Ibid., p. 46.
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diversification of cultural and economic interests in Asia 
and Africa, the rebuilding of closer relationships with 
the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia, and a tightening of ties with 
the U.S.S.R. India’s association with the United States 
is cooperative, but cordiality is only occasionally 
present. The Vietnam war and its ramifications tend to 
place in jeopardy other aspects of Indo-American coopera­
tion, at least within official circles. India's foreign
policy is changing; but not abruptly, nor are the old
20principles and approaches being discarded.
India’s parliamentary democracy passed a crucial 
test following the death of Prime Minister Nehru in late 
May 1964. Until his death Mr. Nehru had been India’s 
preeminent political leader and only Prime Minister. 
Because of the unique position he occupied in Indian 
public life and because of his great personal contribu­
tion to the growth of Indian democracy, there had been 
some concern within India itself over the impact which 
the loss of Mr. Nehru’s leadership might have on the 
country’s political life. However, within a few days 
of Mr. Nehru’s death, a new Prime Minister, Lai Bahadur 
Shastri, was elected unanimously by the ruling Congress 
Party, and the transfer of power was accomplished in an 
orderly and constitutional manner.
Mr. Shastri led the Government for 19 months until
^^Ibid., p. 48.
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his death at Tashkent in Soviet Asia in January I9 6 6. Hs 
had just signed an agreement with President Ayub Khan of 
Pakistan designed to establish a more durable peace in 
the subcontinent in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan 
conflict over Kashmir. Once again India's political lead­
ership effected a smooth transition, electing Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi, the widowed daughter of Prime Minister Nehru, to 
succeed Mr, Shastri. Mrs, Gandhi subsequently was reelected 
to the Prime Ministership following the fourth general 
election in 1 9&7 «
These elections ushered in a new phase in Indian 
political development. The Congress Party, for 50 years 
the supreme forum for meaningful politics in India, no 
longer holds the monopoly of power it had enjoyed through­
out the postindependence period. It has lost its pre­
ponderant position in Parliament, where its victories in 
the first three general elections had consistently given 
it control of about three-fourths of the seats in the key 
lower house; and it has suffered even more severe setbacks 
in the voting for State legislatures, a number of which 
are now controlled by non-Congress governments.
Most of these non-Congress governments are coali­
tions of various small political parties, often dissimilar 
in policy and ideology. Several of them have proven 
unstable, and by the end of I967 three had lost their 
legislative majorities and were dismissed. Nevertheless.
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it remains clear that the era when the Indian political
structure was characterized as a "one plus" party system
is over, and that the country is moving into a new phase
of development which will pose both challenges and oppor-
21
tunities to its institutions,
Indian Himalayan Defense Strategy 
It is useful to narrow the discussion from the 
more general considerations of earlier chapters to the 
restricted focus of India's Himalayan defense strategy, 
in order to provide a smooth transition to the more 
particularized relationships that follow upon which the 
definitive categorization scheme will be constructed.
The Chinese invasion of Indian territory in 
October, I9 6 2, brought into sharp focus the important 
strategic position of the three Himalayan Kingdoms. In 
that attack, and in later probing moves in Sikkim in I965  
and 1 9 6 7, China has demonstrated an apparent intention 
of gaining dominance over the approaches to northern 
India and establishing herself as the preponderant poli­
tical power in the area. The communist leadership has 
stated unequivocally that Tibet is like the palm of China's 
hand; and, with the palm firmly under control, the fingers, 
namely Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the NËPA must
21 "Background Notes--India," U.S. Department of 
State. Publication 784?. December, I9 6 7 , p. 3.
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also be brought under control. Now Delhi fears that Com­
munist Chinese control over the passes leading from Tibet 
would cause Bhutan and Nepal to lose confidence in India’s 
determination and ability to protect them, and would make 
China the dominant foreign power in the area, "With con­
trol over the Himalayan region, Communist China would be
like a boulder poised to roll downhill into Indians (sic)
22heartland, an ancient Indian fear.""'
China has looked upon the three Himalayan king­
doms as an extension of Tibet: as areas of former Chi­
nese influence wrested away initially by the imperialistic 
British, and more recently iniperialized by their vicar,
23
the Indian government. Militarily the topography favors 
China, who can advance down from the Tibetan plateau.
India has been improving strategic communications in the 
region; and the Chinese h a e  been building roads, and air 
fields, and have a more comprehensive logistical struc­
ture. In i9 6 0 , the Chinese were estimated to be main­
taining in Tibet six divisions organized into two armies. 
In the Ladakh area they held the high ground and their 
supply routes across the Tibetan plateau were relatively
22A. M. Rosenthal, "British Will Fly Weapons to 
India in Next Few Days," New York Times « Vol. CXII, No. 
3 8 ,2 6 3 » October 28, 1962, p. 6.
23 "Bhutan and Sikkim," Canadian Geographical 
Journal, Vol. LXV, No. 6, December I9 6 2 , pp. 200-^0?.
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close to their front lines,^ The situation has presented
2 5
India with a major security problem. As a result of
the 1962 conflict, India lost key positions along the
Himalayans and Chinese armies had held the mountain gate-
26ways to the Assam plains. As a result of the cease-fire 
agreement, China has pulled back from all but two of the 
passes leading into Assam.
The location of Bhutan and Sikkim between the 
Tibetan plateau and the Assam-Bongal plains of India 
gives the two kingdoms considerable strategic importance. 
Along with the rest of the Himalayas, India regards these
nations as a front-line defense in the border conflict
27with China, Speaking before the Indian parliament,
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru has asserted:
"From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us 
with a magnificent frontier, of course, they are no 
longer as impassible as they used to be but are still 
fairly effective, , , , We cannot allow that barrier 
to be penetrated • . ,, to be crossed or weakened,_ 
because that would be a risk to our own security," °
The Chumbi Valley was once the seat of Sikkim's
rulers, but was taken over by Tibet in the I8& century.
?4Hanson W. Baldwin, "Mountain War in India," New 
York Times, Vol, CXII, No, 38,262, October 2 7 , I9 6 2 , p. 2.
^^Kahin, Major Governments of Asia, p, 3 8 9.
^^Ibid,, p, 3 9 0 .
27'"Bhutan and Sikkim," Canadian Geographic Journal,
pp. 200-202.
28Karan, Tl'ie Himalayan Kingdoms « p, 133,
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Sikkim. These include:
a. The Che-La
b. The Yok La
c. The Natu La
d. The Dongchui La
29
e. The Jelep-La*
From Sikkim two vital highways lead into India, 
The Nathula Gangtok-Siliguri and Jelepa Rhenoch. If 
China were able to wrest control of the passes and high­
ways they could pour down the Indian plains and cut off 
Siliguri, isolating completely the eastern areas of India
comprising parts of Bengal, Assam, the NEFA, Nagaland
30and the Kingdoms of Bhutan and Sikkim.
Fourteen passes through the Himalayas leading 
from Tibet into Bhutan also concern India as potential 
invasion routes for the Chinese Communist forces. How­
ever, with elevations ranging from approximately 1 5 *0 0 0- 
20,000 feet, the passes are negotiable only by pack
animals or porters. The passes include:
31a. Senchel La 
b• Tremo La
OQ
Scene of Chinese probe attacks in I965 and I9 6 7-
30Singh, India and the Future of Asia. pp. 202-203.
31Scene of a number of probind intrusions by
Chinese troops in I9 6 6.
120
c. Thunkar Pass (the Pass leads to Lhasa over 
a Tibetan motorable road completed by Com­
munist China in 196$)
d. Shingbe Pass
e. Tashi-Gang Dzong
In addition to these, the two most critical 
passes on the east-west axis route are within 25 miles 
either side of Tonga Dzong, the most important commu­
nity in central Bhutan. On the east is Rudong Pass, 
elevation 12,000 feet, on the west is Pele Pass, ele­
vation 1 1 ,0 5 5 feet*^^
Nehru had reaffirmed in I9 6 3 : "The Himalayan
barrier has proved to be vulnerable. If it is breached
the way to the Indian plains and the ocean beyond would 
33be exposed."
India has taken measures to strengthen the 
Himalayan frontier. In Bhutan, in accordance with the 
recommendation of a team of Indian military experts, 
Bhutan has been reorganizing its military power. Sev­
eral Bhutanese have received military training at the 
Indian military academy, and have returned to Bhutan to 
direct the reorganization program of the army at Thimbu. 
However, although India maintains groups of military
30
"Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American 
University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (with 
Sikkim and Bhutan)," pp. 397*398*
^^Nehru, Foreign Affairs. April, 19631 P* (i$8.
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advisers at Thimbu and Ha, there are no Indian military
34
formations in Bhutan. Indian troops in Siklcim were 
increased to 2 5 ,0 0 0-3 0 ,0 0 0  men in 1962 to guard the passes 
from Tibet. Particular attention is given to Natu-La and 
Jelep-La passes, about 25 miles northeast of Gangtok.
India is also completing the construction of roads, par-
3 5ticularly into the northern valleys.^
Geographically, Nepal also occupies a key position
in the Himalayan defense perimeter. India has recognized
this and has made it clear that it will not allow any
encroachments on Nepalese territory. India has also
provided Nepal with substantial economic assistance, which
36currently totals more than l4 million dollars annually,
India has sought to maintain its prestige and
influence with the leaders of the Nepalese Government and
tends to be highly sensitive about Nepal's relations with
other countries, particularly those with Communist China 
37and Pakistan. Indeed along the whole of the Himalayan
border, it is not as much coexistence as containment that
38the Indians are following.
34
Karan, Bhutan. p. 21.
35Karan, The Himalayan Kingdom, p. 77.
36"Background Notes--Kepal," Department of State 
Publication 790% (Washington: Government Printing Office,
October, 1967J,p. 5-
^^National Geographic Magazine. Vol. 123, I9 6 3 , 
pp. 409-4iOV
^"Gordon Shepherd, "where India Meets Red China in^ 
the Himalayas," The Reporter. Vol. 19, No. 3, Sept. 5, I9 6 8 , 
p. 2 9.
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Basic Similarities in the Foreign Policies of 
Bhutan. Sikkim and Nepal
Basic similarities in the world-view of the ruling 
classes in Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan are reflected in the 
policies pursued by the three states. These similarities 
are caused by the fact that all three are comparatively 
small and weak countries surrounded by more powerful and 
expansion minded neighbors. Certain geopolitical factors 
have operated to their advantage. Lines of communication 
into and within their territories have been limited, and 
the mountainous terrain has provided them with a natural 
defense against invasion. This comparative inaccessibil­
ity fostered the evolution of ethnic and cultural features 
that caused these societies to develop a culture fairly 
distinct from their neighbors to the north and south. For 
all of these reasons, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan have been 
relatively successful in safeguarding some degree of inde­
pendence throughout much of their history.
For these reasons a consistent theme in the foreign 
policy pursued by these states has been the great depend­
ence placed upon efforts to isolate themselves from out­
side influences, particularly in periods when developments 
to the north or south appeared to pose a threat to their 
independence. Complete isolation has not been possible 
for the simple reason that trade routes and lines of com­
munication between India, Central Asia and China traverse
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history the authorities in these states often were pre­
pared to forfeit some of the economic advantages inherent 
in their control and strategic position in favor of poli­
tical isolation. Thus, during the eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries, when Chinese control in Tibet and British 
expansion in India threatened the political integrity of 
the border states, their governments placed rigid controls 
on international trade as one means of limiting external 
pressure. This policy was implemented with relative suc­
cess throughout the British period in India. The single 
exception was Sikkim, which was less favorably situated 
to resist British pressure— a fact which partly explains 
the difference between Siklcim *s present position and that 
of Bhutan and Nepal.
An "isolationist" policy was no longer quite so 
attractive after T9^7 and even less so after 1951* Never­
theless, this general approach to the world still exerts 
great appeal to the authorities and public in these states. 
It is reflected, for exainple, in their attitude toward the 
development of systems of communications. Some elements 
in Nepal are strongly opposed to north-south roads that 
connect the country with the outside world; their prefer­
ence is for east-west highways that help unify the country 
without increasing access to the country from either India 
or China. Similar motivations underly the opposition of
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the Bhutanese authorities to road construction programs 
within their territory. It was only the recent events in 
Tibet that finally convinced the Bhutan government of the 
absolute necessity of direct communications with India. 
Government factions in Bhutan still react negatively to 
suggestions for the improvement of communications with 
the outside world.
A second facet of the Himalayan border state's 
traditional foreign policy has been the utilization of 
what might be termed a "balance of power" principle. When 
feasible (i.e., when powerful governments controlled north­
ern India and Tibet) and when necessary (i.e., when any of 
these powers threatened the political integrity of the 
Himalayan states), a policy based on this principle has 
been pursued. "Balance of Power" has been a fundamental 
political concept in this area for many centuries and it
appears to be deeply ingrained in the thoughts of the
political elite. The automatic and immediate response 
to any outside threat has always been to seek other exter­
nal sources of support that might conceivably be useful as 
a counterbalance. The history of this area is character­
ized by instances in which the rulers excelled in the art
of playing neighbor against neighbor. Preferences for 
this strategy still are apparent in the policies pursued 
by Nepal and Bhutan.
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"Isolatiùiiisrû" and "balance of power," then, were 
the twin pillars of the foreign policies of the border 
states. Under certain circumstances both policies would 
be applied jointly. For example, from 1 7 7O-I85O Kath­
mandu's foreign policy pursued as its dual objective the 
maximum isolation of Nepal from both the British in India 
and Chinese in Tibet while, at the same time, balancing 
these two powers against each other to Nepal's advantage. 
It is quite possible that Nepal would have been absorbed 
into the British Indian Empire in the first half of the 
nineteenth century except for British fears of a Chinese 
reaction to such an absorption.
At other times, however, one or the other of these 
two basic policies could not be easily implemented. After 
1 8 5 0 , for instance, Peking's influence at Lhasa declined, 
due to China's defeat in the "Opium War" and internal 
upheavals such as the T'ai ping rebellion. Since China 
could no longer be counted on to balance British imperial 
ambitions, Nepal and Bhutan were forced to seek an accommo­
dation with the British that left them autonomous, but 
under strong British influence in foreign affairs. In 
these circumstances both Nepal and Bhutan placed an even 
greater emphasis on an "isolationist" policy aimed at 
preventing Indian advances. Sikkim, under much greater 
pressure from the British after i860 than either of its 
immediate neighbors desperately sought support from Tibet
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and China, but with no great success= The result was, 
ultimately, Sikkim's virtual absorption into the British 
Indian political system.
Independence for India (19'i?) and the Chinese 
aggression against Tibet (1950-51) forced the Himalayan 
border states to readjust their foreign policies to the 
new circumstances. An ’’isolationist" policy was no longer 
considered feasible, due to the influence which Indian 
nationalist and democratic ideals had made upon the value 
systems of the educated class, and the reemergence of 
China as an interested participant in Himalayan politics. 
The Rana regime, apprehensive over the pervasiveness of 
Indian influence in Nepal and its possible consequences 
on the regime's autocratic rule, turned again to the 
, "balance of power" principle, a policy continued by suc­
cessor governments after tne 1950-51 revolution. In the 
immediate post 19^7 period, relations with China were 
viewed as too ineffectual and insecure to warrant much 
consideration. Kathmandu therefore sought diplomatic 
relations with non-Asian powers, at first with the Western 
countries and the United Nations, and later with the com­
munist bloc as well. However, as Chinese power expanded 
in Tibet, and Peking began to exhibit a definite interest 
in establishing relations on terms moderately favorable 
to Nepal, the possibility of a reversion to the "balance 
of power" principle arose once again. Nepal appeared to
127
be attempting to use China as counterweight against 
growing Indian cultural and economic influence.
In 1956 Nepal and China agreed to exchange diplo­
matic representatives, and a newjhase in Nepali foreign 
policy came into view. The balancing of Chinese and 
Indian power (in a Morganthau sense) has become the basic 
feature of Nepali foreign policy. This general tendency 
was somewhat modified from June 1959 to December I9 6O, 
when a democratically elected government was in power. 
However, the old "balance of power" principle appears to 
have reemerged as the central theme of the policy of the 
successor government dominated by King Mahendra. The
King was the dominant political figure in Nepal in 1956
39when relations with China were first established.
By the end of I9 6 3 , Nepal had established rela­
tions with more than 30 countries, including at least six 
Communist states. The official representatives from most 
of these countries were concerned largely with trade and 
economic development programs. Meanwhile, strict adherence 
to the policy of modified neutralism had been seriously 
threatened by two major Chinese Communist operations: the
invasion of Tibet in 1950, and aggression against the Indian 
frontier in I9 6 2. Throughout this period, Nepal, maintaining
^^Leo £• Rose, "Sino Indian Rivalry and the Hima­
layan Border States," Orbis, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer, I9 6I,
pp. 2 0(l—2 0 8»
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a strictly neutralist attitude in the Peiping-New Delhi
clashes, has strengthened its ties with India while not
weakening those with Communist China. The success
achieved in the field of foreign relations is evidenced
by the offer and acceptance of aid from countries such
as India, Communist China, the Soviet Union, the United
States, Israel and Pakistan--countries with widely diver-
40gent interests and viewpoints.
Because of the nature of their treaty relations
with India, Sikkim and Bhutan are not as well positioned
to use the "balance of power" principles as is Nepal.
Such a policy would be inconceivable for Sikkim under
existing conditions, though this is not as true for
Bhutan. The Bhutan government has expressed an interest
in exploring the possibility of establishing diplomatic
relations with governments other than India, obviously
with the intention of modifying Bhutan's dependence upon
India in external affairs. While not likely at this time,
4i
it does represent a tendency for the future.
The foreign relations of Sikkim are conducted 
solely by India under provisions of the Indo-Sikkim TreAÿy
4oForeign Affairs Studies Division, The American 
University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (with Sik­
kim and Bhutan)," Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-35.
pp. 1 8 7-1 8 8.
^^Rose, "Sino Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan 
Border State," Orbis. p. 208.
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signed on December 5i 1950, Sikkim's only existent treaty 
with any foreign country. Close ties with Tibet prevail­
ing prior to the Chinese Communist invasion of that country 
in 1 9 5 0 have since deteriorated. These ties (based on 
traditions, customs and religious beliefs, including the 
spiritual leadership of the Dalai Lama, and fostered 
largely by trade and royal family marriages with Tibetans) 
were practically severed by the Chinese Communists" sup­
pression of Tibet. This forced the Sikkimese, situated 
south of the Himalayan barriers, to look to India for pro­
tection and guidance. India regardint the northern bound­
ary of Sikkim as an important portion of the line of defense 
against Chinese aggression, responded with economic and 
military aid. Although sympathetic to the royal family, 
India has endeavored to maintain the uneasy balance be­
tween Sikkim's opposing domestic political groups, with­
out incurring emmities that could be exploited by Chinese 
Communist forces seeking to "liberate" the country.
Sikkimese authorities attempt to maintain a neutral 
attitude toward the Chinese Communists and exercise care 
to avoid actions or disputes which might be used as a 
pretext for retaliatory tactics. The problem of dealing 
with Tibetan refugees is particularly sensitive in this 
respect. The initial influx of refugees, including the 
flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959 after the unsuccessful 
Tibetan revolt against the Chinese Communists, alerted
130
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Peking’s proposals for a federation of Himalayan states 
evoked little interest, even among the Sikkimese opposi­
tion leaders.
In 1 9 6 1 , India agreed to bear the brunt of the 
refugee burden by accepting some 7,000, leaving only a 
few hundred to settle in Sikkim.
By 1 9 6 3 , most of the refugees from Tibet had been 
interrogated and passed on to India. If any Communists 
are detected among the refugees they are sent back to 
Tibet.
The generally harmonious relations with Nepal 
and Bhutan are under Indian supervision. The bulk of the 
Nepalese migrations occurred during the period of the 
British protectorate and apparently have not become an 
issue between the authorities of the two states. Bhu­
tanese incursions into Sikkim have ceased and the common
42boundary is not in dispute.
Bhutanese Foreign Relations
The foreign relations of Bhutan have been con­
ducted by a foreign power since the signing of the Punakha 
Treaty with the British in I9IO. Under this treaty, the 
Bhutanese Government accepted British guidance in foreign 
affairs, and the British agreed to exercise no interference
k 2 Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American 
University, "U.S. Army Aroo. Handbook for Nopal (with Sik­
kim and Bhutan)," Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-35.
pp. 387-388. --
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in Bhutan's internal affairs. After the British left 
India the pact was supplanted on August 8, 1949, by the 
Indo-Bhutan Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship, a 
slightly more comprehensive version of the Punakha Treaty, 
with India replacing Great Britain in the text.
Close ties are maintained between the two coun­
tries by frequent exchanges of visits by officials engaged 
in the numerous Indian-suppor'ter projects initiated in 
furtherance of the country’s economic development program.
Bhutanese authorities like those in Sikkim attempt 
to maintain a neutral attitude toward the Chinese Commu­
nists. This policy of neutrality is frequently put to a 
test by Peiping's offer of financial help and its pro­
posals for unilateral negotiations for defining the uncer­
tain boundary with Tibet.
India in turn became increasingly sensitive regard­
ing any direct contact between Bhutanese and Chinese Com­
munist officials. Requests by Prime Minister Jigme Dorji 
to participation in negotiations with Peiping relating to 
Bhutan were rejected by India. Nevertheless, Peiping 
occassionally makes indirect and unofficial approaches to 
Bhutanese leaders, apparently to perpetuate controversial 
discussions regarding Bhutan's boundary, and its lack of 
autonomy in foreign relations.
Tibetan refugees are a potential source of fric­
tion with Communist China, When they began arriving in
t 'iO
1 9 5 0 the Bhutanese Government, to preclude misunderstand­
ings and disputes with the Peiping regime, adopted a 
policy of refusing them the privilege of permanent asylum, 
but conceded their right of transit on the way to India, 
After the revolt of 1959 in Tibet, about 3,000 Tibetans 
entered Bhutan. In early I96I, India declined to accept
m w j i .  O  O V f U t O  -X f  v / v r w  W  X  U A A - L i X  XX AX Ui w c i i x  9  V l X t S V X e U X U "
 ^3
ally awaiting permits to enter India.
Chapter IV has discussed the basic tenets of 
Indian foreign policy, narrowed the focus of study to 
India's Himalayan defense strategy, and concluded by a 
consideration of the foreign policy similarities of the 
three Himalayan kingdoms under study. India's historical 
and cultural experience including the teachings of 
Hinduism have had a profound impact upon Indian foreign 
policy makers. The teachings of Gandhi and Nehru have 
reflected and propagated earlier teachings. From these 
fountainheads have sprung the traditional Indian emphasis 
on neutralism, world peace and nonalignment as expressed 
in the five principles of Panch Shila.
The Sino-Indian War of October I9 6 3 , provided a 
great stimulus for modification of traditional Indian 
foreign policy. There ensued a much greater emphasis on 
military preparedness, and the desire to strengthen the
^^Ibid,. pp. 407-411.
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importance of the three Himalayan kingdoms in the con­
text immediately becomes obvious.
Shielded partially by relative geographical iso­
lation, and located between two more powerful neighbors, 
the three kingdoms of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal have 
sought the traditional foreign policy objectives of iso­
lationism, and attempting to balance the power of stronger 
nations against each other. With this information as a 
backdrop. Chapters V through VII will provide a special­
ized analytical examination of the political, economic 
and defense relationships of India with Bhutan, Sikkim, 
and Nepal, The purpose of this is to develop the first 
phase of a definitive category scheme based on the inter­
nal relations, external relations, and defense relations 
of India with the countries involved.
CHAPTER V
INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH NEPAL
Indian Aid Programs^
The Indian aid program to Nepal has been both 
extensive and comprehensive. The Hindustan Times reported 
on November 7, 1963 that India was working on 105 develop­
ment projects in Nepal, under 24 major programs of Indiein 
aid.2
By June 196?, India had spent about Rs 50 crores
(5 0 0 million dollars) (Nepali currency) in the kingdom and
had pledged another 40 crores for development in the next 
3
five years. One object of the Indian aid program has 
been to supplement the efforts of Nepal to develop its
The following weights and measures will be useful
for the present chapter, and those that follow:
Rs = rupees.
Rupee = the monetary unit of India = app. $0.21. 
i lakh = 100,000.
1 crore = 10 million.
Motmd = a greatly varying weight of India. In 
Madras a Mound is equal to about 25 lbs.
^"India Working on 105 Plans in Nepal,” Hindustan 
Times ; Vol. XIIX, No. 5» November 7. I9 6 3 , p. 12.
^"India Is Largest Single Aid-Giver to Nepal," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 24, June 171 1967, p* 9»
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economy and to raise the living standard of its people.
A second goal has been to strengthen India's position in 
the Himalayan region by reinforcing traditional ties of 
similar culture and heritage between India and Nepal. To 
compete vfith aid from other countries such as the U.S., 
China, Russia, West Germany and others, India has doubled 
the amount of its foreign aid to Nepal. The 1964-1905 
Indian aid figure was 62,736 Nepalese Rupees, and the 
1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 7 figure was 113,194 Rupees.^ Communist China, 
India's main competitor in the area, has also more than 
doubled its foreign aid to Nepal during the same period. 
The total Chinese commitment for 196? was Rs 35 crores 
(Nepali currency) of aid, 3o percent of which remained to 
be spent.^ Regardless of the motives, Indian aid has been 
benefiting important sectors of the economy of Nepal.
One of Nepal's most critical problems has been a 
lack of adequate means of transportation. Hence, with the 
onset of massive Indian aid, the task of constructing a 
large number of roads throughout the country was begun.
The tribhuvan Rajpath, the first National Highway of 
Nepal, was completed in December, 1956, with Indian assis­
tance. The 79 mile road, which was constructed by Indian
4
Â. T> Chandramohan, "Surplus at Last," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol. 53» No. 4, July 2 8 , I9 6 6 , p. l4i.
^Hindustan Times, June I7 , 1967» p. 9*
rjC
artay on^ineers, cost tho Xtidian uovoz'tusent r<a million
and connects Katmandu with the Indian border. Tho highway 
was formally handed over to the Nopal Govommont on 
June 30, 1957* Speaking at the presentation ceremony at 
ilianhot, Nr. Bhagwan SoI:sy, Indian ;\mbassador, said the 
road "bad supplemented tiie ago-old cultural links between 
the two countries." King Mahendra expressed his "doop 
sense of t h a n k f u l n e s s . A  tripartite agreement of 
January 1958, between Nepal, India, and the United States, 
provided for the construction of extensive roads at a 
total cost of about Rs 8 0 0  lakhs (Nepalese currency).
India has also provided a large number of technical per­
sonnel for the Regional Transportation Organisation 
engineering Division. Work was started on various roads 
under thi& program and up to >farch 1 9 6 3 » about 300 miles 
of roads were constructed in different areas of Nepal By 
an agreement signed on April 25« 19Ô2, India had undertaken 
the construction of a road linking Katmandu with Dakshinkali 
in East central Nepal at an estimated cost of Rs If. 6 
laks.^
^"Tribhuvan Rajpath Handed to Nepal," Hindustan 
Times, Vol. VIII, no. 27, July 4, 1957, P* 1*
^Ibid., p. 1 .
u
"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Ministry of 
Finance « Governtaent of India, Calcutta, August, 1^6^, 
p. id.
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On August 2 5 , 1 9 6 4 , India and Nepal signed -a fur­
ther agreement committing India to build for Nepal a 128 
mile highway between Sunauli, a border town in the plains, 
and Pokhara Valley in Midwestern Nepal, at an estimated 
cost of over Rs 9 crores. The agreement of the Govern­
ment of India to extend assistance for the construction 
of the road was first officially mentioned as part of an 
India-Nepal joint communique issued in New Delhi on 
August 3 0 , 1 9 6 3. The road was expected to be completed 
by December 1 9 6 8.  ^ India has also agreed to build the 
major portions of Nepal's most ambitious highway project 
to date— a 640 mile east-west highway to connect its 
eastern and southern borders through the southern foot­
hills.^^ The total cost of the road was estimated by 
Rs 22 crores* The agreement envisages that the eastern 
portion connecting Jhapa to Janakpur will be completed 
by India in March 1971» As for the middle sector the 
Russians have been building an 85 mile stretch from 
Dhalkebar to Adhaver, while the U.S. is building a 52 
mile stretch from Hetaura to Narayangarh,^^ India will
"Text of Fifth India-Nepal Joint Communique," 
Foreign Policy of India ; Texts of Documents 1947-1964, 
Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, India, p. 349*
^^"Text of Seventh India-Nepal Joint Communique," 
Foreign Policy of Indiaî Texts of Documents 1947-1964, 
Lok Sabha Secretariat, Now Delhi, ^
T. Chandramohan, "Indian Aid," Far Eastern 
Economic Review* Vol. 49, No. 7» August 12, I9 6 5, p* 2 8 7.
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take up the construction of a 110 mile stretch from
Butwal to Nepalgunf in the western sector after March
1971 and will look also the construction of the remaining
12portion of the highway westward. The east-west road,
it is stated, will not only help the Nepal government in
linking remote parts of the country, but will also help
in promoting expanded trade between Nepal and India. The
Chinese who have been stepping up their economic aid to
Nepal were to have built this road but had agreed at
Nepal's request to withdraw from the project. The road
passes through the Southern Nepal Terai region near
Indian territory, and India was prepared to pay for the
construction of the major portion of the highway and step
13up her aid to Nepal.
In addition to the construction of roads, India
has assisted Nepal in the construction of airfields. India
is building seven or eight airports in various parts of 
l4Nepal. Work on airstrips at Simra, Jankpur, Bhairawa, 
Biratnagar and Pokliara have been completed. India has
"'"India to Build Nepal Highway," Hindustan Times. 
Vol. XYII, No. 5 1 » December 29, 1966, p. 9 "X-mas-Presents," 
Far Eastern Economic Review. Vol. 55t No. 2, January 19,
1 9 6 7 , p. 7 9.
M Ali, "Nepal at the Crossroads," Far East­
ern Economic Review, Vol. 121, No, 4, April 22, 19^5 9 ?» 159* 
^^Hindustan Times. July 1, I9 6 5 » P* 6 .
^^Ibid.. August 12, I9 6 5 , p. 288.
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also agreed to improve the runways and other facilities 
at Nepalganj, Tumlingtar, and Rajbiraj airports.
Under the Canal and Drinking Water Supply Board 
Program, entirely financed by India, 15 out of l6 irri­
gation projects sponsored by the mission have been com­
pleted. These programs are providing irrigation facili­
ties for l40 thousand acres of cultivated land. India 
has also built 24 water supply schemes covering every 
large town in the kingdom at a cost of Rs 145 lakhs,
The network of irrigation projects was undertaken by India
as part fulfillment of her obligations to Nepal under the 
l8Colombo Plan.
Under a village rural development program spon­
sored by India, Nepalese village development blocs, and 
three intensive valley development schemes at Pokhara, 
Lalitpur, and Palung were provided assistance. India, 
under agreements signed in 1959 and 1 9&1 , has committed 
aid of Rs 400 lakhs, and Rs 112 lakhs respectively for 
the program which sought to subsidize projects meant to 
benefit rural areas. These programs included 320 schools 
and libraries, 71 0 drinking water schemes, 280 culverts
^^"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian
Ministry of Finance, p. 13
17
18 "Nepal’s Irrigation Projects," Hindustan Times, 
Vol. VI, No. 7, Sept. 15» 1955.
• Hindustan Times. June 17» 19&7» P» 9*
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and bridges, 1 10 village roads, 37 panchayat ghars, 11
school grounds, 1 5 , new ponds, 6 parks and other miscel- 
19laneous works.
Nepal has several streams and rivers running 
across the country and consequently the country’s hydro­
electric power potential is very great. India has taken 
up the construction of Nepal's biggest power project to
date— the Trisuli Hydel Project. The project is located
20at Trisuli Bazar, 28 miles from Katmandu. Designed to 
produce 1 2 , 0 0 0 kw of power, in the first stage, and 2 1 , 0 0 0  
ultimately, the project when completed will provide light 
and power to stimulate industrial development in the Kat­
mandu Valley. Tlie project undertaken by the Central 
Water and Power Commission of the Government of India 
will cost an estimated Rs 6 0 0 lakhs, which is being pro­
vided entirely by that Government as a gift to Nepal.
In March 1963» Shri Lai Bahadur Shastri, Minister 
for Home Affairs of the Government of India, visited the 
project at the invitation of King Mahendra, during a^state 
visit. He was pleased to find that work on the construc­
tion of the barrage and power-house was progressing well
^^"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian 
Ministry of Finance, p. 20.
^^"Indian Aid for Nepal Project," Hindustan Times. 
Vol. VIII, No. 20, May l6 , 1957, p. 12.
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and stated that the pace of construction "would be speeded 
up. "21
The Phewatal Hydel Project in Pokhara has also 
been undertaken with Indian aid The project envisages
the generation of 100 kw of electric power for the Pok-
22hara Valley at an estimated cost of Rs 20*6 lakhs. In 
addition to these two, several new agreements were men­
tioned in a joint communique issued in February 19^5 by 
the Governments of India and Nepal. The talks resulted
in an agreement by India to provide aid for further pro-
2 3gross on the Karvali hydel project.
To provide benefits of modern technology and com­
mon service facilities to skilled artisans of the Patan 
area of Nepal, India has entered into an agreement with 
that country to give aid to the extent of Rs 28.8 lakhs 
for establishing an Industrial Estate at Patan itself.
The project is designed to provide facilities such as 
power and workshops, for the economic and efficient run­
ning of small scale industries under one roof where com­
mon services will be provided on a cooperative basis.
21 "Text of Fourth India-Nepal Joint Communique," 
Issued Simultaneously in Katmandu and New Delhi on 
March 5, 1963, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, p. 3^8.
22"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian 
Ministry of Finance. p. 29.
^^"India Will Provide Aid to Nepal Hydel Project," 
Hindustan Times. Vol. XVI, No. 7» February 18, 1965, p. 8 .
142
The agreement alâu pi’Oviùôa xOr facilities for the pur­
chase of stores, equipment and machinery as well as
24financial and technical guidance to businessmen. In 
addition India and Nopal signed a joint communique in 
February 1964 committing India to extend a Rs 1 crore 
loan for the industrial development of Nepal. The loan 
was to be repayable in 15 equal annual installments with 
interest at 3%» It was meant to facilitate the purchase 
of capital goods from India and for equity investments 
in industrial projects such as paper, jute, cement, tex­
tiles, and other industries for which machinery is avail­
able in India.
In the field of schemes designed to benefit local 
communities, Nepal has formulated a number of projects 
for the provision of medical, education and drinking 
water facilities. In this sphere too, India's contri­
bution has been significant. Aid has been rendered for 
running the Paropkar Sliri Panch Indra Rajy a Lakshmi 
Devi Maternity Home at Katmandu, and providing up to date 
equipment for a Child Welfare C e n t e r . N e p a l  has received
24"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian
Ministry of Finance. p. 29,
^^"India Will Give 
Nepal," Hindustan Times. February 27, 1964, p. lo
26 "Cooperation for 
Ministry of Finance, p. 31
o c
“ One-Crore Project Loan to
Progress in Nepal," Indian
1^3
a gift of a 500 bed hospital from India. The hospital
with all its auxiliary components such as X-ray units,
ambulances, etc., cost about Rs 400,000 and was estab-
27lished in the Katmandu Valley. Indian aid for drink­
ing water supply schemes has been facilitated by the 
building of canals by the Canal and Drinking Water Sup­
ply Development Board of Nepal. Twenty plans have al­
ready been initiated including the installation of hand 
pumps, and water pipe systems. India has assumed finan­
cial responsibility for a Katmandu water supply project 
at a cost of Rs 126.4 lakhs, which will provide an addi­
tional 3 2 , 0 0 0 gallons of drinking water per day to the
28capital.
India has been active in helping Nepal to instruct 
a growing number of technical and other trained person­
nel. In March I9 6 2 , nearly 1,500 Nepalese were in train-
29ing institutions in India. The entire cost of training 
such personnel as physicians, engineers, agronomists, 
etc., has been assumed by the Indian Government and India 
has also helped to set up three training institutions 
within Nepal itself. These include an Engineering school, 
operative since 19591 a Forestry Institute at Hithaura
27 "Modernization of Nepal," Hindustan Times. 
Vol. VI, No. 35, September 1, 1955» p« 10.
28
°Ibid.. p. 33.
29"Cooperation for Progress xn Nepal," 
Ministry of Finance, p. 35.
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for the purpose of training forest rangers and a Rural 
Institute in the outskirts of Patan, to train persons 
who are involved in implementation of the Village 
Development Program. Personnel trained at the Insti­
tute include Block Development Officers, Social Education 
Organizers, Village Development Workers, artisans and 
o t h e r s . I n d i a  has helped to construct, develop and
provide teachers for Nepal’s first university--Tribhuvan
31University begun in 1959» Thirty professors and lec­
turers have been provided and a sum of Rs 32 lakhs has 
been made available for expansion and library needs at 
Tribhuvan and Trichanda College in Katmandu* Rs 3-2 
lakhs have also been provided for the improvement of
the Tribhuvan Adarsha Vidyalaya, which is being devel-
32
oped as a model public school.
There are many other areas in which Indian aid 
programs have assisted Nepal. A survey was undertaken 
in 1 9 5 6 - 1 9 5 7 for upgrading the Raxaul-Amlekliganj rail 
line and extending the line to Hithaura. In 1958 India, 
the U.S. and Nepal had signed an agreement and subse­
quently constructed 58 wireless stations for Nepal. Two 
have been located at Katmandu, and the rest throughout
^^Ibid.. pp. 35-36.
^^"Nepal’s First University: India's Aid,"
Hindustan Times « Vol. XI, No. 42, October 20, I9 6 0 , p. 1.
"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian 
Ministry of Finance, p. 39»
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tlie country." A topographical sui'vey of Nepal to prepare 
detailed maps of the country conducted at the request of 
King Mahendra has also been completed. In addition,
India has been making geological surveys in Nepal, with 
a particular emphasis on the investigation of ground 
water resources in the Katmandu Valley. Further sur­
veys for the exploration of mineral resources, such as 
the Godavari marble deposit, the Arkhaulo Kulikhani cop­
per deposits, and the copper and cobalt deposits of Samar 
Bhamar have also been conducted by India. To facilitate 
the surveys, a chemical laboratory has been set up at 
Katmandu. India has also provided aid in an attempt to 
develop the orange growing valley of Pokara into a modern
34winter resort and has assumed a major share of respon­
sibility for a National Archives Project. An agreement 
provides for the cataloging and microfilming of documents 
and manuscripts, as well as designing and constructing 
of the archives building itself. Under another program, 
archeological excavations have been carried out at 
Lumbini, and pre-historic explorations in the Katmandu 
Valley.
^^Nepal to Have Tele-Links in Two Months," Hin­
dustan Times. Vol. XV, No. l6 , April l6 , 1964, p. 3.
r> lt. _
"Indian Aid to Develop Nepal Tourist Spots," 
Hindustan Times « Vol. XI, No. 351 September 1, I9 6O, p. 4.
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On April 12, I965 ♦ the Indian post off ice located 
in the Indian Embassy Compound at Katmandu closed. Until 
that time, India had handled the postal services of the 
nation. In 1959, Nepal started its own postal services 
to the outside world after becoming a member of the Uni­
versal Postal Union. The Indian Embassy continued to run 
parallel services. The closing of the Indian service 
marks the end of Nepal's dependence on India, for an essen- 
tial service. The services of senior Indian officers in 
fields such as forests, posts and telegraphs, law, parlia­
mentary affairs, education and accounts have been made 
available on Nepal's request, and have also been helpful
o £
in the reorganization of Nepal's Governmental Departments.
In addition to the commitment of funds for aid 
programs, Nepal is obtaining great advantage from a canal 
project known as the Koai-Gandak, financed entirely by 
India. Prom the Kosi portion, a western canal will pro­
vide irrigation for over 33,000 acres of land in the Saptari 
district. A hydro-electric power station is under con­
struction on the East Kosi main canal which will generate 
an estimated l8,000 kw of electric power, half of whJ.ch
^^A. T. Chandramohan, "Deplored Demise," Far 
Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 4°, ilo. 12, June 12, 1 9 6 5 ,
pp. 5 4 2-5 4 3.
"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian 
Ministry of Finance, p. 46.
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will bo made available to Nopal* Tîie Kosi project will
also provide protection t'rora floods in an area of about
500 square miles in the Morang District, which was
37devastated by a flood in 1954. A similar project on 
the river Gandak was expected to provide irrigation facili­
ties and hydro-electric power to largo underdeveloped
38aroas in Nepal and India. T h e Qandak Project will pro­
vide irrigation for 1.43 lakh acres in Nepal, and water 
supply for an additional two lakh acres in the Hapti Doon 
area. A power house located in the same region will be
constructed entirely for Nepal's benefit and become
39Nepalese property. In a joint communique Issued at the
end of a three day visit of Prime Minister Shastri of
India to Nepal stated in May 1 9 6 5s
"These two projects (the Kosi and Gandak) are sym­
bolic of the joint efforts to the two countries to 
provide in cooperation with each other a better and 
fuller life to their p e o p l e .
India has spent a great deal in money, material,
and manpower in its Nepalese aid missions. Mr. Phriman
37
A. T. Chandramohan, "Kosi Landmark," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol. 48, no. 9» May 2 7 , I9 6 8 , p. 393.
38 "Text of India-Nepal Joint Communique," issued 
in Katmandu on June l4, 1959, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New 
Delhi, p. 341.
'^^"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indl&n 
Ministry of Finance, p. 49.
40"Indie Assures Aid for Nepal's Development," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. (^VL, No. lo, p. 4,
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Narayan, India's ambassador to Nepal, said in Patna on
December 30, 1 9 6 5 » that India had spent about Rs 32 crores
for development projects in Nepal during the last ten 
4lyears.
However, it would be wrong to imagine that India 
is the sole source of Nepalese aid or that other countries 
do not participate substantially. The East-West highway, 
already mentioned, is a case in point. In I9 6O, King 
Mahendra took direct control of the government of Nepal 
and has since become known for the skill with which he 
has made his country a profitable focal point of the eco­
nomic cold war. Russia, Communist China, the U.S., India, 
the United Kingdom, West Germany and Israel have foreign 
delegations in Katmandu and vie for "the privilege" of 
providing the kingdom with roads, hospitals, schools, 
factories, technical training, etc.' The Russians agreed 
on April 8 , 1964 to construct a 120 kilometre section of 
the Katmandu-Kodari Road, and an agricultural implements 
plant at Birganj on the Indian border. A survey for a 
cement plant is also going on. Three other Soviet projects, 
the Panuati hydro-electric project, a cigarette factory 
at Jankpur and a sugar mill at Birganj, have been com­
pleted.
41"India Spends 32 crores on Nepal Projects," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 52, December 30, I9 6 5 , p. 9.
42Andrew Nathan- "Nepal on Your Map," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol. 7 8 , No. 13» June 25» 196?%
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The Communist Chinese are also involved in Nepalese 
aid as exemplified by the construction of the major portions 
of the Katmandu-Kodari road mentioned earlier. Moreover, 
the Chinese are constructing a brick factory in Katmandu,
a tannery and shoe factory in that same city and two ware-
4 3houses, one in Katmandu and the other in Birganj. At 
the end of a five day state visit to Katmandu in March I9 6 7 » 
West German President Leubke agreed to provide a long 
term loan to the Nepalese government of D M 5 million.
West Germany has also showed interest in giving Nepal 
agricultural aid by offering technical advice on raising 
farm yields in certain regions and supplying fertilizers
44in bulk. The United States has provided approximately 
1 1 0 million dollars worth of economic assistance since its 
aid program commenced in Nepal in 1951. U.S. aid, which 
now runs about 10 million dollars annually, helps to pro­
vide for basic economic and social needs such as rural 
development, education, health, communications, forest
development, small industry, military assistance and 
4*3others. The following is a table of the major for 
aid contributors to Nepal for a four year period:
43A. T. Chandramohan, "Sino Soviet Aid," Far 
Eastern Economic Review. Vol. 71, No. 6 , May 7, 19^4,
pT 2 8 8.
LL
‘■'"German Aid, " Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol. 55, No. 1 3 , March 3 0 , 19&7. p. 603.
^^"Background Notes— Nepal," Dept, of State Publi­
cation 7904 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
October, 1967, P» 4.
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TABLE 4
MAJOR FOREIGN AID CONTRIBUTORS TO NEPAL 1964- 1967
Contributing
Countries
Amount of aid in Nepalese 
Rupees (Million)
1963-64 1 9 6 5 - 6 6 1 9 6 6 - 6 7
India 62,736 8 8 , 8 7 6 1 1 3 , 1 9 4
United States 6 5 , 5 3 0 6 0 , 0 3 7 48,168
Communist China 12,144 1 6 , 1 3 7 3 0 , 2 2 0
U.S.S.R. 463 1 1 , 4 3 0 1 8 , 5 0 0
Others 1 7 4 737 6 , 8 5 0
N = 141,047 1 7 7 , 2 3 7 2 1 6 , 9 2 7
Source : Adapted from data obtained from the "Far Eastern 
Economic Review," July 28, 1966, p. l4i«
The foreign aid has enabled Nepal to maintain a 
balanced economy as exemplified by the 1964-1965 budget 
as shown on the following page.
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TABLE 5 
THE NEPAL BUDGET 1964-5
Nepalese Rupees Million
Expenditure
Regular 1 2 3 . 1
Development 2 1 7 . 2
Total 340.3
Income
Current revenue 1 6 3 . 9
New taxes 1 5 . 0
Foreign aid
ÜS 94.4
India 19.3"
China 1 2 . 7
USSR 1 . 1
Switzerland 0 . 6
Ford Foundation 0 . 1
Total 1 2 8 . 3
Cash balance from 1963-4 1 2 . 5
Foreign loan 15.5
Internal loans ? . 0
Total 340.3
Foreign Exchange Budget
Rev. Est. Est.
Income 1 9 6 3 - 4 1964-5
Invisible export 2 7 . 1 2 6 . 5
Visible export 4.1 6 . 0
Foreign Embassies 2 . 0 2 . 5
Foreign aid 7 . 1 5 . 5
Miscellaneous 12.7 6 . 5
Total 53.0 4 7 . 0
Expenditure
Embassies 5 . 4 6 . 6
Development 1 6 . 2 3 8 . 2
Reverse fund 9 . 7 1 0 . 0
Invisible import 0.9 1 . 0
Debt redemption fund 0 . 2 1 . 0
Miscellaneous 4.9 4.8
Total 37.3 6 1 . 9
Balance +1 5 . 8 -14.9
^Excluding another Rs 79»5 million Indian aid
projects not directly undertaken by Nepalese Government, 
Source: His Majesty’s Government, Katmandu.
^ A: Ti Chandramohan, "Balanced Budget, Far Eastern 
Review, Vol. LX, No. 24, July 19» 1958, p. 8 .
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The nature of the Indian goal in Nepal--to protect 
Indian security through the development of a government 
capable of performing needed services and of carrying out 
needed reforms--has shown clearly in Indian policy during 
the last decade. In spite of pressing needs at home,
Indian experts have been dispatched to Nepal to train an 
army and a civil service, to build schools and roads where 
almost none existed before. Since 1950, India has spent 
millions of dollars in that country for development pur­
poses. Undoubtedly, Indian aid in Nepal, involving calcu­
lations of high strategy, economic planning, and military 
aid programs, are designed to bring maximum returns for the 
expenditures. This aid is intended to build a shield to
47keep Chinese power contained north of the Great Himalaya.
The Indo-Nepal agreement on the utilization of Gandak waters 
for irrigation and power development is a source of con­
flict. Although Nepal's sovereignty and territorial juris­
diction remain supreme, some Nepalese view the river agree­
ment with suspicion and feel it compromises the nation's 
sovereignty. Although Indian aid is designed to enhance 
the stability and security of the kingdom, Nepalese often
48complain of wastage and lack of concrete results.
47Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, pp. 124-125.
48Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 35t February 22,
1962, p. 397.
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Foreign Investments
In addition to foreign aid, the Government of Nepal
began in 1958 a policy of inviting foreign capital for
investment in any peaceful industry in the kingdom under
a new industrial policy. The new policy has welcomed
foreign capital in industries other than those of arms
4 9and ammunitions. By the 1 9 6 3-1 9 6^ period foreign indus­
trial investments in Nepal were as given in Table 6 on the 
following page.
Thus, in the area of foreign investments as well 
as foreign aid, India certainly does not have a monopoly 
in the kingdom of Nepal, As though catalyzed by the com­
petition of other nations for foreign aid programs in 
Nepal, India has increased its activities in this area.
In a joint communique issued in October I967 by the Govern­
ments of India and Nepal the Deputy Prime Minister of 
India assured the Deputy Prime Minister of Nepal of India's 
increasing assistance both material and technical in the 
economic development of Nepal, He also agreed to arrange 
an early technical appraisal of the Karnali hydro-electric 
project for the purpose of determining India's interest 
in it. Mr, Kirti Nidhi Rista, the Nepalese representative, 
thanked the government of India "for its generous help
49"Inviting Foreign Capital," Hindustan Times, 
Vol. LX, No, 24, July 19, 1958, p, 8.
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TABLE 6
MAJOR FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS IN 
NEPAL DURING 1963-4
Name Investment 
(NRS '000)
Source Comments
Janakpur Cigarette 
Factory
20,000 Russian Aid 2,000 million 
sticks per year
Birgunj Sugar Fac­
tory
30,000 Russian Aid Crush capacity 
1,000 tons per 
day
Maharajgung Leather 
Factory
7,000 Chinese Aid
Indo Nepal Cotton 
Textile
31,500 Birla Bros Private Indian 
firm
Golchha Woolen 
Works (P) Ltd.
n.a. Golchha Co. Private Indian 
firm
Golchha (P) Ltd. 1,900 Golchha Co. Producing cata- 
chu for betel
Sahu Jain Ltd. 2,200 Sahu Jain Private Indian 
firm; sugar 
crushing, ca­
pacity of 1,000 
tons per day
Nepal Commercial 
Corporation (P) 
Lid.
800 Private 
Indian firm
Tapes and dyes
K.A. Dikshir 
Products Ltd.
n.a. Private 
Indian firm
Camphor, 
resins, tur­
pentine
Mr. J.V, Coapman n.a. Private
American
Hunting camp^®
Andrew Nathan, "Nepal on Your Map," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol. ?8, No, 13, June 25, 1964, p. bè>9*
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and assistance. In addition, an eight member delega­
tion of the Nepal Chamber of Commerce touring India, 
told businessmen and industrialists in Madras on January 13, 
1966 that there was wide scope for India to establish 
industries in Nepal. The group had said that the Nepal
Government had assured foreign investors of a tax holiday 
52
for ten years.
Indian-Nepalese Trade Relations 
The flow of trade and commerce between India and 
Nepal is an ascient as the history of the two countries.
The geographical contiguity of Nepal and India makes them 
interdependent and complementary to each other in many 
ways. This is particularly true in the context of their 
economic geography and trade. Exports from Nepal to India 
include:
a. jute and jute manufactures 
b« rice
c. ghee
d. mustard and rape seed
e. wood and timber
f. medicinal herbs
"India to Step Up Economic Assistance to Nepal," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 24, November 4, 19&7* 
p. 4.
^^"Nepal Offers Incentives to Indian Investors," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, No. 3, January 20, I9 6 6,
P  •  2  #
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g. oil seeds.
Imports from India to Nepal include:
a. textiles
b. salt
c. tobacco
d. mineral oils
e. iron and steel
f. cement
g. drugs and medicines
h. sugar, tea
i. motor vehicles and machinery
j. cigarettes
k, vegetables and vegetable oils 
531 . soaps.
Nepal's trade with India has steadily increased 
over the last few years. During the 1964-1965 period 
Indian exports to Nepal were valued at Rs 1,662 lakhs and 
imports amounted to Rs 721 lakhs, resulting in a surplus 
of Rs 941 lakhs for I n d i a . A  comparison of Nepal's 
foreign trade with India for the period 1959-1968 is as 
follows :
Shri Manubhai Shah, "Trade Between India and 
Nepal," The Indian Review, Vol. 64, no. 4, April, 1965s 
p. 1Ô0 .
54"Nepal Needs Indian Consumer Goods," Hindustan 
Times, Vol. XVII, No, 4, January 27, 1966, p. 2.
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TABLE 7
DIRECTION OF NEPAL'S FOREIGN TRADE
Imports Exports
1 9 5 8- 1 9 5 9- i9 6 0- 1 9 5 8- 1 9 5 9- 1 9 6 0-
1959 1960 1961 1959 1960 1961
India 9 7.6 9% 1 3 .8 8% 9 2.0% 9 8.95% 9 9.0 2% 99.3%
Ti? i. 0 . 6 0 0 . 9 8 N.A.* 1 . 0 5 0 . 9 8 N.A.*
Other
Countries 1 . 7 1 5.14 8 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0
Total 1 0 0% 1 00% 1 00% 1 0 0% 100% 1 0 0%
N.A, = not available
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 35i
March l6 , 1962, p. 6l9« Dan Galenpaul. Information Please 
Almanac, I9 6 9, p. 2l6.
Between 195# and 1 9 6 2, the volume of Indo Nepalese
cc
trade had more than doubled. We can thus readily imagine 
the enormous economic influence which India might exert 
upon Nepal when we consider the significance of the fact 
that more than 90 per cent of Nepal's total foreign trade 
is with India.
It becomes even more significant when we realize 
that Nepal is a landlocked country and depends upon Indian 
ports exclusively for access to the sea. Originally 
India's trade relations with Nepal were regulated under a
^^Hindustan Times, February 27, 1964, p. 1.
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October 1950» The agreement stipulated that the:
"Government of Nepal agrees to levy at rates not lower 
than those leviable in India custom duties on imports 
from and exports to, countries outside India. The 
Government of Nepal also agrees to levy on goods pro­
duced or manufactured in Nepal, which are exported 
to India, export duties at rates sufficient to prevent 
their sale in India at prices more favorable than those
i r rk r^ H flf  r^r* o H  r%v* m n n n ' P a  r* +  "in  T n H i A  xjV»*îr*V»
subject to central excise duty."5®
The Government of India had presumably been influ­
enced by the consideration of preventing the smuggling of 
goods into India from Nepal and of protecting the coun-
try's industries. The restriction on export goods to
57India was rather harsh. In January 1957# the Nepalese
government had suggested to India two important changes
to the treaty. One of the amendments desired by Nepal
was to enable her to market her goods within India and
overseas at the price her economy permitted. The other
change Katmandu desired was that Nepalese foreign exchange,
controlled by India would come directly under the control 
rA
of Nepal.'' On May 27, 1959# Prime Minister Koirala of 
Nepal informed the Government of India of Nepal's desire 
to revise the 1950 treaty which was to expire in June,
^^Jirilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (New 
York: Asia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 9 3-9 4,
5?Ibid., p. 9 4.
^^Hindustan Times, January 31# 1957# P» 8.
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1 9 6 0,^^ A new Treaty of Trade and Transit was signed
between the two governments on October 31j 1 9 6O. In its
preamble the treaty intentions the:
"desire of the two governments to strengthen economic 
cooperation between India and Nepal and gives expres­
sion to their conviction in the benefits likely to 
accrue from the development of their economics toward 
a common market.
This implies chat both Nepal and India, placed as 
they are in one geographic economic area, should endeavor 
to meet the requirements of each other, and both should 
assist in each other's economic advancement and develop­
ment. The i960 treaty considerably modified the 1950 
agreement, but the fact remains that most of Nepal's 
economic ties with the outside world still run through 
New D e l h i . N e p a l  has sought measures to broaden its 
trade with countries other than India, and reduce its 
dependence upon that country for imports. In 1 9 6I a State 
trading corporation, the National Trading Ltd. was estab­
lished to encourage trade with other countries other than 
India and provide better organization in Nepal's foreign 
trade. It handles about $0% of all non-Indian trade.
^^Hindustan Times, June 4, 1959» p. 12.
^^Shah, "Trade Between India and Nepal," p. I8 1 .
Leo £. Rase, "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan 
Border States," Orbis« Vol. V, No. 2, Summer, 1 9 6 1, p. 201.
^^"Basic Data on the Economy of Nepal," U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce 
Reports GBR 6 8 - 8 6 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
Sent- 1968). D. 8 .
i6o
Pakistan and Nepal agreed to accord to each other, 
most favored nation treatment in a trade agreement con­
cluded between the two countries in October, 1 9 6 2.
According to the details of the agreement, this treatment 
extends to all matters relating to customs duties on the 
export and import of goods and to facilities governing 
customs operations. India agreed to Nepal's request for 
transit facilities across her territory for Nepal's trade 
with Pakistan, at an Indo-Nepalese official level con­
ference in October, 1 9 6 3. Two ports, Radhikapur on the 
East Pakistan-India border, and Wagha on the West Pakistan- 
India border, had been fixed through which transit would 
take place across the Indian territory. At ministerial 
level talks held in Katmandu, the Nepalese Minister of 
Commerce and Trade, Mr. Vedanond Jha, explained the need 
for Nepal to diversify and increase the volume of trade 
with new countries. The Indian Minister of International 
Trade, Mr. Manubhai Shah, stated that India appreciated 
Nepal's desire to diversify her trade and assured Nepal of 
India's cooperation in this regard, in accordance with the 
Nepal-India treaty of 1 9 6 0.^^ However, Shah admitted in 
the Lok Sabha in December 1964, that there was a difference 
of view between India and Nepal on the question of service
go
Mookerjea, "Indo-Nepalese Relations," Calcutta 
Review, July 1965» p. 48.
^^Hlndustan Times, February 27, 1964, pp. 1, 12.
i6i
charges to be levied for supervision and handling of 
transit traffic at Radhikapur, The Indian delegation 
which had negotiated the matter with Nepalese authorities 
had suggested a service charge of Rs l.$0 per ton and 50 
paise per parcel. The Nepalese delegation had desired 
that no service charges should be levied at all, Mr, Shah 
explained that while it was true that India did not col­
lect any charge for providing services and facilities for 
Nepal's transit trade through Calcutta port, small charges 
were collected for "certain special types of services,
Nepal was obviously distressed at the restrictive 
behavior of the Indian Government with regard to transit 
facilities through Indian territory and the use of Indian 
ports. The Nepalese Commerce and Industry Minister, 
Vedanand Jha, said in an informal conference with newsmen:
"India's refusal of transit facilities to starting 
trade with Pakistan via Radhkapur did really touch 
the sentiments of the Nepalese people. We really 
feel distressed, • , , We never imagined that India 
could ever go beyond the treaty of I96O and demand 
from Nepal such a charge when even Pakistan was not 
charging from her for Indo-Afghan trade through 
Pakistan , « the Indian delegation put forward 
one demand after another,"”®
Despite these restrictions, Nepal has continued
to expand its trade with other countries.
^^"India Not Hampering Pak-Nepal Trade": Shah, 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XV, no, 51t December 1?, 1964, p, 9«
^^"Nepal Presses for Transit Facilities," Hindustan 
Times, Vol. XV, no, 52, December 24, 1964, p, 9«
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On September 9, I9Ô5 » Nepal signed a trade agree­
ment with the Soviet Union, by which transactions were to 
be made in Nepalese rupees.
In October, I9 6 5, Nepal signed an agreement with 
Yugoslavia for trade on a barter b a s i s . B y  December 
1 9 6 7 f Nepal had trade agreements with seven different 
countries including India, Communist China, the United 
Kingdom, Pakistan, the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia and Poland. 
However, Indo-Nepalese trade also continued to expand 
rapidly so that over 90% of Nepal’s total trade continued
69to be with India. An intergovernmental joint committee
(Border Committee) was established in January I9 6 7, by
Nepal and India to resolve trade difficulties between the
two countries:
"to make further endeavors severally and jointly to 
make available to each other commodities and products 
which one country needs from the other and to avoid 
to the maximum extent possible diversion of commer­
cial traffic or deflection of t r a d e . "70
To provide further facilities for transit traffic
T. Chandramohan, "Doors to the World," Far 
Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 49, no. 11, September 9,
1965, p. 4 9 3.
^®A. T. Chandramohan, "Another Outlet," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol. 3O, no. 2, October l4, I9 6 5, P» 51*
69 "Basic Data on the Economy of Nepal," U.S. Depart* 
ment of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce CBR 
68-86, September 1 9 6 8, p. 8 .
^^"Joint Commission for Industrialization of 
Nepal," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVlll, no. 1, January 5,
19 6 7, P • 5 •
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across India and to remove the difficulties which had been 
experienced by Nepalese importers and exporters, it was 
agreed upon by the two countries that all cargo arriving 
at the port of Calcutta would be moved in the first instance 
to a transit shed, where it would be expeditiously cleared 
by the customs authorities in Calcutta. It has also been 
agreed that Indian laws will not apply to the transit 
trade of Nepal. Indian railway authorities attempt to 
move Nepali import and export cargoes expeditiously.
India has agreed to provide a separate and self 
contained space for handling Nepalese cargo at an Indian 
port in West Bengal in principle. The matter will be dis­
cussed further between the two governments in a study to 
be made of the arrangements which are in force for the
movement of cargoes from the ports of Rotterdam, Trieste
71and Hamburg to land locked states.
Nepal has little foreign trade with nations other 
than India because of three factors: an unstable currency
which necessitates payment in Indian currency; the small 
size of Nepal's demand for goods manufactured outside 
India; and its dependence on Indian railways and ports for 
shipments from abroad. Some trade was formerly carried 
on with Tibet, but the volume has dwindled since the Chinese 
occupation of the plateau. In view of the predominantly
T^Ibid., p. 9.
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agricultural character of Nepal's economy, imports from 
India are naturally concentrated on basic industrial products 
which are not made in the kingdom. The principal articles 
of export from Nepal into India are agricultural products 
such as rice, mustard, and oil seeds. Traditionally, 
whatever is imported into India flows freely into Nepal.
This aspect of trade has been emphasized in the Indo-Nepal 
Treaty of Trade and Transit which came into force in Novem­
ber, i9 6 0. It is probable that most of Nepal's trade will 
remain confined to India in the foreseeable future. The 
market for Indian goods can be affected only if this 
Himalayan kingdom starts importing in much greater quanti­
ties from other countries. This possibility is dampened 
by the fact that Nepal has little or no foreign exchange 
reserves. However, under the Indo-Nepal trade agreement 
of i9 6 0, Nepal has the freedom to pursue its own trade
with foreign countries and is seeking to expand its activi-
72ties in this area.'
Politico-Legal Relations 
A comprehensive detailed study of the politico- 
legal relationship of India with any one of the three 
Himalayan kingdoms could serve as the basis of a doctoral 
dissertation in itself. This is not the purpose of this 
work, which is designed instead to develop definitive
72Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, pp. 110-111.
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categories for the purpose of providing another interna­
tional relation tool for the study of big power-small power 
relationships. Hence only those elements relevant to that 
purpose will be explored.
If China’s main interest in Nepal is the expansion 
of its influence over territory where it previously exer­
cised suzerainty (a policy which Hans Morganthau would 
call imperialism), India's interest is economic and cul­
tural as well as strategic. Her geographical contiguity 
with Nepal as well as her economic-cultural connections 
make essential the development and maintenance of close 
contact with the Himalayan Kingdom. This is so not just 
as an adjunct to India's economy, but also as a strategic 
necessity in containing Communist Chinese expansionist 
designs with regard to the three Himalayan Kingdoms, and 
parts of Indian territory itself. (A policy which Mor­
ganthau would name that of desiring to preserve the
%
status quo via containment.) This position in turn 
involves the maintenance of political strength in order 
to prevent interference with or discrimination against 
her economic and political interests in Nepal. Nepal 
is not a bonafied buffer between India and China for two 
reasons. Firstly, Tibet is not a natural part of China. 
Secondly, even if China's claims over Tibet are accepted 
as they have been by both Nepal and India, this does not 
detract from the fact that the main Himalayan ranges lie
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to the north of Nepal and it is the Himalayas that form
the only natural strategic defense line between China
and South Asia. Also, Nepal does not possess any natural
73boundary with India.
The significance of this is that India must main­
tain close economic and cultural relationships with Nepal, 
and prevent, at all costs, Chinese influence in Nepal, 
less it bring that influence to bear south of the Him­
alayan barrier, and directly threaten India's northern 
border.
Indo-Nepalese relations rest upon a Treaty of
Peace and Friendship signed with the Ranas on July 31,
1 9 5 0. Several clauses in the treaty are almost identical
with those of a Treaty signed between Britain and Nepal
74at Katmandu on December 21, 1923.
When Chandra Shumshere was Prime Minister, the
Anglo-Nepalese Treaty was signed under which the British
75government recognized the sovereignty of Nepal. Arti­
cle I of the treaty reads:
"Article 1: There shall be perpetual peace and friend­
ship between the governments of Great Britain and 
Nepal, and the two Governments agree mutually to
^^Girilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (New 
York: Asia Publishing House, 1 9 5 9 p. 8 6,
^'Levi, "Nepal in World Politics," Pacific Affairs. 
September, 1957* p. 2 3 6.
^^Jain, India Meets China in Nepal, p. 92.
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both internal and external."76
Nepal was never reduced to the status of a British
protectorate (in a legal sense) as were Bhutan and Sikkim,
In referring to the Treaty, the London Times stated:
The Treaty . . .  is another mark of the fuller recog­
nition of the unrestricted independence of the kingdom 
of the Gurkhas which followed the war. It was then 
signalized by change of the style of the British 
representative from that of resident tothat of British 
Envoy at the Court of Nepal, Katmandu."77
The 1923 treaty served as a model for the 1950
agreement. Article one of the latter treaty states:
"Article 1: There shall be everlasting peace and
friendship between the Government of India and the 
Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree 
mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence 
of each other."7°
Despite the seemingly comprehensive terminology
in the treaty there is one limitation on Nepal's freedom
of action in external affairs. Article 2 states:
"The two governments hereby undertake to inform each 
other of any serious friction or misunderstanding 
with any neighbouring state likely to cause any 
breach in the friendly relations subsisting between 
the two governments,"79
^^Por full text of the "Treaty between Great 
Britain and Nepal, 1923" see Appendix F.
77”Treaty with Nepal," The London Times. No. 
4 3 ,5 3 2, December 24, 1923, p. 9»
7®Por the full text of "India-Nepal Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship," Issued in Katmandu on July 31,
1 9 5 0 , see Appendix 6.
79*'Text of India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friend­
ship," Issued in Katmandu on July 31, 1950, Texts of Docu­
ments Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, p. 5 6.
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The Treaty also permits Nopal to import arms 
through India (Article 5), which is the kingdom's only 
access to the rest of the world.
During the revolt against the Rana regime in 1950- 
1 9 5 1» India advised both sides in the conflict and played 
a leading role in negotiating the terms of peace. The 
Rana representatives finally accepted India's proposed 
reorganization of Nepal's political structure and agreed 
to restore King Tribhuvan to the throne and to recognize 
him as the King of Nepal. The King approved the proposals 
immedaitely. The Nepali Congress Party leaders, after 
considerable persuasion by the Indian Government and some 
further negotiations with the Rana regime, finally acceded 
to the compromise plan. Since 1951, India's policy has 
apparently been to assist Nepal in establishing a stable 
popular government that will develop a sound political 
administration and social system, capable of withstanding 
internal and external subversive forces. This policy 
seems to be acceptable to the Nepalese ruling powers, 
despite repeated accusations by political opposition 
groups that it involves undue Indian interference with 
both internal and external affairs. The New York Times
âoForeign Affairs Studies Division, The American 
University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (with 
Bhutan and Sikkim)," Department of the Army Pamphlet 
550-35 (Washington: Government Printing Office, May
1964), p. 1 9 3.
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reported on Jannory 9 ; 1 9 5  ^ that according to reliable
sources, a serious internal situation was building up in
Nepal, with the pro-Chinese Communist Party and anti-
Indian elements separately opposing the Government. The
article went on to scry:
"India is deeply concerned that the strategic bor­
der state shall remain stable within the Indian 
sphere of influence as a buffer against Communist 
China.
The anti-Indian movement gained support among 
Nepalese living in the Katmandu Valley as the civil ser­
vants living there had created the impression that the 
Indian advisers had taken over the Nepalese administra­
tion. The Indian advisers had attended cabinet meetings 
which was regarded by dissidents as proof enough that the 
independence of Nepal had been compromised. In addition, 
the Nepali business community had resented the presence 
of Indian business men. The provisions of the Indo- 
Nepalese Trade Agreement of October 1950 already men­
tioned, added fuel to the fire. The anti-Indian feeling 
in the Katmandu Valley continued to grow in 1953 and 
1954* India suffered from the failure of the Nepalese
leaders to give the country a stable administration and
82to improve the lot of the people. The Indian authorities
Qi
"Nepal-India Moves Counter Red Plot," Now York 
Times. Vol. Cl, No. 34,318, January 9, 1952, p. 3*
82
““Jain, India Meets China In Nepal, pp. 94-97
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have functioned as intermediaries between various politi­
cal groups sometimes exerting a moderating influence on 
the parties involved, particularly when their activities 
seemed to endanger governmental stability. Almost all of 
India's efforts in this respect have brought accusations 
of "interference," "domination" and a "threat to Nepal's
O o
sovereignty." Anti-Indian sentiment has been aroused
on occasions, and in several instances has been manifested
by demonstrations. The position of Nepal with regard to
the India-China dispute in 1959 was not in accord with the
sentiments of the Indian Government. Nepalese Prime
Minister B. P. Koirala said on September 4, 1959 that
Nepal should not "take sides or get involved in any way"
84in the dispute. When King Mahendra struck at the elected 
government in December I96O, he also in a way struck at 
India's defense interests. Establishment of closer rela­
tions with China and Pakistan and the reduction of the 
role of India in Nepal no doubt is a policy which has
O e
gained the King's support from Nepalese nationalists.
Relations between India and Nepal began to be
^^"Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-35i”
May 1 9 6 4, p. 1 9 4,
84“"Nepal Not to Get Involved," Hindustan Times, 
Vol. X, No, 37* September 10, 1959, P= 1.
O g
K. Krishna Moorthly, "Worsening Nepal-India 
Row," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 Vol. XXXVIII, No. 5*
p. 200.
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strained in 1 9&9 , after the flight of political exiles to 
India. According to the Nepalese government, the politi­
cians in exile in India, who according to Nepal, were 
using India as a safe haven, were responsible for the 
striking increase in rebel activity in the kingdom. As 
the tempo of the activities increased, Nepalese officials 
became more resentful toward India for allegedly giving 
asylum to the exiles and providing them with bases and
8Ômaterial support for their operations against Nepal.
King Mahendra himself has denounced these Nepalese
leaders for directing guerilla violence "from the sanctuary
of a foreign power." In January 1962, when an attempt
was made to bomb his car, the king repeated the charge,
saying "Some people from foreign soil are making improper
07
efforts to disturb the peace in the country."
The increase in strained relations was marked by 
an anti-Indian demonstration on January 26, 1962 in front 
of the Indian Embassy at Katmandu. On April 17, 1962, 
Nepal's Ministry of National Guidance issued a sixty page 
pamphlet charging that rebels operating from Indian bases 
were conducting raids into Nepalese territory. The King
"Dept, of the Army Pamphlet," 550-35• May 1964, 
p. 194; Dept, of State Publication 7904, October, 1967#
P c  4c
^^Times of India (Delhi), January 24, 1962; 
"India's Dilemma in Nepal," The Economist (London), 
February 17# 1962, p. 624.
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after threatening to take the question of India's encourage­
ment of the raids to the United Nations sent his Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Rishikesh Shah, to New Delhi early in 
September 1962 for talks with Prime Minister Nehru, Minister 
of Defense Krishna Memon and other cabinet ministers. The
Nepali Monarch also appealed to the Indian Government to
88stop giving support to the armed opposition movement.
On October 1, 1962 Bihar's Deputy Police Minister declared 
that Indian outposts on the Nepal border had been rein­
forced and other precautionary measures taken after an 
"unprovoked firing" by Nepalese policemen in Raxaul.
He told the Bihar State Legislative Assembly that the 
incident had caused panic and widespread resentment 
among the people on the border. The Bihar Government 
asked the Indian Central Government to make a strong 
protest to the Nepalese Government. In a note to the 
Nepalese Government on October 4, 1962, the Indian
External Affairs Ministry called for a joint Indo-
Ao
Nepalese inquiry into the incident. After the talks 
following the investigation and protests, the tempo 
of anti-government operations in Nepal subsided. This 
was due in part to Indian pressure on the emigree Nepalese 
political leaders to desist from actions against the
p. 28=
88Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 124.
89Far Eastern Economic Review. November 1, 1962,
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Nepalese Government that threatened to demoralize Nepal's
internal security forces. More important, however, was
a decision of the emigree leaders themselves to cease
their militant activities because of a mounting Chinese
90Communist tlireat to the Himalayan region in general.
Another irritant to Indian-Nepalese relations was
the passage by Nepal of the 196? Land Tenancy law. The
law restricted the ownership of land and other property
to Nepalese citizens. Mr. Dinish Singh, Minister of
State for External affairs, said in a speech before the
Rajya Sabha in November 196?:
"Under the treaty of peace and friendship signed by 
the two countries in 1 9 5 0, they agreed to give each 
other's nationals "equal treatment" with their own 
nationals . . .  therefore any provision made to 
discriminate against Indian citizens by equating them 
with other foreigners would appear to be in violation 
of this agreement."91
Nepal agreed to hold discussions regarding the 
situation.
These then are the elements which act as a cen­
trifugal force, serving to disrupt Indo-Nepalese relations. 
However, the elements of Indo-Nepalese cultural affinities, 
economic interdependence, and geographical contiguity 
catalyzed by a mutual suspicion of Communist designs in 
the Himalayan area, have acted as a stronger centripetal
^^"Department of the Army Pamphlet $00-35," May 
1964, p. 194.
"Nepal Government to be Approached," Hindustan 
Times, Vol. XVIII, No. 48, December o, 196?, p. 3»
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force serving to solidify relations between the two.
Nepalese authorities, on the whole, have a high regard 
foi Indian advice. Government leaders when confronted 
with serious problems frequently visit New Delhi to seek 
counsel from the Indian Government. As pointed out earlier, 
Nepal depends upon India ports for contact with the out­
side world.Throughout the 1947-196? period friendly 
messages, statements and joint communiques have been 
issued by both governments with regard to their "special 
relationship." Nepalese Prime Minister Rana said on 
July 31* 1 9 5 0 upon the signing of the India-Nepal Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship:
"I am confident that the treaty will help in strength­
ening and making yet closer the present happy rela­
tions between our two countries which have lived in 
perfect peace, amity and understanding throughout
the centuries."93
In 195 4 Mr, Mahendra Mikraiu Shah, Nepalese ambas­
sador to India, told a meeting of the International 
Centre, a socio-cultural organization of Kanpur:
"We appreciate the generous friendship of the gov­
ernment of India who in spite of their vaster and 
more complex problems and shortage of technical men 
had always shown their willingness to meet ungrudg­
ingly the needs and demands of Nepal."94
92"The Subcontinent of Asia," Department of State 
Publication 7410, November 1 9 6 2, p. 62,
"Foreign Policy of India," Texts of Documents 
1 9 4 7-1 9 6 4 , Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1964, p. 5 8.
94"Nepal's Foreign Policy," Hindustan Times,
Vol. y, Noi 5 2 * December 30, 1954, p= 9=
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In his inauguration of the India-Nepal Friendship 
Association at New Delhi in November 1955» King Mahendra 
said:
"India and Nepal are two independent and sovereign 
nations, of the same great family. Racially, 
spiritually and culturally we are closer than we 
are to other countries . . ,"95
The two countries expressed solidarity on matters
of international peace, anti—colonialism, respect foz each
other’s territorial sovereignty, and intention to consult
together on appropriate measures of mutual assistance in
the texts of joint communiques issued between June 1959
and November 1963*^^ Statements of friendship were issued
by leaders of both countries during the same period.
Perhaps a statement by Dr. 5, Radhakrishnan, President
of the Republic of India on August 27» 19&3» is a good
example of many such utterances:
"Our friendship is based on cultural links, on geo­
graphical proximity, on historical tradition, on a 
great heritage to which we are both heirs. It is my 
ambition that our policy towards each other must be 
one, if nothing more, of friendship and well being 
of our people,"97
To the disquiet of the Indian Government, China 
has been trying to agitate anti-Indian sentiments in 
Nepal, Chinese designs toward the Himalayan kingdom are
^"Close Indo-Nepal Relations," Hindustan Times, 
Vol. 6, No, 46, November 17» 1955» P» 1. 
g6
"Foreign Policy of India," Texts of Documents 
1 9 4 7-1 9 6 4, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1964,
pp, 3 4 1-3 5 4 ,
97lbid,, p, 350.
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being pursued by a triple line of action. These consist 
of a political line of Communist indoctrination and 
infiltration, a military line aiming at secuiing control 
over strategic boundaries, and a diplomatic line which 
aims at discrediting and isolating I n d i a , B e t w e e n  1964 
and 196 7 Indo-Nepalese relations remained generally friendly 
and cooperative. King Mahendra said in Banaras on Decem­
ber 1965 that the relations between Nepal and India which 
went back to ancient times, would be further strengthened
by the efforts of the people and the governments of the 
99two countries.
A joint communique was issued by both countries 
on December 20, I965 at the conclusion of King Mahendra's 
three week tour of India, The two countries agreed that 
the policies of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence had 
promoted the concept of equality among all sovereign 
states, big and small. The communique noted the continu­
ing growth of co-operation and partnership "in diverse 
fields of activity to the mutual benefit of both coun­
tries,"^®^ In April I9 6 6, Mr, Sui'ya Bahadur Thapa,
qA
Satyabrata Rai Chowdhuri, "Nepal--A Study," 
Modern Review, Vol. CXVII, No, 4, April I9 6 5, p, 294,
^^"Nepal King Confident of Stronger Ties with 
India," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No, 49• December 9s
1 9 6 5, p, 4,
^®®"Nepal Supports Our Stand on Self-Determina­
tion," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No, $2, December 30, 
*1 r\Ct^ ^  V
^  f y  * J- •
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Chairman of Nepal's Council of Ministers, commended
India's efforts to ’’build good neighborly relations" with
Pakistan on the basis of the Tashkent declaration. The
chairman declared:
"there are no serious problems between India and 
Nepal and that there was a complete understanding 
and identity of views between them on important 
issues."ICl
Indian President Radhakrishsan declared on Novem­
ber 5» 196 6 that India and Nepal would stand together 
whatever may be the cost or consequences. In addressing 
a meeting of the Indo-Nepal Friendship Association in 
Katmandu the President said:
"We may have our differences here and there, but 
deep down, there is this calm, connection, a kind 
of intermingling of cultures of our two coun­
tries. "102
At the conclusion of talks between India's Deputy 
Prime Minister Moraji Desai and Nepalese Deputy Prime 
Minister Kirti Nidhi Bista at Katmandu in late 19&7 a 
joint communique was issued by India and Nepal. The Com­
munique said:
"The two Deputy Prime Ministers reiterated their 
firm support and unflinching dedication to the 
principles of peaceful coexistence, non alignment, 
international cooperation and p e a c e . "^03
101,iNepal Assured of All Possible Aid," Hindustan 
Times, Vol. XVII, No. 1 6 , April 21, 1 9 6 6, p. 6 .
I'^^iipresident Underlines Indo Nepal p. 2 Affinity," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, No. 26, December 12, I9 6 6.
103’’India to Step Up Economic Assistance to 
Neoal." Hindustan Times* Vol. XVIII, No. 24, November 4,
1967,
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The nota stroasoci the need to olimiaato the 
throat of war eud said the two loaders wore plcdsod to 
the eottlemant of coaflic cs through peaceful means « 
relaxation of internationai tensions "based on the prin­
ciples of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty,
104justice, equality, and peaceful co-existence." Though
China was not mentioned by name, the principles of 
foreign policy to which Nepal and India had declared their 
adherence made it clear that they were united in opposing 
the path of violence chosen by Peking. They also ex­
pressed the hope that in times to coiao the bonds of 
friendship between Nepal mid India would go "from strength 
to strength.
Defenses
Nepal is signatory to no formal military alli­
ances and has sought to avoid any appearance of political 
alignment which might complicate the relations with 
either Ccitnauiist China or India. It is interesting to 
note as mentioned in earlier chapters that both India and 
China have announced that if Nepal were attacked they 
would come to her aid.'^^^ Nepal has a 20,000 man standing
‘^^Ibid., p. 4. 
lO^Ibid.. p. 4.
Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-35," May
1964, pp. 343-344.
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army. In addition, there are 10,000 Gurkhas serving
in the British army and 21,000 in the Indian army which 
could be called home in the event of a national emer­
g e n c y . S u f f i c i e n t  manpower is available to maintain 
an array of some 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 men in addition to those al.eady 
serving in Gurkha units. The annual expenditure from 
state funds by the Ministry of Defense has almost doubled 
between the fiscal year 1 9 5 6 - 5 7 and the fiscal year 1 9 6I- 
6 2 . The Ministry of Defense spends more than any other 
government agency. Nineteen military check posts on the 
boundary with Tibet are manned solely by Nepalese forces. 
The main pass across the $00 miles Nepal Tibet border is 
the Kodari Pass (6,500 foet).^^^
The army had proved loyal to the government and 
been called upon to protect the integrity of the Crown.
In December I9 6O, when the King took direct control of 
the government, army units patrolled the streets of 
Katmandu and a number of political leaders, including 
cabinet members, reportedly were taken into custody and 
detained by the military pending disposition of their 
cases. The King has been the supreme commander of the
^^^Statesman*s Yearbook, 1 9 6 8-1 9 6 9, p. 1268.
X03Pradyumna P. Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms 
(New York: Van Nostrand, 1 9 6 3)» p. 117»
^^^"The Defense of India's Northern Borders," 
India Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 1, January-March, I9 6 6 ,
Ir» • • >
i8o
Royal Nepalese Army since the overthrow of the Rana 
legime in 1 9 5 1, and reserves for himself the portfolio 
of the Minister of Defense. In July 1958, an Indian 
military mission to Nepal which was in that country at 
the request of the Nepal Government to train and modern­
ize the Nepalese Army, ceased to function. In asking 
the mission to return home. King Mahendra "thanked it 
for its satisfactory completion of the job."^^^ An 
Indian Military supply and liaison group continues to 
function in Katmandu. In 1964, Nepal had decided to 
accept limited arms aid from Britain and the United States 
to modernize the Royal Nepal army. King Mahendra was 
emphatic in stressing on the occasion that there would be 
no change in Nepal’s policy of non-alignment.
In every sense of the word, Nepal is a viable 
sovereign state. Briefly summarizing the subcategories 
developed in our original scheme as applied to the situ­
ation in Nepal's relations with India:
I. INTERNAL RELATIONS:
A. Rule Making Authority--Under the control of 
the Royal Nepalese Government; no Indian control.
B. Rule Adjudication Authority--Under the control
^^^"indian Military Mission in Nepal," Hindustan 
Times, Vol. IX, No. 30, July 24, 1958, p. 11.
^^^A. T. Chandraraohan, "Dovecoter Calm," Far 
Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 6 9 , No. 4, April 23, 1964,
^  1 my  j. •
l8l
o f  the Royal Nepalese Government; no Indian control.
C. Rule Application Authority— Under the control 
of the Royal Nepalese Government ; no Indian control.
D. Economic Aid and Investments.
In the 1 9 6 6 -6 7 period India was furnishing 113*194 
million Nepalese Rupees of foreign aid for about 3^% of 
Nepal's total foreign aid of 216,927 million Nepalese 
rupees. While Indian aid is substantial, Nepal is 
becoming less and less deperidenc upon India for assistance. 
Traditional contributors such as Communist China and the 
Soviet Union have increased their aid Lo a great extent. 
U.S. aid remains high and new donors such as West Germany 
are advancing increasingly large amounts of aid. With 
regard to foreign investments in Nepal, India partici­
pates in less than 30% of these, with the Soviet Union 
the largest investor and the United States and Communist 
China also participating substantially. Hence, foreign 
economic aid and investments from India in no way infringes 
upon the internal sovereignty of Nepal.
E. Internal Communication and Transportation.
Although Communist China and India have helped
in the construction of Nepal's internal transportation 
and communication systems, neither exercises any form 
of control over these vital facilities. Until April 12, 
1 9 6 3, India had handled the postal services of the nation, 
but this is no longer true.
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F, Currency--The monetary unit is the Nepalese 
rupee, printed and distributed by the Nepalese government,
G, Conclusion— Nepal has formal control over its 
internal relations, though India has enormous indirect 
influence through its domination of foreign trade and 
large share of economic aid.
II. EXTERNAL RELATIONS
A, Diplomatic Representation--Nepal is a member
of the U,N, and has diplomatic relations with most coun-
112tries of the world, India has no right by treaty, nor
has it sought by imposition of its will to speak on behalf 
of the Government of Nepal, Nepal’s sole responsibility 
to India in the area of foreign relations is stated in 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship which 
obligates the two governments "to inform each other of any 
serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring 
State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations 
subsisting between the two governments•"
B, Foreign Trade--Over $0% of Nepal’s total 
trade is with India, In addition, Nepal being a land­
locked country depends upon Indian ports for access to 
the sea. These facts give India an enormous capacity to 
apply pressure to the Kingdom in the form of economic 
sanctions, India has not chosen to do so, because of the
112Dick Wilson, "Himalayan Honour," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol. 117, No, 12, March 25, 1965» p,
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generally harmonious relationship between the two coun­
tries; except for one occasion, A service charge of 
Rs 1 . 5 0  per ton and 50 paise per parcel have been levied 
on transit traffic at the port of Radhikapur through which 
flow impoi'ts and exports between India and Pakistan, How­
ever, trade between Nepal and other countries has been 
expanding rapidly in the last few years. Competition 
with Communist China for Nepalese trade would act as an 
inhibitor against India's invoking economic sanctions even 
if she should desire to do so. As Nepalese trade with 
other countries continues to expand, India's leverage to 
apply economic sanctions will decrease. Hence, although 
India dees possess this capacity for influencing Nepalese 
foreign relations, it does not in any measure control 
these relations.
Conclusion--(a) Nepal has formal control over its 
external relations, (b) India has an enormous capacity to 
apply economic sanctions by its control over Nepalese 
access to the sea, and the large volume of trade which 
is negotiated between the two nations,
III, DEFENSES
Under the control of the Royal Nepalese Govern- 
•iient ; no Indian control.
CHAPTER VI
INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
The solitude which Bhutan enjoyed prior to this 
century has been eroded away by the emergence of India 
as an independent nation, and by recent Chinese Communist 
aggressive moves. Until recently Bhutan had followed a 
policy of isolationism. However, in 1959 Prime Minister 
Jigme Dorji, King tfangchuk, and other leaders of Bhutan, 
became convinced that progress could not be achieved 
without international intercourse, and they began negotia­
tions with the Indian Planning Commission for drafting a 
Five Year Development Plan. This had occurred after an 
earlier visit by India Prime Minister Nehru to Bhutan in 
September, 1958*
Indian Aid Programs 
£conon:ic development of Bhutan was the main topic 
of the two day discussions held between Prime Minister 
Nehru and King Mahendra which wore concluded in Paro on 
September 26, 1958» Mr. Nehru had emphasized the need 
for development of road com unications between India and
l84
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Bhutan y and within Bhutan itself. He expressed India's 
readiness to give technical aid and other kinds of assis­
tance required by the Kingdom,^ Subsequently as a result 
of a later visit by Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji 
to New Delhi in September 1959i India agreed to render
Bhutan both technical and financial assistance for the
2
construction of five all-weather roads.
Bhutan's first five year plan was financed solely 
by India, and implemented from I9 6I-I9 6 6. The total 
Indian expenditure was Rs 105 million, in addition to 
Rs 300 million spent by the Indian Border Roads Organi­
zation for road construction.
Indian expenditures allocated for economic devel­
opment during Bhutan's 1 9 6I-I966 Plan were as shown in 
the table on the following page.
A second five year plan beginning in 1966 and 
scheduled to terminate in 1971 at an expenditure of
3
Rs 200 million is also being totally financed by India.
More than 8OO kms of roads have been constructed
^"India Willing to Assist in Bhutan's Develop­
ment," Hindustan Times, Vol. IX, No, 39* September 2 5 ,
1 9 5 8 , p. 1 2 .
2
"Mr. Jigme Dorji on Indo-Bhutanese Relations," 
Asian Recorder, Vol. 3, September 19-25, 1959, p. 2903.
3
Pradyumna P. Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and
Cultural Geography (Lexington: Üniversity of Kentucky
" , p. Bi.Press, 1967)
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TABLE 8
INDIAN EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO BHUTAN DURING 
THE 1 9 6 1 -1 9 6 6 FIVE YEAR PLAN
Project
Expenditure 
in Rs million
Roads 6 2 . 0 0
Education 1 0 .0 0
Transport 7 . 5 0
Health 3 . 2 0
Forest Conservation 3 * 20
Agriculture 2 . 0 0
Power 1 .6 0
Animal Husbandry 1 .5 0
Industries 1 .1 0
Miscellaneous 9 .1 0
Total Rs 101.20
million
Source : Adapted from information obtained from the 
Information Service of India, Political Office « Gangtok, 
Siitkim, July 5» 1968, p. 5»
since planning began. A 208 kilometer road linking 
Phuntsholing on the Indo-Bhutan border in North Bengal 
to Paro and Thimbu in the interior has opened up Western 
Bhutan to motor vehicles for the first time. In addition 
to the Phuntsholing-Paro highway, three other north-south 
roads from the Indian border to central Bhutan have been 
constructed under the first Five Year Plan period. These 
are the Samdrup-Jongkar-Tashigang road; the Hatisar- 
Tongsa road; and the Sarbhang-Chirang-Wangdu Phodrang 
road. These roads have opened up large areas of central
^"Bhutan on Threshold of Great Changes," Hindustan 
Times, Vol. XI, No. 23, June 9» I96O, p. 2.
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and eastern Bhutan to motorized vehicles. A 300 mile 
(400 km) east-west road connecting all the major inner 
Himalayan valleys is under construction. It will link 
Paro and Tashigang when completed.^ India, aware of the 
military vulnerability of Bhutan if Chinese Communist 
aggression should occur, is giving financial and techni­
cal assistance for the construction of another 400 miles 
of new roads under a second Five Year Plan. In addition 
to the roads, small airplane landing strips have been con­
structed at Paro and Thimbu to provide links with India. 
Helicopters are used to provide fast travel between Hashi- 
mara and Paro-Thimbu.^
In the field of communications fifteen wireless 
units have been supplied by the Government of India, some
•7
of them for flood warning systems. In 1 9 6 3, India lent 
the services of a postal adviser to help modernize Bhutan's 
postal system.^ There are now 25 post offices in Bhutan, 
and eight more are to be opened in 1970. Telegraph
^"Bhutan and Sikkim,” Information Service of 
India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim, July 5i 1968, 
p. 6.
^Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography,
p. 7 9 .
Krishna Moorthy, "Bhutan the Economic Scene,” 
Far E.istern Economic Review, Vol. 31» February 23» 1961, 
p. 333.
o
Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography,
p. 81.
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facilities are also being constructed. Sites have already 
been built at Phuntsholing, Paro, and Thimbu, The Border 
Roads Organization of the Government of India has provided 
telephone links between some principal towns in western
9
and eastern Bhutan.
In the field of education, before the Five Year 
Plan, there were only 36 lower primary schools and 23 upper 
primary schools in the entire country. The total enrolment 
was about 2,500 children. By the end of 196?» there were 
108 schools, with a total student population of over 1 5 ,0 0 0  
students, one teacher's training institute, and one tech­
nical training school. In addition 5OO Bhutanese students 
were receiving training in I n d i a . A t  the technical 
training school students were being trained in the use
of the wireless, in mechanics, and other training sub-
11 12 jects* The schools teach Bhutanese, Hindi and English.
In September I96I, India and Bhutan signed a pact
to harness the Jaldhaka River for hydroelectric power,
A diversion wier has been constructed on the border of
q
"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of 
India, p. 7 ,
^^"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of 
India, p. ?•
■'^Daniel Wolfstone and M. P. Gopalan, "The Road 
to Bhutan," Far Eastern Review, Vol. 42, No. 3» p. 8 6 .
p. 333.
X2Far Eastern Economic Review, February 23, I9 6 1,
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Bhutan and India from which water is brought to a power 
house. The plant generates l8,000 kilowatts of power of 
which Bhutan receives without charge, 250 kilowatts daily. 
In addition to bringing benefit to the northern areas of 
West Bengal with its tea plantations, the plant is sup­
plying power to southwestern Bhutan, which has no supplies
13of coal and oil. The Indian Central Water Power Com­
mission has sent technical personnel to help the Bhutanese 
Government establish a Hydel Directorate Commission. Under 
this Commission's direction, the construction of a 400 kw
l4project to serve the needs of Paro is nearing completion. 
Indian engineers have been surveying likely sites on 
Bhutan's rivers for the location of other hydroelectric 
projects. A nuinber of small stations at Wangdu, Phodrang, 
Tongsa, Byakar Dzong, Tashigang, Ha Dzong, Sarbhang, and 
Satndrup Jongkhar have been recommended.^^
With the beginning of the first Five Year Plan, 
a department of Health was established within the Gov­
ernment of Bhutan, for the first time. Prior to the onset 
of the Plan in I96I, there were only 11 dispensaries and
13Karan, Bhutan; A Physical and Cultural Geography,
p. 4 7 .
14"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of 
India, p. 8.
p. 47.
^^Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography,
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p hospitals throughout the entire country. Only two of 
the hospitals had physicians. Since I9 6 1, the facili­
ties of these institutions have now been expanded, and 
all have qualified physicians. Three new hospitals have 
been constructed, and a fourth is underway. In addition, 
kO new dispensaries have been established. There has 
ensued an extensive campaign for the eradication of malaria, 
tuberculosis, leprosy, goiter and venereal disease.^
Water supply schemes for major Bhutanese towns have been 
completed, and a number of pharmacists and nurses have 
been trained in Bhutan and India.
A Bhutanese Government Department of Agriculture 
was also established with the first Five Year Plan. The 
Department has established a large number of model agri­
cultural farms, seed multiplication farms, and agricul­
tural research stations. Bhutan, a land of small farms, 
has predominantly an agricultural economy. A concerted 
effort is being made by the new Agricultural Department 
to increase the area under fruit and vegetable cultiva­
tion. A Department of Animal Husbandry has also been 
established after the inception of planning. Its achieve­
ments have been to initiate six livestock farms, a sheep 
breeding farm, a mithum breeding center in eastern Bhutan,
^^"Satisfactory Progress in Bhutan," Hindustan 
Times, Vol. XVI, No. 23, June I5 , I9 6 5, p. 2.
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furnished to Bhutan*”'' High level talks were held between
officials of India and Bhutan in February 196? at Thimbu
covering the entire range of Bhutan's second Five Year
Plan. At the talks Prime Minister Shastri of India
assured the Bhutanese King: . . the government of
India will gladly provide the necessary financial and
technical assistance for the implementation of Bhutan's
21development schemes."
In 1 9 6 2t Bhutan became a member of the Colombo 
Plan under Indian sponsorship. The Colombo Plan is an 
arrangement for discussing national economic development 
plans, providing technical assistance, and financing par­
ticular developmental projects for south and southeast 
Asia, established at Colombo, Ceylon in June 1951. The 
scheme followed discussions by the governments of India, 
Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain, 
Later the United States, Japan and a number of countries 
in southeast Asia joined the organization. The basic 
work is dons at one annual meeting. However, a continu­
ing body, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, deals with technical assistance. Financing 
of development projects is arranged bilaterally between
20"Aerial Survey of Bhutan," Hindustan Times, 
Vol. VIII, No, 1, New Delhi, January 3, 1957» p. 10.
^^"P.M. Assures Financial Aid to Bhutan," Hin­
dus tan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 3, January 21, I9 6 5» p. 3»
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22individual governments or the International Bank.
Six students have now received training in I.idio 
under the Colombo Plan in veterinary science. In addi­
tion, an agricultural expert from Japan has joined the
2 3Bhutanese Department of Agriculture in 1964. Several 
member countries of the Colombo Plan have offered scholar­
ships for Bhutanese students, but only those offered
24by India have been utilized." At a Bangkok meeting of 
the Colo:übû Plan Consultative Committee in November I9 6 3, 
a three-member Bhutanese delegation presented the imme­
diate requirements of the kingdom, calling attention to 
a shortage of transport, labor, and technical personnel 
as the main hurdles in the pi ogress of its five year 
development plan. The Australian government has sup­
plied 40 three-ton trucks and the United Kingdom has 
given four Land Rover Ambulances. A Colombo Plan survey 
for extensive sheep breeding, particularly in North-central 
and northeastern Bhutan, has indicated that the prospects
^^Statesman's Year Book 1968-1969* pp. 45-46.
^^Foreign Affairs Studies Division, Special 
Operations Research Office, The American University, 
"U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sikkim and Bhu­
tan)" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1964), p. 3 9 5.
Far Eastern Economic Reviewj April 9i 15*4#
p. 8 5 .
'^Karan, Bhutan, pp. 75» 8l,
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are good»^^ By a tiealy aigned with India in August 9,
1 9 4 9f Bhutan has agreed to be guided by India in its 
foreign relations. Besides a subsidy of Rs 500,000 pro­
vided for under the Treaty, India has been providing all 
Bhutan's foreign aid. Contributions by other nations
(under the Colombo Plan) have thus far been insignifi- 
27cant. Bhutanese leaders have felt that they have the 
right to approach foreign countries directly for economic 
aid, despite their treaty obligations to be guided by 
India's advice in foreign affairs. India, however, has 
feared that direct foreign contacts would draw Bhutan into 
power politics and might seriously harm its progress toward
28social and economic stability.
Foreign Investments 
Because of the backwardness of the country and 
lack of trained personnel, foreign investments in Bhutan 
have been insignificant. Modern industry is itself 
almost nonexistent in Bhutan. In I9 6 1, The Bhutanese 
Government had negotiated with a Swedish Company for 
technical assistance in developing a paper industry but
2Glbid.. p. 8 2 .
27Moorthly, Far Eastern Economic Review, Febru­
ary 1 6 , 1 9 6 1, p. 295; Karan, Bhutan, p. 19
28Paul Grimes, "Remote Bhutan Awakening to 20*b
Century," New York Times, Vol. CIX, No. 37,396, June 13,
i960, p. 8.
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these negotiations have recently been abandoned. Except 
for a fruit preserving plant, which processes oranges and 
pineapples, and a distillery owned by an Indian entre­
preneur, handicraft industry accounts for most of the goods 
produced. In 1963-1964, a team of Japanese also considered 
the possibility of a rayon pulp and paper plant for which 
raw materials would be obtained from the Conifer forests 
in the upper reaches of the Wang Chu, Foreign assistance 
is being sought for the plant and also for matchwood and
29
plywood industries.
Indo-Bhutanese Trade Relations 
With the sealing of the Tibetan border in 1959t 
Bhutan's trade has been limited to India (95%)$ and the 
members of the Colombo Plan (5%)»^^ Under the 1949 treaty 
there is free trade between India and Bhutan, and India 
provides facilities for the carriage, by land and water, 
of Bhutanese produce. India has fuither given Bhutan 
the right to use the Indian forest roads along the border 
area, and Bhutan''is free to import, through India, what­
ever arms, ammunition, and machinery are needed for the 
defense and welfare of the kingdom. Bhutan's total annual 
trade is valued at Rs 1,000,000 and all of Bhutan's
29Karan, Bhutan, p. 4?.
p . 207.
30Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year, I9 6 3,
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foreign exchange needs for development purposes are met
T 1
by the Reserve Bank of India.
Exports from Bhutan to India include:
1. Timber
2 . fruit
^  VV4 a.
4. handicrafts
5 . rice
6 . food grains
7 . potatoes
8 . forest products
9 . handloom cotton cloth.
Exports from India to Bhutan include:
1, Cotton textiles
2 . light machinery and equipment.
Politico-Legal Relations 
The strategic position of Bhutan from the stand­
point of India's political geography cannot be over­
stressed. Bhutan is the pivot for the defense of India's 
northeastern frontier. An unfriendly or Chinese dominated 
Bhutan would flank India's position in upper Assam, and
32
strategically place the Chinese south of the Himalayas.
31Pradyunma P. Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms (New 
York; Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 43»
32A. R. Field, "Bhutan Kham and the Upper Assam 
Line," Vol. Ill, No. 2, Summer, 1959» p. 182,
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India's relations with Bhutan have as their 
foundation the India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, signed 
by both countries and issued in Darjeeling on August 8 , 
1 9 4 9* The treaty was basically patterned after a British 
treaty with the Maharaja of Bhutan revising certain arti­
cles of an earlier treaty, the Sinchula treaty, of 
November 11, l8 6$« The Sinchula Treaty had followed a 
period of hostility between Britain and Bhutan between
1837 and l864 in which the Bhutanese continually raided
33British troops occupying the Durrang Duars in Assam.
The sturdy Bhotias using the hills as natural fortifica­
tions defeated an English garrison in I8 6 5 , with heavy 
losses to the British. This, combined with developments 
inside India, and the experience of the Great Rebellion
of 1 8 5 7 1 probably prevented the British from further expan-
34sion, and helped Bhutan to remain independent. The date 
of the Treaty Revision Agreement was January 8 , 1910.^^
The Sinchula Treaty had ceded the Duars to the British 
Government, freed British prisoners, and established free
O A
trade between Bhutan and British India. It also
33Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 3 6 .
' iL
Hem Chandra Haider, "India's Neighbor: Bhutan,"
Modern Review, Vol. I0 7 , April, 1 9 6O, p. 310.
^^For full texts of the I865 Sinchula Treaty and 
the January 1910 revision Treaty see Appendixes H and I.
^^"India," The London Times, No. 25,353, November 27,
1 8 6 5* p. 1 2 .
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guaranteed an annual allowance of Rs $0,000 (Indian Rupees)
"provided the Bhotias abstained from fresh breaches of
peace." The major significance of the 1910 Amendment
Treaty was that it amended Articles IV and VIII of the
earlier Sinchula Treaty. Article IV increased the annual
allowance to the Government of Bhutan fro.j Rs $0,000 to
Rs 100,000. Article VIII required the Bhutan Government
to agree to the arbitration by the British Government of
all disputes between Bhutan and the Rajahs of Sikkim and
Cooch Bihar and "to abide by the decision of the British 
37Government." Article VIII of the amended Treaty guaran­
teed Bhutan control over its internal relations and the 
Bhutanese Government agreed to be guided by the advice 
of Britain with regard to its external relations:
"Article VIII: The British Government undertakes to
exercise no interference in the internal administra­
tion of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Govern­
ment agrees to be guided by the advice of the British 
Government in regard to its external relations.
Under the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, India has 
also formally guaranteed to Bhutan that it will not inter­
fere in the internal administration of the country. Bhutan 
has also agreed to be guided by the advice of India in
"The Sinchula Treaty of l86$," Principal Treaties 
and Documents Relating to Bhutan (Lexington: University
of Kentucky Press, 1967), P® 93 o
^®"Treaty with the Maharaja of Bhutan Revising 
Certain Articles of the Sinchula Treaty of l86$," dtd.
8th January 1910 Bhutan (University of Kentucky Press, 
1 9Ô7 ), p. 9Ô.
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39regard to its external relations. These provisions 
were specifically mentioned in Article II of the agree­
ment, which is an exact duplicate of Article VIII of the 
191 0 Revision of the I865 Sinchula Treaty, which Bhutan 
had signed with Britain. In the case of the 19^9 Treaty, 
India replaces Britain in the wording which states :
"The Government of India undertakes to exercize no 
interference in the Internal administration of Bhutan. 
On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be 
guided by the advice of the Government of India in 
regard to its external relations."*
Other major provisions of the treaty include the
following :
à. It should continue in force in perpetuity unless 
terminated or modified by mutual consent (Arti­
cle X),
b. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship 
between the government of India and the Govern­
ment of Bhutan (Article I).
c. The Government of India agrees to make an annual 
payment of Rs $00,000 to the Bhutan Government 
(Article III).
d« There shall be free trade and commerce between
the territories of the Government of India and 
the Government of Bhutan, and the Government of 
India agrees to grant every facility for the 
carriage by land and water throughout India of 
Bhutan produce, including the right to use such 
forest roads as may be specified from time to 
time (Article V). 
e. The Government of India agrees that the Govern­
ment of Bhutan shall be free to import with the
assistance and approval of the Government of
^^Robert Trumbull, "India, Bhutan Sign Perpetual 
V, New York Times. Vol. XCVÎÎI, No, 33,43$, August 9 
1 9 4 9, p. 3.
^®"Text of India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship," 
issued in Darjeeling on August 8, 1949, Texts of Docu­
ments . Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 4,
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India, fxOiu Ox through India into Bhutan what­
ever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material 
or stores as are desired for the strength and 
welfare of Bhutan (Article VI),
Other clauses of the treaty relate to reciprocal judicial 
(Article VII) and extradition facilities (Article VIII).
Relations between Bhutan and India have been out­
wardly friendly; Speaking at a state banquet in January
1 9 5 4 , Prime Minister Nehru stated that India would help
42Bhutan materially, with "affection and understanding."
India has also reaffirmed Bhutanese independence and its
non-imperialistic aims with reference to the Kingdom.
Nehru speaking at a public meeting at Faro, Bhutan, on
September 23, 1958, said that India's only desire for the
border state was that it should remain independent and
choose its own direction of progress, Mr, Nehru asserted:
"Some may think that, since India is a great and 
powerful country and Bhutan a small one, the former 
might wish to exercize pressure on Bhutan. , , •
It is essential that I make clear to you that our 
only wish is that you (Bhutan) shall remain an 
independent country, choosing your own way of life 
and taking the path of progress according to your 
will, , , ,"43
In a press conference held in New Delhi on
^^Ibid,, pp, 4-7. For full text of the 1949 
India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, See Appendix J,
42"Friendship with Bhutan," Hindustan Times,
Vol. V, No. 3, January 21, 1954, p. 2.
4i"Foreign Policy of India," Texts of Documents, 
1947-64. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1964, p. 8.
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September 15» 1959, Prime Minister Digme Dorji of Bhutan
mentioned the need for a furthering of cultural and other
contacts between India and Bhutan. He disclosed that in
November 1959 a delegation of about a hundred men and
k k•women would undertake a tour of India.
In a written statement of August 1964, Bhutanese
Acting Prime Minister Lhendup Dorji said that Bhutan’s
policy of friendship and "extreme cordiality" towards
45India remains unchanged. Upon the assassination of 
Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji on April 1964, the 
Government of India, at Bhutan’s request, had deployed 
a few expert crime investigators from Calcutta and New 
Delhi to assist Bhutanese officials in their investiga­
tion. The Indian Government charged that "a well laid 
out plot of Chinese conspirators" was involved in the
46assassination. Upon his return from Gangtok on Decem­
ber 30, 1 9 6 9 » Indian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. 
Dinesh Singh reported that King Mahendra was quite happy 
with existing arrangements in Indian-Bhutanese relations. 
His report said:
I±Il
Mr. Digme Dorji on Indo-Bhutan Relations,"
Asian Recorder. Vol. 5» September 19-25» 1959» p. 2903. 
45I "Accent on Friendship in Indo-Bhutanese Ties," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XV. No. 34, August 20, 1964, p. 6.
^^"Chinese Hand in Bhutan P.M.’s Assissination," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XV, No. 1?» P* 6.
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"The King was appreciative of the special relation­
ship and the collaboration his Government was 
receiving from the Government of Indiao"^?
The vagueness of Article II of the 19^9 Treaty 
relative to India’s "guidance" in Bhutan's foreign rela­
tions has been the subject of heated discussions in the 
Bhutanese National Advisory Assembly and is interpreted
by some Bhutanese leaders to mean that India may offer
48advice but Bhutan is not obliged to accept it. In
speaking about Indo-Bhutanese relations on May 8 , 1956,
Prime Minister Jigme Dorji stated:
"Bhutan considered herself independent and wanted 
49
to stay independent."
There is scope for various interpretations of 
what the Indian "guidance" in Bhutan's foreign affairs 
really means. Mr. Dorji said again at a news conference 
in New Delhi on September 15» 1959$ that his government 
stood by the Treaty of 19^9 with India under which Bhutan 
had agreed to be guided by India in its external rela­
tions, but this did not mean that the Government of India 
was to conduct Bhutan's foreign policy. He was of the
^^"Mr. Dinish Singh Visits Bhutan," Asian Recorder. 
Vol. XIII, January 22, 196?, p. 7505.
48
Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American 
University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal with 
Bhutan and Sikkim," p. l46.
49
A. M, Rosenthal, "Change Is Coming Bhutanese 
Says," New York Times, Vol. CV, No. 35,901, May 10, 1956,
p. 1 2 ,
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opinion that while Bhutan could directly contact foreign 
countries and establish diplomatic relations with them, 
it had to consult India before embarking on any such 
negotiations, including those concerning economic and 
military aid. He was not aware that the Bhutanese Gov­
ernment wished to make any foreign contact "at this 
moment or in the immediate future." The Bhutanese Gov­
ernment was, however, studying a report submitted to it 
by its constitutional advisor, Mr. D. K. Sen,^^ Mr. Nehru 
wrote to the Maharaja advising against such a move alleg­
ing that Bhutan could not afford the costs— presumably 
financial-involved. The Maharaja accepted this advice 
with the caveat that "Bhutan must decide for itself in 
such matters.
The Bhutanese Tsongdu (National Assembly) con­
tinued to maintain that the Bhutanese Government had a 
right, in theory at least, to establish direct relations 
with countries other than India even while conducting 
its foreign relations with India's guidance. Son's 
recommendation had been known to include establishing
5®"Mr. Jigme Dorji on Indo-Bhutanese Relations," 
Asian Recorder. September 19-25, 1959, p. 2 9 0 3.
^^Rose, "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan 
Border States," Orbis. Summer, I9 6I, pp. 199-200; 
Moorthly, "Bhutan: Thoughts of Sovereignty," Far East­
ern Economic Review, February 23, I9 6I» p. 297.
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—  _  52foreign relations with the U.S., Kussia and oritain.
New Delhi has interpreted the 1949 treaty to
mean that all of Bhutan's external relations must be
“53negotiated through India, India has feared that direct
foreign contacts would draw Bhutan into international
power politics and might seriously hamper the nation's
progress toward social and economic stability. The issue
has gained in importance because of Chinese probes to
Bhutan for direct negotiations. Some time ago, two
western powers were approached by Bhutanese agents for
direct diplomatic relations, and New Delhi politely told
the two countries that such a move would be considered
55an unfriendly act. Mr. Jigme Dorji had approached 
British officials in 1959 about the possibility of obtain­
ing teachers and was r e b u f f e d . D o r j i  has wanted to be 
included in the negotiations between Mr. Chou En-Lai 
and Mr. Nehru regarding the border dispute but Nehru had 
turned down this request also. The Chinese have never­
theless continued to make unofficial annroaches to Bhutan.
^^"Bhutan for More Say in Foreign Policy," Hin­
dustan Times, Vol. XI, No. 23» June 9» I960, p. 12.
53Paul Grimes, "Premier and Indian Lead Bhutan's 
Struggle to Modernize," New York Times « Vol. CIX, No. 
37,398, June 15, I960, p. 1 2 ,
^*New York Times. June 13, I960, p. 1.
^^Far Eastern Economic Review, February l6 , I9 6I,
p. 297.
^^New York Times. June 15, I9 6 0, p. 1 2 .
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In 1 9 6 1 , the Bhutanese Prime Minister alleged, "The
Chinese urge that Bhutan, in enlightened self-interest,
57may now by pass India and start direct negotiations,"
The Maharaja of Bhutan, arriving in India for 
talks with Mr. Nehru, declared that Bhutan had no desire 
to enter into direct negotiations with China. But he 
added: "We do not want to be either friends or enemies
of C h i n a . T h e  Maharaja had also added that Bhutan had 
the right to establish direct diplomatic relations with 
any country as Bhutan is "a sovereign independent state. 
In a seeming reversal of policy Acting Prime Minister 
Lhendup Dorji of Bhutan said in Calcutta on August 11, 
1964:
"There is no question of Bhutan having any direct 
diplomatic relations with foreign countries, . . .  
Bhutan respects, honors and will stand by the 1949 
Treaty of Friendship between India and Bhutan."”®
Bhutanese authorities have attempted to maintain
a neutral attitude toward the Chinese Communists
^^Far Eastern Economic Review, February I6 , I9 6I,
p. 2 9 7.
"Bhutan and India Can Safeguard Border," Hin­
dustan Times, Vol. XI, No. 2 5 , June 23, I9 6 0 , p. 3»
^^Far Eastern Economic Review, February I6 , I9 6 1 ,
^^Hindustan Times, August 2 0 , 1964, p. 6 .
p. 2 9 7.
^^Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American 
University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With 
Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 475.
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Indian Socialist Leader Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia said at
a press conference in Nel Delhi on November 2, 1964 that
they (Bhutan and Sikkim) did not feel grateful to India
as they should have been for the aid which it had given
them from time to time:
"The trouble with these countries, he added, was that 
the people who mattered politically in the Government 
as well as others had been trying to be non-aligned 
D o r w e e n  x n a i . a  a n a  ' - n i n a .  i n i s  i s  i  o e i i e v e  o n e  o i  
the most dangerous twists to the doctrine of non- 
alignment. "°-
On September 13» 1966, Chinese troops had begun 
encamping on Bhutanese territory in the Doklan Pasture 
area. The intrusion was believed to be politically moti­
vated. The Peking intentions may have been to put pres­
sure on Bhutan for direct dealings in solving their border 
dispute.
In addition radio Moscow said in July 196? that 
China had moved a military division specializing in 
sabotage activities into Tibetan mountain areas border-
64ing Bhutan. Indian Defense Minister Swaran Singh 
returning home after a visit to the area in late July 
1 9 6 7, said the local people had felt that Chinese arms
“"Peking Pressure on Sikkim, Bhutan Increasing: 
Lohia," Hindustan Times. Vol. XV, No. 46, November 12, 
1964, p. b.
^^"Chinese Occupy Bhutan Area," Hindustan Times 
Vol. XVII, No. 40, October 13, I9 6 6 , p. 1.
64"Maoism Active on Bhutan Border," Hindustan 
X imes « vox. a v x i x ,  « 0 . , vuxy  ^ x?o/, p. x.
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................  6'ôwere being smuggled into tne area. '
Under Indian sponsorship, Bhutan became a member 
of the Colombo plan in I9 6 2, India is also backing 
Bhutan's application for membership in the Universal 
Postal U n i o n . B h u t a n ' s  king has a trade commissioner 
at Calcutta, and the political officer in Sikkim repre­
sents the Government of India in B h u t a n . K i n g  Mahen­
dra has been anxious for his country to join the United
Ô0Nations, with India's consent and backing. However, 
under the threat of Communist Chinese demands and activ­
ities in the Himalayan region, India has kept a rather 
firm control over Bhutanese foreign relations under the 
provisions of Article 2 of the 19^9 Treaty of Friendship 
between Bhutan and India. No foreigner can enter Bhutan 
without a permit from the Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs. In theory, any visitor who has obtained the 
permission of the Bhutanese authorities should get the 
permit automatically, but this has not always proven to 
be the case. No Bhutanese, not even the King, can go
ge
"Chinese Army Buildup on Bhutan Border," Hin­
dustan Times. Vol. XVIII, No. 2 9 , July 22, I9 6 7 , p. 9»
^^Department of State Publication 8334, December,
1 9 6 7 , p. 3 .
^^The Statesmen's Year Book 1968-1969% p. 833=
^^Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geog­
raphy , p. 19; The Statesman's Weekly (Calcutta). April 23, 
1 9 6 6 ; The London Times, April 28, I9 6 8 , p. 13 ; The Neif 
York Times. October 23. 1967. p. 4.
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abroad without applying to the Indian reserve bank for 
foreign exchange. This would appear to give the Indian 
Government virtually complete control over Bhutan's foreign 
contacts,and be a direct illustration of India’s influ­
ence in domestic affairs. The Indian Government has said
it will support Bhutan's application for U.N. membership
70"when the Bhutanese are ready." Some Bhutanese regard 
this as undue procrastination. Namgyal Wangchuk, Govern­
or of Paro, said in October 196?: "We are ready now.
71The question is, when will the Indians be ready?"
Defenses
The defense of Bhutan is the joint responsibility 
of the Indian military establishment and the Government 
of Bhutan. Although there is no chfense agreement between 
India and Bhutan, India has declared that an attack on
72Bhutan would be considered as aggression against India. 
Justification also exists under article 2 of the 19^9
69 Joseph Lelyvsld, "Kingdom of Bhutan Opening 
Window on the World," New York Times, Vol. CXVII, No. 
40,084, October 2 3 , 19^7» P» 4; Washington Star. August
2 3 , 1 9 6 6, p. 5 .
^^Lelyveld, New York Times, October 23» 196?*
p. 4.
^^Ibid.. p. 4.
/^"India Would Rush to Bhutan's Defense if It Is 
Attacked," Weekly India News Information Service of India, 
Vol. 2 5 , No. 2 8 , Washington, D.C., October 28, I9 6 6 , p. 6 ; 
New York Times, September 1, 1959» P» !•
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treaty between India and Bhutan in which the Government 
of Bhutan agrees to be "guided by the advise of the Gov­
ernment of India in regard to its external relations,"
Bhutan also conducts her own defense, under Indian mili-
73tary training and supervision, deploying 2 0 , 0 0 0 military 
troops--a number which would be doubtless insufficient in 
case of a major Chinese aggression. The Bhutanese Army 
uses Indian equipment exclusively and is in fact paid by
*7/t
New Delhi. The Kingdom has, however, forbidden the 
stationing of Indian combat troops in her country, apparently 
because it feels that no provocation should be given to 
the Chinese, The ability of Nepal to prevent the station­
ing of Indian troops within its borders demonstrates 
Nepalese internal sovereignty with regard to this point. 
Additional justification for the participation of India 
in Bhutan's defense system originates from agreements of 
high level meetings, and statements of the Bhutanese Gov­
ernment formally endorsing Indian defense assistance, 
Bhutanese Prime Minister Digme Dorji welcomed at a press 
conference in New Delhi on September 15, 1959 a» assurance 
by Prime Minister Nehru that India would defend Bhutan in
^^Statesman's Year Book 1968-1969, p, 833»
nix.
Karan,, Bhutan; A Culttiral and Physical Geo­
graphy. p, 84,
^^Ibid. . p, 84; New York Times, October 23, 196?»
p, 4,
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case of external a g g r e s s i o n . T h e  Bhutanese Prime Min­
ister also indicated the readiness of Bhutan’s own militia 
to defend its borders in an interview in Calcutta on 
November 20, 1959. He declared that the people and Gov­
ernment of Bhutan "were as keen and anxious as any other 
independent country to safeguard their territorial inte­
grity.
At a high level meeting held in February I9 6I, 
presided over by Prime Minister Nehru and attended by the 
Maharaja of Bhutan and India's Defense Ministers and ser­
vice chiefs, the group formulated new programs for the 
discharge of India’s responsibilities for the defense of 
Bhutan. The strength of the Indian defense forces avail­
able to answer a distress call from Bhutan were substantially 
increased. Also an intensive study of facilities for 
Indian air force operations over Bhutan was instigated.
At an invitation from the Bhutanese Government, senior 
Indian military officers visited Bhutan's lands in I9 6I 
and made an elaborate survey of Bhutan's defense require­
ments. Following their advice, the Bhutanese Government 
started a large scale recruitment of militia from the 
population, ingrained with the tradition of voluntary ser-
76vice for border petroling in the North. On his way back
^^Hindustan Times, September 24, 1959» p. 4. 
"^^ Hindustan Times, November 26, 1959» p. 1. 
'^ K^aran, The Himalayan Kingdoms. p. 55*
211
to New Delhi after a visit to Bhutan; Indian Minister of
External affairs Mr. Dinesh Singh said at Calcutta in
December 19662
"The Bhutan King has assured me that Bhutan would 
work more closely with India. He was aware of the 
danger from China and would co-operate with India 
so that the two countries, when necessary, might 
jointly defend the valley.
Summary
Briefly summarizing the sub-categories developed 
in our original scheme as applied to Bhutan's relations 
with India:
I. INTERNAL RELATIONS;
a. Rule Making Authority— Under the control of 
the Bhutanese Government; no Indian control.
b. Rule Adjudication Authority— Under the con­
trol of the Bhutanese Government; no Indian control.
c. Rule Application Authority— Under the control 
of the Bhutanese Government; no Indian control.
d. Economic Aid and Investments.
India has been providing virtually ail Bhutan’s 
foreign aid. Contributions by other nations under the 
Colombo Plan have been insignificant. Foreign invest­
ments in Bhutan, including Indian, remain as yet incon­
sequential, due to the backwardness of the country and 
to the lack of trained personnel among the Bhutanese people.
79"Bhutan Alive to Danger from China," Hindustan 
Times. Vol. XVIII, No. 1, January 5, I9 6 7 , p. 1.
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e• Internal Communications and Transportation.
Although India has been instrumental in helping 
Bhutan to develop a more sophisticated communication and 
transportation system, she does not exercise any control 
over these vital facilities.
f • Currenj^.
The traditional monetary unit has been the Indian 
rupee. However, The New York Times reported that in I9 6 8 , 
Bhutan began printing its own money in opening its first
3obank at Phunchholing.
Conclusion.
Bhutan has absolute control over its internal 
relations though dependence upon Indian economic aid 
gives India a strong leverage point of influence.
II, EXTERNAL RELATIONS;
a. Diplomatic Representation.
India has absolute control over the external rela­
tions of Bhutan under the provisions of article 2 of the 
19 4 9 Treaty of Friendship. Bhutanese officials have 
challenged the vagueness of the article's provision with 
reference to "guidance,” but have for the most part 
acquiesced to the Indian interpretation thus far.
b. Foreign Trade.
In excess of 93% of Bhutan's foreign trade is 
with India. Article 2 of the 19^9 Treaty of Friendship
Q
New York Times, October 23, I967» p. 4.
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has been interpreted by India as giving her s t e w a r d s h i p  
powers with regard to the kingdom's external trade rela­
tions .
Conclusion.
India has absolute control over the external
relations of Bhutan.
III. DEFENSES:
The defense of Bhutan is the Joint responsibility 
of the Governments of Bhutan and India. Although no formal 
defense agreement exists, Article 2 of the 19^ *9 Treaty of 
Friendship has been interpreted by India as giving her 
responsibilities in the defense of Bhutan. The Bhutanese 
army is trained, financed, and supervised by the Indian 
Government. Unilateral declarations by the Indian govern­
ment to come to the defense of Bhutan if it were attacked 
by a foreign power, and statements and conferences by Bhu­
tanese officials publicly approving India's defense efforts 
on her behalf, all make India the senior partner in the 
Indo-Bhutanese defense of the Kingdom. However, Bhutan 
does have a 20,000 man militia at its disposal, and the 
kingdom has forbidden the stationing of Indian combat troops 
on its soil. The defense of the strategic northern passes 
leading into Tibet is the responsibility of the Bhutanese 
army.
Conclusion
The defense of Bhutan is both the responsibility 
of the Indian and Bhutanese Governments, with the Indian 
Government assuming the greater share of the burden.
CHAPTER VII
INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
RELATIONS WITH SIKKIM
Sikkim is situated in the most strategic and
exposed position in the frontier region between India and
China. Not only is Sikkim the major channel of communica-
tioj between India and Tibet, it is also the connecting
link between the predominantly Hindu culture of the Central
Himalayan Region, and the Buddhist and Animist communities
of the Eastern Himalayan Region.^ The Chinese threat has
been responsible for a greatly stepped up program of road
construction and economic development in Sikkim, as well 
2
as Bhutan.
Indian Aid and Investment Programs 
In 1 9 5 2, Sikkimese Maharaja Sir Tashi Namgyal, the 
Chogyal (ruler) of Sikkim and Indian Prime Minister Nehru
1
Leo £. Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the
Relationship," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLII, No. 1, Spring,
1 9 6 9, p. 3 2 .
2
Karan, "Sikkim and Bhutan: A Geographical
Appraisal," Journal of Geography, February, I96I, p. $8.
k
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met and formulated Sikkim's Seven Year Plan. Since then
Sikkim has prospered economically as the result of the
implementation of two economic plans. The first one began
in 1 9 5 4 and lasted until 1 9 6 1. On March I5 , 1955, the
Maharaja of Sikkim recommended the Seven Year Plan to his
people with the following words;
"I would now earnestly call upon myi people to set 
themselves, with purpose and determination to the ful­
filment of this great adventure. I am confident that 
with the implementation of the Plan, we shall have 
advanced far towards achieving the welfare and happi­
ness of the people,"3
The second plan began in I961 and terminated in 
1 9 6 6. At the end of the second plan the Kingdom had 
showed an annual per capita income of Rs 700, approxi­
mately double that of India, its benefactor. The two 
plans have been financed from funds provided by India as 
outright grants.^ India spent a sum of Rs 32.369 million 
on the Seven Year Plan (1954-1961). An examination of the 
Plan is provided by Table 9 on the following page.
The emphasis on road construction evident in the 
first plan doubtless reflects India's concern for being 
able to transport its troops to Sikkim to meet any mili­
tary threat from the Communist Chinese. Also it is
^Chandra Das Rai, "Sikkim 3-Seven Year Plan," 
iia, Vol. 12, no. 4, 1 9 6O, pp. 360-361.
Zl
"Sikkim Parties Share Hostility to China,"
Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 22, June 1, 196?, p. 9.
2l6
TABLE 9
EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO SIKKIM DURING THE 
1 9 5 4 - 1 9 6 1 SEVEN YEAR PLAN
Project Expenditure in Rs Million
Agricultural and Rural Development 1 . 3 0 0
Horticulture 1 . 1 2 1
Minor Irrigation works 0 . 1 5 5
Animal Husbandry 0 . 2 9 2
Dairying and Milk Supply 0 • 552
Forest 2 . 2 5 8
Co-operation 0 . 5 4 2
Power Project 2 . 9 8 3
Cottage Industries 0 . 3 8 7
Other Industries 1.440
Roads and Buildings 1 3 . 9 0 1
Communications 0.001
Road Transport 1 . 6 7 0
Education 2 . 3 2 2
Medical and Public Health 2 . 2 7 3
Buildings 1 . 0 2 6
Cultural Organizations 0.146
Total Rs 3 2 . 3 6 9
Million
Source 1 Adapted from information obtained from the 
Information Service of India, Political Office, Gangtok, 
Sikkim, July 5 , 1968, p. I6 .
understandable that without good roads and bridges none of 
the other schemes under the plan could be developed* 
Medical aid would remain static, the farmers' markets 
would be restricted, education would be departmentalized,
5etc.
In the second Plan (1 9 6I-I9 6 6) India doubled its
5„
no. 4, i960, p. 361,
Sikkim 3-Seven Year Plan*" United Asia, Vol. 12,
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aid to Sikkim, with the major emphasis again on road 
construction. An examination of the Plan demonstrates the 
area of road construction to be of greatest concern to New 
Delhi :
TABLE 10
EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO SliUtlM DÜKINÜ THE 
1 9 6 1 - 1 9 6 6 FIVE YEAR PLAN
Project Expenditure in Rs Million
Agricultural Production 2 . 8 9 2
Minor Irrigation 0.145
Animal Husbandry 1 . 1 7 9
Dairying 0 . 2 0 9
Forests 5 . 3 7 9
Soil Conservation 0 . 4 5 6
Fisheries 0 . 0 2 6
Co-operation 0 . 3 1 5
Power 5 . 3 0 5
Cottage Industries 0.935
Other Industries 0.241
Roads 26.084
Road Transport 4.400
Tourism 0 . 5 2 4
Education 7 . 6 8 2
Health 4 . 2 6 7
Housing 0 . 6 3 2
Publicity 0.140
Press 0.440
Cultural Activities 0 . 1 3 9
Marketing Centers 0 . 1 7 4
Secretariat Building 0 . 5 2 5
Community Center 0 . 3 0 6
Planning Development 1.242
Total Rs 6 3 . 6 3 7
Source; Ibid., Chart one, p. I?»
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It is an important consideration to take note of 
the fact that both the Seven Year plan and the Five Year
6plan were completely financed by the Government of India, 
The greatest emphasis of both plans has been on communica­
tion and transportation development. Before 195^t there 
were only 50 kilometers of motorable road between Gangtok 
and Rangpo, on the West Bengal-Sikkim border; and only 
342 kilometers of motorable roads throughout the entire 
country. By 1962, several jeep tracks in lower Sikkim 
and about 153 kilometers of the North Sikkim Highway 
connecting Gangtok with Lachen and Lachung in North Sikkim 
had been constructed. Former pathways inaccessible to 
motor vehicles have been developed into roads capable of 
supporting mechanized traffic. These include a road 
between Rishi on the West Bengal border, and Jalepla on 
the Tibet border; a road from Gangtok to Natu La on the
7
Sikkim-Tibet border; and other roads in eastern Sikkim,
On June 29, 1965 a Rs 500,000 suspension bridge linking 
Kalimpong, a sub-division in West-Bengal, and Western 
Sikkim at Malli was completed. The 292 foot long bridge 
transversed the Teesca River and linked the Sikkim-Narugyal
^’’Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of 
India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim, July 5 * 1968, 
p. 1?,
7Ibid., p. 18,
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highway with the Siliguiri-Gangtok highway. The bridge 
was subsequently "washed away by heavy landslides" but 
plans have been drafted to build it again. In addition,
19 "long bridges"^ were constructed in outlying areas.
As a result of the road construction programs, almost all 
parts of Sikkim are within easy reach of Gangtok and the 
Sikkim Nationalized Transport operated services on all 
important routes. Sikkim has neither airfields nor rail­
ways, but Gangtok is connected to the Indian Air terminal 
and railhead of Silguru by a motorable road via Rangpo. 
Under the 1930 Indo-Sikkitnese Treaty, communications are 
managed by the Government of India. Under the Indian 
Development assistance programs, Sikkim has increased the 
number of Post and Telegraph offices from two to nine.
Before the onset of the two development plans,
88 schools with a total enrollment of 2 , 5 0 0  students 
existed in Sikkim. "With the termination of the Second 
Plan, there were 1 9I primary schools, 5 secondary schools, 
1 public school, 1 technical training school and one 
monastic school.
o
"Bridge with Sikkim Inaugurated," Hindustan Times, 
Vol. XVI, No. 2 7 , July 8, 19651 p. 4.
q
"Sikkim’s March to Progress," Hindustan Times,
Vol. XVII5 No. 13; March 31, 1966. p. 3.
^^Statesman Year-Book 1 9 6 8-I9 6 9, p. 424.
^^"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, 
j r o j - x c x c a x  \ ^ x x x c e ,  p .  x ? .
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The Government of India has donated about Rs 1 
million since 1958 to the Naingyal Institute of Tibetology, 
at Gangtok, where Mahayana Buddhistic Studies are carried 
on. Two hundred fifty Sikkimese students have been trained 
in India on scholarships made available by the Government 
of India.
There are plans for a college to be established 
in Gangtok in 1971, and four Adult Education Centers have 
recently been established. The total student enrollment 
in July, 19 6 8 was 15,000.^^
About one-third of Sikkim’s 2,828 square miles of 
territory are forested, and lumber is considered one of 
the Kingdom’s greatest assets. The Sikkimese Forest Depart­
ment has been engaged in soil conservation and afforesta­
tion programs. Sikkim sells timber to India for its rail­
way development projects. The Forest Department has also 
embarked upon a tea plantation program which is providing 
for hundreds of Tibetan refugees. Contour surveys are
also being carried out for a proposed tea garden and
I kreclamation area to be located at Kewzing.
Sikkim has considerable hydro-electric potential.
^^Ibid., p. 22.
-^Ibid., p. 1 9.
l4
"Sikkim’s March to Progress," Hindustan Times,
March 31» 1966, p. 3.
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In 1961 the Rangni Hydel Project was completed and is now
generating 2100 kilowatts of electricity for the Gangtok 
15area. The project was expanded during the Five Year
Plan, and is now the principal soui'ce of power supply to
Singtatn, and Rangpo. In addition, it will soon be supplying
hydro-electric power to adjoining areas in West Bengal.
A Micro-hydel project in Manul in North Sikkim is
also under construction, and plans have been completed for
17three more hydel projects at Rothak Geyzing and Lagyap.
Before the commencement of planning, there were 
only two hospitals in Sikkim. At the conclusion of the 
Five Year Plan, there were 5 government hospitals, 24 
government dispensaries and 4 sub-dispensaries. Medical 
complexes consisting of a maternity ward, an isolation 
ward, and a T.B. ward have been completed in almost every 
district. Government programs for the eradication of such 
diseases as malaria, tuberculosis, venereal disease, Kola 
Azar, and intestinal worms have had remarkable success.
One hundred fifty-four village water supply schemes have 
also been instituted with Indian help. Indian army doctors
^^Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. ?2.
"Bhutan and Sikl-cim," Information Soi, vice of India, 
Political Office, p. I9 .
^^Ibid., p. 19; Hindustan Times, March 31» 1966,
p. 3.
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have been quite active in all of these programs.
Agriculture has traditionally been the chief sup­
port of Sikkim's economy. Ninety-five percent of the popu­
lation of Sikkim depend upon agricultural products for 
their livelihood. In order to assist in the development
of this vital area, a Department of Agriculture was cre- 
19ated in 1955» Under Indian grants the Department has
given Rs 400,000 in loans to needy farmers and opened
100 acre farms at Geyzing, and Ribdi to provide quality
seeds. A crash program to step up food production and
provide seeds, fertilizers and technical expertise to
20farmers has also been introduced." Government demonstra­
tion centers have been set up at Tadung , Lachen and Gang- 
21tok. A Department of Animal Husbandry recently established, 
has taken steps to improve the quality and yield of wool, 
improve cattle and sheep breeds, and provide veterinary
22hospitals and dispensaries for all district headquarters.
Since I96O, the Sikkim Mining Corporation, a joint
1 ft"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of 
India, Political Office, pp. 19-20; Hindustan Times,
March 3 1 » 1966, p. 3.
19Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 70»
^^Hindustan Times, March 31» 1966, p. 3*
““"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of 
India, Political Office, p. 20.
^^Hindustan Times, March 31» 1966, p. 3»
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undertaking of the Governments of India and Sikkim has 
been instrumental in sponsoring systematic mineral develop­
ment. Copper, lead and zinc are mined in appreciable 
quantities. In addition the five year plan has provided 
for an industrial survey of the Kingdom to determine pos­
sibilities foi setting up Indus tiles based on foxes t
23
fx y? ^  ^  y» ^
24
,    . _ A cy y V* a T y» 4 A
collaboration is currently under consideration.
Twenty-four co-operative societies and four fair
price shops are now functioning in Sikkim. A sum of
Rs 840,000 was given in I965 to Sikkim by India to start
four small scale industries. These include a wire nail
factory at Rangpo, a gas plant at Rhensek, an orchard
sanctuary at Gangtok, and an extension of the nursery at 
2 *5Rhenock.
A third plan (1966-1971) is currently in effect. 
Under the Plan, India is contributing outright grants
totaling Rs 90 million to Sikkim, with the accent on 
further industrialization. Allotments have also been made
23Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 71.
oil
"Indian Aid for Sikkim Paper Pulp Project," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, no. 13, March 31» 1966, p. 3<
^^Hindustan Times, March 31» I966, p. 3»
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26for improving agriculture.^"
Virtually the entire development budget is met by
India through direct grants in aid, loans or subsidies.
Article IV of the Text of the Indian-Sikkim Peace Treaty
issued in Gangtok, on December 5» 1950 forbids Sikkimese
acceptance of foreign aid from countries other than India.
The Article asserts;
(l) the external relations of Sikkim whether political 
economic or financial, shall be conducted and regu­
lated solely by the Government of India and the Govern­
ment of Sikkim shall have no dealings with any foreign
power.^7
Sikkim is interested in such multi-national aid 
programs as the Colombo Plan or in private foreign capital 
investment. However, the Indian Finance Minister, Moraji 
Desai made it quite clear during his visit to Gangtok 
in March I968 that the government of India is not dis­
posed to approve foreign collaboration in the development
28of industries in Sikkim. Indeed most of the local com­
mercial Euid credit structure is dominated by Indian mer­
chants and bankers domiciled in Sikkim. Even the recently
•'Sikkim Parties Share Hostility to China," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 22, June 1, 1 9 6 7, p. 9» 
Leo E. Rose, ^^ ï^ndia and Sikkim: Redefining the Relation­
ship," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 1969, p. 35»
^^"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Issued in 
Gangtok on Dec. 3 , 1950, Texts of Documents 1947-64,
Lok Sabha, New Delhi, 1964, p. 1 7O.
28Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Rela­
tionship," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 1969, p. 44.
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established Sikkim State Bank is closely connected with 
the Indian State of Marwari banking firm. In addition, 
Sikkim's industrial development program has been intrusted 
to a corporation in which 9 2 . 5 percent of the share 
capital is held by the Kamani Engineering Giro up of Bom- 
bay.29
Indo-Sikkimese Trade Relations 
The restrictions on Sikkim's external relations 
with other countries under Article IV of the Indian- 
Sikkim Peace Treaty of 1950 also applies to Sikkimese 
trade, which is consequently limited to India alone. 
Imports from Sikkim to India include:
1. Cardamom
2. Oranges and apples
3. Potatoes
Imports from India to Sikkim include:
1. Essential textiles
2. Foodstuffs
3» Other consumer goods.
Under the 1950 treaty and supplementary arrange­
ments, Sikkim has almost been constituted as an integral 
part of the Indian economy. The procedures under which
^^Ibid., p. 36.
^*^"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of 
India, Political Office, p. 15»
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Sikkim obtains its foreign-exchange requirements from 
India are not specifically mentioned in the treaty, but 
rather stem from the pattern of economic relations implicit 
in the treaty provisions, and from the fact that the Indian 
rupee is the only legal currency in the state. Article 5 
of the 1950 treaty states: The government of Siklcim
agrees :
not to ^evy any import duty, transit duty, or other 
import on goods brought into, or in transit through 
Sikkim, and the Government of India agrees not to 
levy any import or other duty on goods of Sikkimese 
origin brought into India from Sikkim.31
The treaty thus bars Sikkim from imposing excise
duties on imports that it has gained from Indian economic
assistance. The Sikkimese Maharaja has spoken of the
"very great disadvantage to us," and suggested that this
32is an appropriate subject for negotiations. “ Sikkim has 
been even more dissatisfied by the system by which India has 
collected and retained excise duties on goods imported 
into Sikkim. The Sikkim Executive Council claimed in 
1967 that:
It is true that the financial aid amounting to Rs 12 
crores or so given to Sikkim during the past l4 years
"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," issued in 
Gangtok on December 5» 1950, Texts of Documents, 1947-1964, 
Lok Sabha, p. I7 0 .
32Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relation­
ship," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 1969, p. 43.
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of the plan period by the Government of India has 
considerably increased the revenue of Sikkim, But 
the granting of aid which has generated the increase 
has been more than offset by Indian excise duty levied 
on all the goods imported to Sikkim from India, which 
has not been transferred to Sikkim so far. And this 
excise duty paid by Sikkim amounts to nearly a crore 
of rupees per annum.
If these figures are correct, Sikkim has obtained
approximately Rs 120 million in aid from India since 1953,
but has paxd nearly Rs 1^0 mxltxon xn oxcxso duty durxng
the same period. The implication is that Sikkim would have
been better off if it had not received any economic aid
from India but had itself imposed excise duties on Indian
imports. Sikkimese officials have resented the Indian
Foreign Ministry's restrictions on Sikkim's exports and
35other contacts with the outside world. The Maharaja is 
particularly unhappy that the State cannot trade and earn 
hard currency from cardamom.
Politico-Legal Relations 
India's relations with Sikkim have as their founda­
tion the India-Sikkim Peace Treaty signed by both countries, 
and issued in Gangtok on December 5» 1950» The Treaty was
33lbid., p. 44.
^^Ibid.8 p. 44; Peter Braestrup, "Sikkimese Want 
Pact with India That Gives Them More Self-Rule," New York 
Times, Vol. CXVI, no. 39*971» July 2, I9 6 7 . p. 3.
^^New York Times, July 2, 1 9 6 7 * P« 3.
^^Hindustan Times. June 1, 1967, p. 9,
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patterned after a March 1?» I8 9O Convention between Great 
Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet, The Con­
vention signed at Calcutta, delimited the boundary between 
Sikkim and Tibet, and, according to article 3, both Govern­
ments agree to respect the boundary as defined in Article I 
and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective 
sides of the frontier. In accordance with Article 4, regu­
lations regarding trade communication and pasturage were 
appended to the Convention,
Article 2 of the treaty had the effect of making 
Sikkim a protectorate of the British Government, It pro­
vided:
(2 ) It is admitted that the British Government, whose 
protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recog­
nized had direct and exclusive control over the 
internal administration and foreign relations of that 
State, and except through and with the permission of 
the British Government, neither the Ruler of the 
State nor any of its officers shall have official 
relations of any kind, formal, or informal, with any 
other country.37
British suzerainty was thought by the British to 
have been established by an earlier treaty which Britain 
imposed upon Sikkim in 1 8 6 1. This view however, was repudi­
ated by the Tibetans who proceeded to engage in official
37"Convention Between Great Britain and China 
Relating to Sikkim and Tibet (1 8 9 0)," Tests of Treaties, 
Agreements and certain exchange of notes relating to the 
Sino-Indian Boundary. Indian Society of International Law, 
New Delhi, 1 9 6 2 , p. l4. For full text of Treaty see 
Appendix K.
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activities in Sikkim. In 1Ü88, a British military expedi­
tion drove the Tibetan army out of Sikkim and pursued it 
into the Chunibi Valley in Tibet. The Chinese suzerains 
of Tibet then ordered their resident in Lhasa to make
38peace and the I8 9O Calcutta Treaty was signed. The
London Times in commenting on the signing of the Treaty
said: "It is understood that the main effect of the
treaty is to confirm the British claims to treat Sikkim
39as a feudatory State,"
A controversy arose almost immediately after Indian
independence over whether India automatically inherited
the paramount rights the British had enjoyed in the border
states. India argued that as the successor government,
it enjoyed all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities
of the British. The Sikkim Court disagreed and argued
that independent India was "a new juristic person" which
could not "claim to be subrogated to the rights and obliga­
tetions of the British Government." Paramountcy had 
lapsed, the Sikkimese insisted, with the British withdrawal
•j O
Koran, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 59*
Sikkim," The London Times, No, 32,96?, March 2t,
1 8 9 0, p. 5 .
UCiRose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Rela­
tionship," p. 33; Qyaliiio Hope Namgyal, "The Sikkimese 
Theory of Landholding and the Darjeeling Grant," Bulletin 
of Tibetology. Vol. Ill, no. 2, July 21, 1966, pp. t?-6o.
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from India. The political climate in Sikkim during the 
negotiations with India in 1950 was seriously disadvan­
tageous to the Sikkim government. Internal disorders in 
the state had reached alarming proportions between 1 9^7- 
1 9 4 9* and the very survival of the ruling dynasty had 
seemed to require outside support. With the exception of 
a small (300) man State Police, the only military force 
in Sikkim at the time was an Indian army detachiuent that 
had been sent to Gangtok during the disturbances in May, 
1 9 4 9» The Chinese occupation of Tibet, with all that this 
implied for both India and Sikkim occurred between the 
signing of the Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1949, and the 
signing of the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty. This latter Treaty 
in particular reflected New Delhi's heightened concern
4lwith frontier security. Article 2 and 11, deal with 
Sikkim's relationship with India regarding Sikkim's internal 
affairs.
Article 2 states:
Sikkim shall continue to be a Protectorate of India 
and, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, 
shall enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal af­
fairs. 42
Article Xi states:
^^Ibid.. p. 3 4 .
42"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Issued in 
Gangtok on December 5 , I960. For full text of the Treaty 
see Appendix L.
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The Government of India shall have the right to ap­
point a Representative to reside in Sikkim; and the 
Government of Sikkim shall provide him and his staff 
with all reasonable facilities in regard to their 
residential and office accommodation and generally 
in regard to their carrying out their duties in
Sikkim.43
In theory, the Maharaja of Sikkim controls the 
State's internal affairs. However, he is aided by an 
Indian appointed civil servant who assists as the Prin­
cipal State administrative officer. The Indian officer 
called a dewan is permanent chairman of the State Council. 
His duties are rather similar to those of a prime minister, 
and he has now become an essential part of the Kingdom's 
administrative machinery. The Dewan is appointed by the
k kGovernment of India with the approval of the Maharaja.
There is also an Indian financial adviser, an Indian Chief 
engineer, an Indian director of the state distillery and 
Indians at the head of other important departments of 
Government. Hence, India and Sikkim share in the 
executive-legislative functioning of the Sikkimese govern­
ment. Article 6 of the treaty grants India further control 
over the internal physiology of the Kingdom; in particular.
43
-^Ibid., p. 1 7 2.
44"Parliamentary Government Sought for Sikkim," 
Hindustan Ti les, Vol. XI, No, 35* September 1, I960, p. 3
^^Statesman's Yearbook 1968-1969* p. 424; Karan, 
The Himalayan Kingdoms, pp. 74-75» "U.S. Array Area Hand- 
book for Nepal {With Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 383.
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control over Sikkim's transportation and communications
systems. The Article states:
(l) The Government of India shall have the exclusive 
right of constructing, maintaining and regulating the 
use of railways, aerodromes and landing grounds and 
air navigation facilities, posts, telegraphs, tele­
phones and wireless installations in Sikkim, . . .
(3 ) The Government of India shall have the right to 
construct and maintain in Sikkim roads for strategic 
purposes and for the purpose of improving communica­
tions with India and other adjoining countries.
Although the Kingdom exercises judicial power over
its subjects. Article 12 of the 1950 treaty gives India
supremacy in judicial disputes regarding interpretation
of the Treaty itself. Since many of the articles deal
with matters concerning Sikkim's internal affairs, the
Article indirectly gives India juridic control over these
affairs. Article 12 reads;
If any dispute arises in the interpretation of the 
provisions of this Treaty which cannot be resolved 
by mutual consultation, the dispute shall be referred 
to the Chief Justice of India whose decision thereon 
shall be final.*7
Article 4, which grants India domination over the 
political, economic and financial external relations of 
Sikkim has already been discussed. As a result of 
Article 4, Sikkim has not, noi may it have external rela­
tions with any country other than India. In addition.
46"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Lok Sabha 
Secretariat, p. 17O.
^^Ibid., p. 173.
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the unit of exchange in Sikkim is the Indian rupee.
Despite Indian influences, the Maharaja exercises 
strong authoritarian control over his Sikkimese subjects 
and areas of the Sikkimese government not covered by the 
1 9 5 0 treaty. In i9 6 0, a delegation from the Sikkim National 
Congress Party presented a memorandum to Prime Minister 
Nehru of India seeking a promise that India would not 
interfere when the Party "launched civil disturbances" 
in an effort to attain a more democratic rule. The group 
was particularly interested in securing a constitution, 
since Sikkim has none, and a parliamentary form of Govern­
ment. The delegation also asked for the abolition of the 
post of Dewan, and the formation of a Constituent-Assembly
to create the desired constitution. India failed to act,
49and the Party's attempt for reforms were aborted.
India has been most adamant about limiting Sikkim's 
relations with all other nations through the Indian Govern­
ment, particularly in the case of Communist China. In 
December 1963* China sent a condolence message to the new 
Maharaja of Sikkim, Thondup Namgyal, upon the death of his
48Paul Grimes, "2 Sikkimese Ask Closer Indian 
Tie," New York Times, Vol. CIX, no. 37,132, September 23,
1 9 5 9, p. 12.
4q
"Sikkimese Prod India," New York Times, Vol. 
CIX, No. 3 7 ,4 7 1 , August 2 7 , i9 6 0, p. 5» Hindustan Times, 
September 1, I96O, p. 3.
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father. India upon learning of the incident issued a pro­
test to the People’s Republic, that "this was a breach of 
p r o t o c o l , I n  April, 196$, Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of 
the People's Republic of China, sent the Maharaja of Sikkim 
a telegram of congratulations on the occasion of his 
coronation. In a note sent to the Chinese Embassy in 
Delhi, on April 9» 1965» the Government of India said 
that the Chinese action "is totally unacceptable." The 
note went on to say that the Chinese Government was well 
aware that the external relations of Sikkim were the respon­
sibility of the Government of India, and any communications 
either formal or informal from the Government of China to
the Government of Sikkim or its Chogyal (Maharaja) should
51be channeled through the Indian Government.
Publicly and superficially the relations between
India and Sikkim have been warm and friendly. In Gangtok
on April 6, 1965» the Sikkimese Maharaja extolled the
friendship of the two countries;
"India is a great and peaceloving country and we feel 
secure in her protection. Tho bonds of friendship 
between our two countries are strong and indissoluble.
I take this opportunity to affirm that it will be our
^^"India Protests to Peking over Message to Sikkim," 
New York Times. December 23, 1963» P» 3=
^^"Protest at Message to Sikkim," Hindustan Times, 
Vol. XVI, No. l8. May 6, I9 6 5» p. 6.
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purpose and endeavor to further strengthen these
bonds in the fullest m e a s u r e . 52
After the Maharaja concluded his speech, Mrs.
Lakshmi Memou, India's Minister of State of External
Affairs, asserted:
"We ere certain that your benevolent guidance will 
lead the people of Sikkim to great prosperity and 
well-being and will preserve and promote cultural 
and spiritual v a l u e s . "53
Underlying the cordiality and couaraderie of such state­
ments there has existed great tension between the two 
nations, as Sikkim has sought to attain greater internal 
and external autonomy. In a joint statement, issued in 
June, 1 9 6 7 1 three members of the Executive Council of 
Sikkim had stressed the need fojc a "thorough change" in 
the provisions of the Indo-Sikkimese treaty. The state­
ment contended that any right which had become the respon­
sibility of India under the treaty had been intrusted to 
her by Sikkim. It was therefore, an obligation on the 
Government of India to "gracefully sponsor our membership 
of various international organizations." The statement 
said that since Sikkim had signed the Treaty with India, 
it was within her rights as a sovereign nation to demand 
its revision. The note concluded:
^^"Sikkim Maharaja Affirms Friendship with India,"
Hindustan Time3, Vol. XVI, No. 151 April I5, 19&5# P- 4.
53lbid., p. 4.
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■'Evÿxy uûLüi Lxy liû s tlï6 i.iiliôx"8n't i'igllt to OXXât âilu 
maintain its separate identity and to review and 
revise its Treaty obligations in the wake of changing 
circumstances » 5^
On May 19, 196?i the Maharaja of Sikkim told news­
men in Gangtok that the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950 had 
to be "reviewed" in view of the changed situation since 
the Treaty was signed. This was the first time that the 
Maharaja had spoken publicly of the need to review the 
Treaty, although he had indicated earlier about the matter 
to members of the Sikkimese Court. Asked how soon he would 
seek review of the treaty the Maharaja said:
"We await the convenience of the Government of India.
We have chosen to throw our lot with India. We share
the ideology that you (India) follow. This does not,
however, mean merger with I n d i a . "55
He also spoke of economic independence as being 
"more important than political independence in the present 
day w o r l d . M r .  Vincent Coehli, a local representative
for the Government of Sikkim said in July, 196? that he
had a great distrust of "New Delhi's colonialism." He 
spoke with great disfavor of the Indian Foreign Ministry's 
restrictions on Sikkim's exports and other contacts with 
the outside world. To gain a visa to enter Sikkim a
^^"Call for Revision of Indo-Sikkimese Pact," 
Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 35 ; June 24, 196?, p. 12.
Bjq _
'•'"Sikkxm Ruler on Need to Keview Treaty with 
India," Asian Recorder, Vol. XII, no. 25, June 24-28, 196?»
pp. 7 7 5 5-7 7 5 6.
S^Ibid., p. 7756.
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foreigner must apply several days in advance to the Indian
Foreign Ministry, which may or may not grant him permis- 
57sion. India appears to face a great dilemma with regard 
to Sikkim. Sikkimese authorities have attempted to main­
tain a neutral attitude toward the Chinese Communists and 
have exercised care to avoid actions or disputes which 
might be used as a pretext for retaliatory tactics by the 
Chinese Government. The Maharaja of Sikkim had said as 
late as May 19$ 1967! "Sikkim was a small country and she 
did not seek a quarrel with the north (China),
Meanwhile, the Chinese continue to remain in 
strength along the northern borders.
Defenses
The defense of Sikkim is the responsibility of the 
Indian Army. The 1950 Treaty grants India the right to 
station troops anywhere in the country, take any measures 
regarded as necessary to defend it, control all imports 
of arras, build strategic roads and track down fugitives
Braestrap, "Sikkimese Want Pact with India That 
Gives Them More Self Rule," New York Times, July 2, 1 9 6 7$ 
p. 3.
^^Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American 
University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (with 
Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 38?*
^^Asian Recorder, June 18-24, 1 9 6 7, p. 7756.
^^"Heavy Casualties Inflicted on Chinese at
Nathu-La," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 47, Novem­
ber 24, 1967» p. 9.
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within the country. Article 3 of the treaty states in 
part :
(l) The Government of India will be responsible for 
the defense and territorial integrity of Sikkim, It 
shall have the right to take such measures as it con­
siders necessary for the defense of Sikkim or the 
security of India whether preparatory or otherwise, 
and whether within or outside Sikkim, In particular, 
the Government of India shall have ^he right to sta­
tion troops anywhere within Sikkim.--
In December I9 6 0, the Sikkimese Maharaja expressed 
a desire for an increased participation in its own defense, 
The Array then consisting of only 60 raen was used priraarily 
to guard the Maharaja's palace, India agreed to establish 
and equip a separate militia force of 280 raen to be trained 
and commanded by Indian officers to help man the border 
outposts.
The size of the Sikkimese array was later raised to 
560 raen, a strength at which it remained up to October 
1 9 6 8, The Sikkim guard is not under the direct command 
of the Indian array, however, nor is it currently used 
as a border defense force. In times of emergency, such 
as during the border firings in September 196?1 the Guard 
is available for defense purposes, and presumably would
^^"Text of the xndia-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Issued
ir Gangtok on Dec, 5 , 1950, Tok Sabha, p. 1 6 9.
Sikkim Wants Its Own Military Force," Hindustan 
Times, Vol. XI, No, 49, December 8 , 1 9 6O, p. 1.
^^"U,S, Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan
and Sikkim)," p. 3 8 8.
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then come under the authority of the Indian army commander
an
65
64
in the area. The New York Times reported the Indi
troop strength in Sikkim in July I967 at 40,000 men.
Briefly summarizing the sub-categories developed 
in our original scheme as applied to Sikkim’s relations 
with India:
1. INTERNAL RELATIONS:
a. Rule Making Authority--Under the control of 
the Maharaja, who is aided by the Indian dewan (or prime 
minister), nominated by India.
b. Rule Application Authority--Under the control 
of the Maharaja and the elected State Council, assisted 
by the Indian dewan and other Indian department heads.
c. Rule Adjudication Authority--Under Sikkimese 
control except for those matters dealing with Article 12 
of the 1 9 5 0 Treaty, in which case the Chief Justice of 
India has the final say, e.g., transportation, communica­
tion, defenses, etc,
d. Economic Aid and Investmenta--India is the sole 
provider of Sikkim's foreign aid, and its sole economic 
investor. This has been required under Article IV of the 
1 9 5 0 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty.
64Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Rela­
tionships," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 19&9, PP» 4l-42,
^^New York Times, July 2, I967» P» 3»
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e. Internal Communication and Transportation-- 
India has ultimate control over the communication and 
transportations network of Sikkim under Article VI of the 
195 0 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty.
f. Cvurrency--The medium of exchange in Sikkim is 
the Indian rupee.
Conclusion; Sikkim and India share control over 
the internal relations of Sikkim. India's control over 
economic aid and investments, internal transportation and 
communications, and the use of the Indian rupee as a 
medium of exchange, all give the Indian Government enor­
mous influencing leverage. A Dewan and other Indian 
officers constitute an indispensable part of the Govern­
ment's administrative machinery. However, the Maharaja 
must approve the Dewan*s appointment, and the former 
exercises strong authoritarian control over his Sikkimese 
subjects and governmental areas not covered by the 1950 
Treaty,
II. EXTERNAL RELATIONS;
a. Diplomatic Representation— Article IV of the 
1950 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty places the external rela­
tions of Sikkim under the regulatory power of the Govern­
ment of India.
b. Foreign Trade--Article IV places a similar 
restriction on Sikkim's foreign trade.
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Conclusions The external relations of Sikkim axe 
under the control of the Government of India.
III. DEFENSES:
Article III of the 1950 India-Sikkiin Peace Treaty 
places the defense of Sikkim under the protection of the 
Government of India. A small 560 man self-defense force 
exists in Sikkim, but it is trained by Indian officers 
and is inconsequential to Sikkim's defense.
Chapters V through VII have dealt with a particu­
larized study of the political, economic and defense rela­
tionships of India with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal and devel­
oped the first phase of a definitive category scheme based 
on the internal, external and defense relations of India 
with each of the Himalayan states. Chapter VIII will 
explore the cultural similarities and dissimilarities 
between India and each of the three countries under study 
in order to develop the second phase of the categorization 
plan.
CHAPTER VIII
INDIAN CULTURAL SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES 
WITH BHUTAN, SIKKIM, AND NEPAL
I. ETHNIC AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
a. Indian Ethnic and Racial Characteristics.
The ethnic history of India is extremely complex, 
and racially distinct divisions between peoples generally 
cannot be clearly drawn. However, Negroid, Australoid, 
Mongoloid, and Caucasoid stocks are discernible. The 
first three are represented mainly by groups of tribal 
peoples in the southern hills, the Plateau, Assam, the 
Himalayas, and the Andaman Islands. The main Caucasoid 
element is Mediterranean, including the dark complexion 
Dravidians of the south, and other groups dominant in 
much of the north; and Indo-Aryan, a taller, fairer 
skinned group dominant in the northwest. Historical 
groupings result mainly in differences of language and 
religion. The small, dark Dravidians, ancestors of the 
Tamils of South India, were among the earliest known 
inhabitants. Ruins of a civilization in the Indus Valley 
has revealed that 5,000 years ago the inhabitants there
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were using niêiùiâ âüu liâu uOîiiêS'ticâ'fceci snisuls, citzGS,
bathrooms, and drainage systems. About 1500 B.C. the
taller, light skinned Aryans began pushing through the
passes of the Northwest frontier and gradually spread
across all northern India, pressing the indigenous people
southward but absorbing certain features of their culture 
1in the process.
^The statistics quoted in this chapter are the 
result of comparing data from the following sources ;
a. "Background Notes--Bhutan," U.S. Department 
of State Publication 8334, December, 1 9 6 7, p. 1%
b. "Background Notes— Nepal," U.S. Department of 
State Publication 7904. October, I9 6 7 , p. 1.
c. "Background Notes-India," U.S. Department of 
State Publication 7847. December, I9 6 7 , p. 1.
d. "Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of 
India. Political Office. Gangtok*J Sikkim, July 5» 19^&«
e. Encyclopedia Britannica. Vol. 3, pp. 5 6 6-5 6 7 » 
Vol. 1 6 , pp. 220-22’4'j Vol. 20, p. ”508.
f. Golenpaul, Dan. Information Please Almanac 
(New York: Golenpaul Assc.), November, 19^8.
g. Karan, Bhutan, pp. 72-75.
h. Karan, Nepal. p. 66.
i. Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms. pp. 4l, 62-64. 
j. "The Subcontinent of Asia," U.S. Department
of State Publication ?4lO. p. 55•
k. Smith, C.R. "Overseas Business Reports," OBR 
6886, U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of International 
Commerce (Vashington: Government Printing Office, September
1 968), p. 2 .
1. The Statesman's Yearbook. 1968-1969. pp. 833» 
424, 1 2 6 8.
m. "U.S. Army Area Handbook for India," U.S. 
Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-21. July, 1964,
n. Foreign Affairs Studies Division, the American 
University, "U.S. ibrmy Area Handbook for Nepal (With 
Bhutan and Sikim)," pp. 395» l64, 274.
o. Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations. Vol. 4 
"Asia and Australia," 1 9 6 7, pp. 82, 25, 196, 2 3 6.
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b. Nepalese Ethnie and Racial Characteristics.
The people of Nepal are descendants of tiiree
major migrations from India, Tibet, and Central Asia.
Major groups include the Tharus, Bhutias, Svinware, Limbus, 
Newars, Gurung, Magai and Rois. The aboriginal stock are 
Mongolians, who managed to migrate to Nepal via Tibet, 
Sikkim, Assam, and northern Begal; and Indo-Aryans, who 
migrated from the Indian plains and from the sub-Himalayan 
hill region. Ethnically and culturally the Nepalese in 
the Terai and central hills have close links with India, 
but the inhabitants of Northern Nepal, which borders on 
Tibet, are mostly Buddhist.
Because of the polyglot nature of the racial and 
ethnic groups of both India and Nepal, they must be con­
sidered on the basis of this categorization to be racially 
and ethnically amorphic.
c. Bhutanese Ethnic and Racial Characteristics.
The major ethnic groups of Bhutan are the Bhutiyas
(Bhotias). These people are of Tibetan origin, speak a 
Tibetan dialect and practice the same form of Buddhism 
prevalent in Tibet. The Bhutias comprise about 6 3 % of 
the inhabitants of Bhutan, and the majority of them live 
in the northern part of the country. The largest minority 
ethnic group is the Nepali faction which comprises 20-25% 
of the population. Other minority elements are the 
indigenous Lepcha; and Santals, who migrated from India's
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Bihar state. These two comprise 10-15% of the nation's 
citizens. Because of the preponderant presence of the 
Bhutias (65%), Bhutan must be considered racially and 
ethnically divergent to the majority of the Indian popu­
lation.
d. Sikkimese Ethnic and Racial Characteristics.
The majority of the indigenous people of Sikkim 
are generally of Tibetan stock. Although 75% of the 
inhabitants of the tiny kingdom are Nepalese, the vast 
majority of Nepalese immigrants are from the northwestern 
part of Nepal and possess Mongolian features. The larg­
est minority element are the Bhutias and Lepchas, which 
together comprise 21% of the population. These groups 
are both of Tibetan stock, the latter racially akin to 
some of the hill tribes of Assam and the Tamangs, Limbus 
and Rois from Nepal. The Lepchas are believed to have 
been the original inhabitants of Sikkim. There are also 
many Tibetan refugees living in Sikkim. Because of the 
preponderance of the Mongolian-Tibetan group, the majority 
of the people of Sikkim must be considered racially and 
ethnically divergent to the majority of the Indian popu­
lation.
II. RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
a. Indian Religious Characteristics.
The preponderant religion of India is Hinduism, 
the elemental characteristics of which were discussed
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earlier. A breakdown of the major religions of India 
is as follows:
TABLE 11 
MAJOR RELIGIONS OF INDIA, I967
Religion Number of Believers 
(in millions)
Percent of 
Believers
Hindu
Moslem
Christian
Sikh
Others*
428
56
12
9
5
84%
1 0 .9%
2 .3%
1 .7%
1.1%
Total 510 100%
*Jain, Buddhist, Zoroasterin, Jewish, etc.
Source: Adapted from "Background Notes--India,"
Department of State Bulletin 7847. p. 1.
b. Nepalese Religious Characteristics.
Nepal is officially a Hindu kingdom with about 
75% of the population professing that faith; however, 
Hinduism has been both influenced by and is an influence 
upon a large Buddhist minority. There is an intermingling 
of the two religions throughout the country as Buddhists 
venerate Hindu Gods and use the same temples. The result 
is that a unique variation of the two religions has been
createa. m e  x n n a o i x a n T S  01 n o r t n e r n  i N O p a j .  ouraexxUg
24?
Tibet are mostly Buddhist. Because no sharp line can be 
drawn between Hindu and Buddhist groups in Nepal, the two 
faiths are becoming more or less fused. The Hinduism 
practiced in India is decidedly different from that prac­
ticed in Nepal, yet there are many similarities. The 
majority of the people of Nepal must thus be considered 
religiously amorphic to the majority of the Indian popu­
lation.
c. Bhutanese Religious Characteristics.
The majority of the citizens of Bhutan (75%) 
practice Mahayanan Buddhism of the Durk Kargyu sect such 
as that practiced in Tibet. The majority of the remain­
ing twenty-five percent practice either Brahmanical Hin­
duism or a form of religion characterized by a fusion of 
Hinduism and Tibetan Buddhism. These two beliefs are
practiced predominantly by the Nepali minority group 
which makes up 25% of the population of Bhutan. Because 
75% of the citizens of Bhutan practice Mahayan Buddhism 
(the State religion), the majority of the people of Bhutan 
must be considered religiously divergent to the majority 
of the Indian population.
d. Sikkimese Religious Characteristics.
The preponderance of the Bhutia and Lepcha ele­
ments as well as some Nepalese practice Tibetan Buddhism, 
the religion of 28% of the population, and the official 
state religion. The majority of the population, however.
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(609o) , practices the same form of Hinduism found in Nepal, 
That is, a unique variation created by the fusion of 
Buddhism and Hinduism. The Hinduism practiced in Sikkim 
is thus decidedly different from that version practiced 
in India, yet there are many similarities. The majority 
of the people of Sikkim must thus be considered religiously 
amorphic to the majority of the Indian population.
III. LINGUISTIC CONSIDERATIONS
a. Indian Linguistic Characteristics
In India, cultural regions are coterminous with 
linguistic regions. Within each region, the language, 
food habits, dress and attitudes are generally similar.
As a result of government policy, the l4 major linguistic 
divisions in India correspond generally to the adminis­
trative division into states. Within each of the major 
regions, are several subregions of dialectical variation 
and patches of extreme linguistic heterogeneity and mutual 
unintelligibility. Table 11 demonstrates the language 
distribution in detail.
To simplify a most complex matter, almost 75% of 
the population speak one of the four Indo-European languages 
of Hindi, Hindustani, Urdu or Punjabi. It is difficult 
to determine the extent of the use of Hindi, the national 
language of the Union. According to the 1961 census k2%  
of the population speak Hindi, Urdu, Hindustani or Punjabi 
as a mother tongue. These were grouped together as a
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TABLE 12 
MAJOR LANGUAGES OF INDIA, I963
Language Region
Number of speakers 
(in thousands)
Indo-European Family 
Hindi
Hindustani
Urdu
Punjabi Northern States 1 4 9 , 9 4 4
Assamese Assam 4 , 9 8 8
Bengali West Bengal 2 5 , 1 2 2
Gujarati Gujarat 1 6 , 3 1 1
Kashmiri Kashmir n.a.
Marathi Maharashtra 2 6 , 5 4 7
Oriya Orissa 1 3 , 1 5 4
Dravidian Family
Kannada (Kanarese) Mysore (Karnatak) 1 4 , 4 7 2
Malayalam Kerala 1 3 , 3 8 0
Tamil Madras 2 6 , 5 4 7
Telegu Andhra Pradesh 33.000
Source : Adapted from India, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Publications Division, India 1963* p« 19»
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single language in I9 6I. The Constitution of 1950 states 
that Hindi in the Devanagari script shall be the official 
language of the Union.
b. Nepali Linguistic Characteristics 
In the past Sanskrit and Pali served the educated 
class of Nepal in handing down cultural and religious 
traditions. Today, in addition to Nepali, which is the 
national language, and splken by about two-thirds of the 
people, Newari, Marthili, and Bhojpuri are widely used. 
Hindi and Hindustani are also used extensively in the 
Terai areas bordering India. Nepali is a language which 
has certain features in common with Hindi, being derived 
from Sanskrit, and written in the Devanagari script. How­
ever, it also presents a mixed character, having borrowed 
words from the Tibeto-Burman languages. Hence, the pre­
ponderant portion of Nepal's citizens speak a language 
different from Hindi, the most common language spoken in 
India, yet possessing certain characteristics in common 
with that language (the official Indian language and the 
one spoken by the largest number of Indians). The majority 
of the people of Nepal must thus be considered linguisti­
cally amorphic to the majority of the Indian population, 
ce Bhutanese Linguistic Characteristics
The m o s t widely spoken dialects in Bhutan are 
forms of Tibetan, blended with words and idioms from
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languages of the neighboring countries. The most common 
include s
1. Dzongkha (the official language) spoken primarily in 
western and northern Bhutan.
2. Bumthangkha, spoken primarily in central Bhutan.
3. Sarchaphkka, spoken in Eastern Bhutan.
4. Nepali, spoken in southern Bhutan.
Bengali, Assamese and Hindi are minority languages.
Nearly 2/3 of Bhutan's citizens speak dialects akin to 
the language of the Khampas of eastern Tibet. Hence the 
preponderant portion of Bhutan's citizens speak a language 
linguistically divergent to the majority of the Indian 
population.
d. Sikkimese Linguistic Characteristics
The official language of Sikkim is English, 
though comparatively few Sikkimese speak it. Sikkimese 
and Gurkhali are spoken by a majority of the people.
Lepcha is spoken by a minority faction. Gurldiali is a 
form of Nepali, exhibiting stronger Tibetan influence than 
the latter. Because Gurkhali is spoken by a majority of 
the Sikkimese people, and has certain features in common 
with Hindi (being derived from Sanskrit, and written in 
the Devanagari script), Sikkim must be considered lin­
guistically amorphic with reference to India.
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IV. TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC AND HISTORICAL COMPARISONS
a. Nepalese Traditional, Economic and Historical
Tlfe---------------- *-------------------------
The history of Nepal is in many ways inseparable 
from India. During the Mauryan era of Indian history 
(2 5 0 BC), Buddhist culture flourished in Nopal, and Ashoka, 
the Indian king, built four stupas at Patan in the Katmandu 
Valley, and erected a pillar to mark the birthplace of 
Buddlia in the Terai. The fiist recorded use of the name 
Nepal occurs in the fourth century A.D. when the country 
was under the Gupta dynasty of India. Although the Nepalese 
have been nominally autonomous for most of their history, 
they have been either directly or indirectly under some 
measure of foreign domination. Sana in his work, "Charita 
Harsha" records that the Indian ruler Sri Harsha invaded 
the country in 607 A.D. After the successful invasion 
Harsha supposedly returned to India, leaving the conquered 
state in the hands of a governor, who was driven out by 
Amsuvarman, one of the great rulers of early Nepal (620 
A.D.). The new King instigated the first Sanskrit grammar 
in the country. About the first quarter of the seventh 
century. Bod (Tibet) embarked with an army of 100,000 
under the leadership of King Srong Dtsan and conquered 
Nepal, which thon became a vassal state to China until 
the 8th century. During this period Nepal pursued a 
somewhat independent course in domestic affairs, although
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within the Tibetan sphere of influence. Around the thir­
teenth century, the Hindus, fleeing from the Moslem pene­
tration of their own country, began to take refuge in the 
hills of western Nepal, where they set up a small number 
of kingdoms. It was the little western kingdom of Gurkha, 
formed by some refugees of Rajput origin, which in the
eighteenth century consolidated the territory, and founded
2
the modern state of Nepal, Geographical proximity and 
cultural affinities have kept India's influence dominant 
vis-a-vis China. In I96O-6I, India was the leading
3importer (99%) and exporter (92%) of Nepalese trade.
b . Traditional Bhutanese Economic and Historical 
Ties
It is generally assumed that the ancestors of 
the dominant ethnic group, the Bhote, descended from 
Tibet. Tibetan invaders in the ninth century conquered 
Bhutan, then a Hindu state, ruled by a Maharaja. Small 
groups of farmers, herdsmen and Buddhist priests followed 
the Tibetan warriors across the Himalayan ranges; the 
main influx coming in a southeastward direction through 
the Chumbi Valley into Bhutan, over several high passes. 
Intermarriage between the Tibetan conquerors and descendants
2
Pradyumna P. Karan, Nepal: A Physical and Cultural
Geography (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 19bOj.
pp. 4-0.
Dan Golenpaul, Information Please Almanac (New 
York: Golenpaul Assc. November, 1 9 6#)t P« 2l6.
254
of the original Bhutanese inhabitants was common, and many 
of the latter, originally Hindus or animists, were con­
verted to Lamaistic Buddhism. In the early seventeenth 
century, Bhutan became a distinct political entity when 
Shabdung, an influential Tibetan, established his authority 
as king, and acquired the title of Dharraa Raja of the 
church-state.
The early Dharma Rajas exercised both temporal 
and spiritual authority through penlops (governors of 
territories) and jungpens (governors of Dzongs).^ In 
1 8 6 5, under a treaty signed at Sinchula Pass near the 
Indian border, Bhutan assented to the formal cession of 
the Duars to British India for an annual subsidy.^ After 
the withdrawal of the British from India in 194?, a new 
treaty signed between Bhutan and India in 1949» replaced 
the earlier agreement with the British.^ As explored 
earlier, traditional Bhutanese trade has been with Tibet. 
However, this trade has completely stopped since 1959 as 
a result of the border dispute. At present the Himalayan 
kingdom is almost totally dependent upon India for its 
economic development and prosperity.
4
Fortresses built in the architectural style of 
the potala (palace) of the Délai Lama, at Lhasa.
p. 9.
6
^Karan, Nepalt A Physical and Cultural Geography,
Karan. The Hiinalavan Kingdoms, n . 92.
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c. Traditional Sikkimese Economic and Historical 
Ties
The Lepchas are thought to be the earliest 
inhabitants of Sikkim, though their numbers began to 
diminish after the Tibetans started to colonize Sikkim at 
the end of the l6th century. Definite control by the 
Tibetans was acquired during the first half of the 17th cen­
tury, Laiaaxst Euddhxsm was mtroduced, and government 
established under a Tibetan king from whom the succeeding 
line of Maharajas claim descent, Tibetan suzerainty over 
Silckim ended in 1 8 9O when Tibet and China recognized 
British control over Sikkim's internal administration and 
foreign relations. In Jur^ e 1949, Sikkim again agreed to 
be a protectorate, this time of India, Traditional trade 
was with Tibet although India now controls all of Sikkim's 
trade.
Listing the cultural categorizations developed 
along linguistic, religious and racial-ethnic classifica­
tions :
TABLE 13
CULTURAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN INDIA AND THE 
KINGDOMS OF BHUTAN, SIKKIM AND NEPAL
India
Racial/Ethnic Religion Language
Nepal amorphic amorphic amorphic
Bhutan divergent divergent divergent
Sikkim divergent amorphic amorphic
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The classification of Nepal and Bhutan becomes 
rather obvious.
In the case of Nepal, its relationship to India 
based on the definitive classifications established is 
one of Cultural Amorphiani. That is to say, k 0 - 6 0 %  of the 
citizens of Nepal exhibit culturally similar character­
istics to 6 5-1 0 0% of the citizens of India; based on 
racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic similarities and 
dissimilarities.
With regard to Bhutan its relationship to India 
based on the same cultural categories is one of Cultural 
Divergency. That is to say, only 0-35% of the citizens 
of Bhutan exhibit culturally similar characteristics to 
6 5-1 0 0% of the citizens of India.
With regard to Sikkim the results indicate a more 
complex situation. Racially the majority of the people 
possess Mongoloid features. Although 75% of the inhabi­
tants are Nepalese, 60% of the population practices the 
same form of Hinduism practiced in Nepal (a fusion of 
Hinduism and Buddhism); and a majority of the people speak 
Gurkhali (a language with features of both Hindi and 
Tibetan).
The sole factor of cultural divergency is the 
fact that the majority of Nepalese immigrants have strong 
Mongoloid features (although they cannot be strictly called 
Mongolian)- This fact cannot bv itself tin the balance of
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cultural characteristics in favor of cultural divergency
especially in view of the fact that Sikkim has been an
Indian "Protectorate" since 1949 with Sikkim's defenses,
communications and external relations under Indian manage-
7ment. In a country of only l80,000 people, the cultural 
impact of 25-30,000 Indian troops stationed there since 
1962 to guard the vital passes from Tibet, also cannot be 
overlooked.
With regard to India, the relationship of Sikkim 
based on comprehensive cultural similarity factors must be 
considered to be one of Cultural Amorphism.
Chapter VIII has explored the cultural similari­
ties and dissimilarities between India and each of the 
Himalayan States and developed the second phase of the 
categorization plan based on ethnic, racial, religious, 
and linguistic considerations with attention given to the 
traditional economic and historical ties of each nation 
involved. Chapter IX will conclude this work by con­
verging the two classification systems into one definitive 
categorization for each of the three relationships under 
study, and describe the general implications of the study 
for the field of international relations.
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION
Ail é X â i i i i ï i â  b J.011 O x  t lié x O î T é x g î l  x ' é l â ' t x C n S  O x  x j t l u x â
with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal has provided an excellent 
milieu for testing the categorization scheme conceived 
in the introductory chapter of this writing. The nature 
of the relationship of India with each of the Himalayan 
Kingdoms is of a sufficient variance to permit the demon­
stration of three definitive classifications and thus 
indicate the usefulness of the method as a tool in the 
study of big power-small power relationships. A sum­
marizing of the elemental components explored in 
Chapter IV designed to determine the locus of sovereignty 
in the internal relations, external relations, and 
defenses of the national samples under study, is pro­
vided by the following tables:
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TABLE l4 
INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH NEPAL
. OC d.OIlo #
a. Rule Making Authority--Total Nepalese Control.
b. Rule Adjudication Authority--Total Nepalese Control,
c. Rule Application Authority--Total Nepalese Control.
d. Economie Aid and Investments--Indian aid and 
investments are substantial.
e. Internai Transportation and Communications--Total 
Nepalese control.
f. Currency: The Nepalese rupee.
Illation: Nepal has absolute control over its
internal relations.
2. External Relations;
a. Diplomatic Representation— Formal Nepalese Control.
b. Foreign Trade— 90% with India.
Illation: Nepal has formal control over its external
relations though India is in a strong influ­
encing position.
3. Defenses: Total Nepalese Control.
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TABLE X5 
INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH BHUTAN
1 , Internal Relations:
a. Rule Making Authority— Total Bhutanese Control,
b. Rule Adjudication Authority--Tota.l Bhutanese Control,
c. Rule Application Authority--Total Bhutanese Control,
d. Economic Aid and Investiaents--Indian Aid predomi­
nant, foreign investments inconsequential,
e. Internal Transportation and Communications--Total 
Èhutanese Control,
f. Currency: Bhutan is just recently adopting its 
own currency.
Illation: Bhutan has absolute control over its inter­
nal relations, though India has suasive 
potential by its dominance over the king­
dom's foreign aid.
2, External Relations:
a. Diplomatic Representation--India has absolute con­
trol over the external relations of Bhutan under 
Article 2 of the 19^9 Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of 
Friendship.
b. Foreign Trade— India dominates Bhutanese foreign 
trade (95^ of all its total trade is with India).
Illation: India has absolute control over the external
relations of Bhutan.
3, Defenses: <
The Defense of Bhutan is the joint responsibility 
of the Governments of Bhutan and India, Although no 
formal defense agreement exists, Article 2 of the 19^9 
Treaty of Friendship, Indian military training and 
financing of the Bhutanese array, unilateral declara­
tions by the Indian Government, and statements and 
conferences by Bhutanese officials acknowledging India's 
efforts, ail make India the senior defense partner.
Illation: The defense of Bhutan is the joint responsi­
bility of the Governments of Bhutan and India,
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TABLE 16 
INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH SIKKIM
1. Internal Relations:
a. Rule Making Authcrity--Is shared between the 
Maharaja and his staff with an Indian dewan and 
other Indian administrators.
b. Rule Application Authority— Is shared between 
the Maharaja and his staff with an Indian dewan 
and other Indian administrators.
c. Rule Adjudication Authority--Under the kingdom's 
control, with the exception of those matters 
dealing with the 1950 Indo-Sikkimese Treaty, at 
which time the Chief Justice of India decides.
d. Economic Aid and Investments--India is the sole 
provider.of Sikkim’s foreign aid and investor as 
required by Article IV of the 1950 Treaty,
e. Internal Co;mnunication and Transportation— Under 
the control of the Indian Government as outlined 
in Article VI of the 1950 Treaty.
f. Currency— The Indian rupee.
Illation: Control over,the internal relations of
Sikkim is shared between the Royal Sik­
kimese Government and the Government of India,
2. External Relations:
a. Diplomatic Representation--Under the control of 
the Government of India by the provisions of 
Article IV of the 1950 Treaty,
b. Foreign Trade--Under the Control of the Govern­
ment of India, by the provisions of Article IV 
of the 1950 Treaty,
Illation: India has absolute control over the exter­
nal relations of Sikkim.
3 . Defenses:
Under the control of the Government of India by
the provisions of Article III of the 1950 Treaty.
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The data of the first three tables may be col­
lapsed into three trichotomous tables designed to sum­
marily indicate which nation has the dominant influence 
over the internal relations, external relations and 
defenses of the three small-powers under consideration. 
In addition each table has been constructed to show 
whether or not any existing big-power control is exer­
cised by voluntary treaty or involuntary imposition, as 
well as the relative degree of big-power control.
TABLE 17
THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF INDIAN CONTROL OVER THE DEFENSES,
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND INTERNAL RELATIONS OF NEPAL
1 Indian Control With 
1 Nepalese Agreement
:
Indian Control Without 
Nepalese Agreement
1 Nepalese 
1 Autonomous Control
1 Absolute 1 Partial 
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TABLE 18
THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF INDIAN CONTROL OVER THE DEFENSES,
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND INTERNAL RELATIONS OF BHUTAN
; Indian Control With 
I Bhutanese Agreement 
---------
5 Absolute 
I control
Indian Control Without 
Bhutanese Agreement
Bhutanese 
Autonomous Control
I Absolute 
I control
Partial
control
Partial
control
Absolute
control
Defenses
External
Relations
Internal
Relations
CO
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TABLE 19
THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF INDIAN CONTROL OVER THE DEFENSES,
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND INTERNAL RELATIONS OF SIKi^IM
[ndian Control Without 
Sikkimese Agreement
Sikkimese 
Autonomous Control
Indian Control Wit& 
Sikkimese Agreement
j Partial 
j control
Absolute
control
Partial
control
Partial
control
Absolute
control
Absolute
control
Defenses
[Internal
[Relations
to
VJ1
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TABLE 20
DEFINITIVE CATEGORIES DESIGNED FOR USE IN THE 
STUDY OF BIG POWER-SMALL POWER RELATIONSHIPS
Function of the '< Method of Big Power Control
Controlled ; Voluntary
I Treaty
Involuntary Treaty 
or Imposition
f
1 . Defensest j
: : : : : : : :  {supen»t.nd,n.y 
all controlled |
Subjugation
1
2. Defensesf | 
external relations, ? 
controlled; |Protectorate 
Internal relations | 
autonomous. |
Tutelage
3. External relations ( 
controlled; >
Defenses, jsatellite 
internal relations, | 
autonomous s
i1!
Restrainment I
Defenses, I | 
external relations, L . ( . . 
internal relational Autonomous Autonomoua
1 all autonomous, ) |
267
By comparing the results of Tables l6, 1?, and l8 
with the definitive categorization scheme developed in 
Table 19i it is possible to classify in exact terms the 
relationship of India with the three Himalayan Kingdoms.
1. Nepal--whose defenses, external relations and internal 
relations are controlled by Nepal is categorized as a 
Total Autonomy in its relations with India.
2. Bhutan--whose internal relations are controlled by 
Bhutan; whose external relations are controlled by 
India; and whose defenses are partially controlled 
by India, by voluntary treaty with India the senior 
partner, is categorized as a Partial Protectorate in 
its relations with India.
3. Sikkim— whose defenses and external relations are 
totally controlled by India; and whose internal rela­
tions are partially controlled by India, by voluntary 
treaty, is categorized as a Partial Superintendency.
It is possible to further expand the development 
of the classification scheme by including a cultural basis 
of comparison between India and the three Himalayan king­
doms. By comparing the degree of similarity or dissimilarity 
of such elemental factors as religion, language, ethnic 
and racial groups; as well as traditional economic and 
historical ties, three cultural categories are possible.
1. Cultural Synergism-— 6 5% of the citizens of the small 
power exhibit culturally similar characteristics to
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6 5-10 0% of the citizens of large power,
2. Cultural Amorphiam--40-60% of the citizens of the small 
power exhibit culturally similar characteristics to 
6 5-1 0 0% of the citizens of the large power,
3 , Cultural Divergency--0-35% of the citizens of the 
small power exhibit culturally similar characteristics 
to 6 5-1 0 0% of the citizens of the large power. On 
the basis of the cultural classification scheme:
1 , Nepal is categorized as a Cultural Amorphism when 
its culture is compared to the culture of India,
2, Bhutan is categorized as a Cultural Divergency when 
its culture is compared to the culture of India,
3 , Sikkim is categorized as a Cultural Amorphism when 
its culture is compared to the culture of India.
In summation, the relationship of India with
Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal may be indicated by the follow­
ing definitive classification:
1 , Indian-Nepalese Relations (1 9 4 7-1 9 6 7):
A Culturally Amorphic Total Autonomy
2, Indian-Bhutanese Relations (1947-1967):
A Culturally Divergent Partial Protectorate
3 , Indian-Sikkimese Relations (1947-1967):
A Culturally Amorphic Partial Superintendency
The categorizations developed for Bhutan, Sikkim and
Nepal in their relations with India for the specific
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time period indicated are but 3 of 52 possible classi­
fication groupings which this scheme provides. It is 
recognized that the relationship between nations is con­
stantly changing. Hence, in using this method it is 
essential that the date of formulation accompany the 
determined categorization. For instance what may be at 
one time classified a superintendency may actually evolve 
into a Total or Partial Subjugation at a later date.
This is indeed what may happen to the tiny kingdom of 
Sikkim should its struggle for greater autonomy in inter­
nal and external affairs be thwarted or even suppressed 
by the Government of India,
The definitive categories developed by this work 
may be utilized to interpret the relationships of nations 
of divergent political power wherever they exist on the 
international scene. The categorizations furnish a frame 
cf reference for the political scientist which indicates 
an immediate awareness of several elemental considerations 
in the study of Big Power-Small Power relationships.
These considerations include the degree of cultural sim­
ilarity and the extent of control by the Big Power over 
the internal relations, external relations, and defenses 
of the Small Power under study. An adequate frame of 
reference for the study of nations of divergent political 
power has not been afforded by conventional classification 
models and schemes currently used in the field of
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international relations. Consequently terms used to 
describe this kind of relationship have been vague, indis­
tinct and lacking in clarity.
It is my hope that this classification plan may 
provide a new implement for the study of Big Power-Small 
Power relations for the field of international relations.
APPENDIX A
TIBETO-NEPALESE TREATY OF 1?92
1. That China should henceforth be considered as father 
to both Nepal and Tibet. who should regard each 
other as brothers;
2. That after due investigation by the Chinese Govern­
ment, the full value of the articles plundered at 
Lhasa would be paid to the Nepalese sufferers by 
the Tibetan authorities;
3. That all Nepalese subjects, with the exception of 
armed soldiers, would be permitted to travel, to 
establish factories and to carry on trade within 
the jurisdiction of Tibet and China;
4. That if either of the two brotherly States should 
commence an unprovoked dispute with the intention 
of possessing the territories of the other, the 
representatives of the two Governments would report 
all particulars to the court of Peking which would 
finally decide the dispute;
5. That if Nepal be ever invaded by a foreign power, 
China would not fail to help her;
6 . That the two brotherly States would send to China 
some produce of their country every five years in 
token of their filial love;
7. That the Chinese Government would in return send to 
Nepal a friendly present, and would make every 
necessary arrangement for the comfort of the mission 
to and from Peking.
(From the Life of Maharaja Sir Jung 
Bahadur by General Pudma Jang Bahadur Rana, 
Allahabad, 1909.)
Î7Î
APPENDIX B
PEACE TREATY BETWEEN TIBET AND NEPAL, I856
We undersigned Bharadare and Lamas representing the Gorkha 
Government and the Tibetan Government have nutually set­
tled a treaty of the following 10 articles, and with the 
Supreme Being a* witness we have affixed our seals unto 
it of our own free will and choice.^ The Emperor of 
China shall continue ^o bo regarded %d.tb respect^ as 
heretofore. So long os two Governments continue to abide 
byterms set forth herein, they shall live in amity like 
two brothers. May the Si^teme Being not allow that side 
to prosper that may make war upon the other; and may the 
side be exempt from all sin in making war upon the other 
side which violates tbs terms contained in this agree­
ment (Treaty).
Here follow the names and seals of the signatories • 
Article 1: Tibet shall pay a sum of Rs. ten thousand
annually to the Gorkha Government.3
Article 2: Gorkha and Tibet have both been regarding
the Emperor of China with respect,* Tibet being merely 
a country of monasteries and Lamas and place of recita­
tion of prayers and practice of religious austerities, 
should the troops of any other Raja Invade Tibet in 
future, Gorkha shall afford such assistance and protection 
as it can.
‘‘The Tibetan text omits ‘‘of our own free will and
choice."
^Tbe translation of the Treaty by Aitchison says 
instead: "we further agree that the Emperor of China
shall be obeyed by both States as before."
The Tibetan text inserts the words "in cash." 
Aitchison adds the words as "tribute" and Sir Charles 
Bell "as a present.
4
Aitchison translates the relevant word as "borne 
allegiance."
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Article 3: Tibet shall not levy any taxes (on routes), 
duties (on merchandise) and rates (of any other kind) 
leviable by Tibet on the merchandise and subjects of the 
country of Gorkha.
Article 4: Tibet shall return to the Gorkha Govern­
ment all Sikh soldiers held as prisoners and also all 
officers, soldiers, women and guns of Gorkha that were 
captured and taken during the war; and the Gorkha Gov­
ernment shall return to Tibet all the soldiers of Tibet 
captured in war, as also the arms, the yaks, whatever 
may be belonging to the Rayats of Kirong, Kuti, Jhunga, 
Taklakhar, Chhewar-Gumbha and on the completion of the 
Treaty all the Gorkha Troops that are in Taklakhar and 
Chhowar-Gumbha, Kirong, Jhunga, Kuti, Dhyaklang up to 
Bhairab Langur shall be withdrawn and places evacuated.
Article 5 : Henceforth not a Naiya (Headman), but a
Bharadar shall be posted by the Gorkha Government at 
Lhasa.
Article 6 : The Gorkha Government shall establish
its own trade factory at Lhasa which will be allowed 
to trade freely in all kinds of merchandise from gems 
and ornaments to articles of clothing and food.
Article 7 : The Gorkha Bharadar at Lhasa shall not
try and determine suits and cases among subjects and 
merchants of Tibet; and Tibet will not try and deter­
mine suits and cases among Gorkha subjects, merchants, 
the Kashmeries of Nepal, residing within the jurisdiction 
of Lhasa. In the event of dispute between the subjects 
and merchants of Gorkha and those of Tibet, the Bharadar 
of both Gorkha and Tibet shall sit together and jointly 
adjudicate the cases. All incomes (fines, etc.) from 
such adjudications realised from the subjects and mer­
chants of Tibet shall be taken by Tibet and those 
realised from the Gorkha subjects and merchants and 
Kashmeries shall be taken by Gorkha.
Article 8 : A Gorkha subject who goes to the country
of Tibet after committing murder of any person of Gorkha 
shall be surrendered by Tibet to Gorkha; and a Tibetan 
who goes to the country of Gorkha after committing mur­
der of any person of Tibet shall be surrendered by 
Gorkha to Tibet.
Article 9< If the property of Gorkha subjects and 
merchants be plundered by any person of Tibet, the 
Bharadars of Tibet shall compel the restoration of such 
property to the Gorkha subjects and merchants; should 
the property not be forthcoming from the plxinderer,
Tibet shall compel him to enter into arrangement for 
restitution (of such property). If the property of 
Tibetan subjects and merchants be plundered by any 
person of Gorkha, Gorkha shall compel the restoration 
of such property to Tibetan subjects and merchants; should
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the property be not forthcoming from the plunderer, 
Gorkha shall compel him to enter into agreement for the 
restitution (of such property).
Article 10: After the completion of the Treaty
neither side shall act vindictively against the person 
or property of the subjects of Tibet who may have 
joined the Gorkha Durbar during the war, or of the sub­
jects of Gorkha who may have joined the Tibetan Durbar.
This the third day of light fortnight of Chaitra in 
the year Samvat 1912 (March 24, I8 5 6).
(Translation from Nepalese text by Perceval
Landon, in his Nepal)■
APPENDIX C
SINO-NEPAL TREATY (1956)
Tais Treaty was signed between China and Nepal in 
1 9 5 6. As a result of this Treaty, the extra­
territorial privileges granted by Tibet and enjoyed 
by Nepal (by virtue of io5o Treaty of Peaca between 
Tibet and Nepal) were renounced. The Treaty proves 
that the People’s Republic of China has accepted the 
legal position that treaties concluded by Tibet with­
out the mediation of China had continued validity 
until abrogated and replaced by other agreements in 
regard to the same subject, after the assumption of 
governmental authority by China over Tibet. It also 
proves that Tibet had the power, without the inter­
mediary of China, to conclude treaties with foreign 
States at that time.
The Government of the Kingdom of Nepal and the People's 
Republic of China, being desirous of further developing 
the friendly relations between the two countries as good 
neighbours on the basis of the longstanding friendship 
between the two peoples.
Reaffirm the Five Principles (Panch Sheela) of
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial 
integrity and sovereignty;
2. Non-Aggression;
3* Non-interference in each other's internal affairs 
by any reason of economic, political or ideological 
character;
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5* Peaceful co-existence,
should be the fundamental principles guiding the rela­
tions between the two countries.
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The two parties have resolved to conclude the present 
Agreement in accordance with the above-mentioned prin­
ciples and have for this purpose appointed as their 
respective plenipotentiaries :
The Government of the Kingdom of Nepal, His Excellency 
Shri Chuda Prassad Sharma, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
The Government of the People's Republic of China, His 
Excellency Pan Tzu-li, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to the 
Kingdom of Nepal, who having examined each other's cre­
dentials and finding them in good and due form, have 
agreed upon the following!
Article 1. The High Contracting Parties declare that 
peace and friendship shall be maintained between the 
Kingdom of Nepal and the People's Republic of China.
Article 2. The High Contracting Parties hereby 
reaffirm their decision to mutually exchange diplomatic 
representatives on ambassadorial level.
Article 3. All Treaties and documents which existed 
in the past between Nepal and China including those 
between Nepal and the Tibetan region of China are hereby 
abrogated.
Article 4. In order to maintain and develop the 
traditional contacts between Nepal and the peoples of 
the Tibetan region of China, the High Contracting 
Parties agree that the nationals of both Parties may 
trade, travel and make pilgrimage in these places in 
each other's territory as agreed upon by both Parties, 
and the two Parties agree to safeguard the proper inter­
ests of the nationals of the other party in its terri­
tory in accordance with the laws of the country of 
residence, and for this purpose the High Contracting 
Parties agree to do as follows:
Paragraph 1
The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to estab­
lish Trade Agencies.
1. The Chinese Government agrees that the Government 
of Nepal may establish Trade Agencies at Shigatse, 
Kyerong and Nyalam.
2. The Government of Nepal agrees that the Chinese 
Government may establish an equal number of Trade
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Agencies in Nepal, the specific location of which 
will be discussed and determined at a later date 
by both Parties.
3. The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be 
accorded the same status and same treatment.
The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy 
freedom from arrest while exercising their 
functions, and shall enjoy in respect of them­
selves, their wives, and their children who are 
dependent on them for livelihood freedom from 
search.
The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the 
privileges and immunities for couriers, mailbag and 
communication in code.
Paragraph 2
The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of 
both countries may trade at the following places:
1 . The Chinese Government agrees to specify (l) Lhasa, 
(2 ) Shigatse, (3) Gyantse and (4) Yatung as markets 
for trade;
2. The Government of Nepal agrees that when with the 
development of Chinese trade in Nepal, it has 
become necessary to specify markets for trade in 
Nepal, the Government of Nepal will specify an 
equal number of markets for trade in Nepal;
3* Traders of both countries known to be customarily 
and specifically engaged in border trade between 
Nepal and the Tibet Region of China may continue 
trade at the traditional markets for such trade.
Paragraph 3
The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by 
religious believers of either country to the other country 
may continue according to religious custom. Personal 
baggages and articles used for pilgrimage carried by 
the pilgrims of either Party shall be exempt from taxa­
tion by other Party.
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Paragraph 4
For travelling across the border between Nepal and 
Tibet Region of China, the High Contracting Parties 
agree that the nationals of both countries shall use the 
customary routes.
Paragraph 5
For travelling across the borders by nationals of 
the two countries, the High Contracting Parties agree to 
adopt the following provisions := =
1. Diplomatic personnel and officials of the two 
countries and nationals of the two countries 
except those provided by sub-paragraphs 2 , I  
and 4 who travel across the border between Nepal 
and the Tibet Region of China, shall hold pass­
ports issued by their respective countries and 
visaed by the other Party. Nationals of the two 
countries who enter Nepal or Tibet Region of China 
through a third country shall also hold passports 
issued by their respective countries and visaed
by the other Party.
2. The Traders of the two countries known to be cus­
tomarily and specifically engaged in trade between 
Nepal and the Tibet Region of China, their wives 
and children dependent on them for livelihood and 
their attendants, not covered by sub-paragraphs
3 of this paragraph, who enter into Nepal or 
Tibet Region of China as the case may be for the 
purpose of trade shall hold passports issued by 
their respective countries end visaed by the 
other party, or certificates issued by their 
respective Governments or orgeuns authorised by 
their respective Governments.
3. Inhabitants of the border districts of the two 
countries who cross the border to carry on petty 
trade, to visit friends or relatives or for 
seasonal change of residence, may do so as they 
have customarily done heretofore and need not 
hold passports, visas or other documents of certi­
fication.
4. Pilgrims of either Party who cross the border 
between Nepal and the Tibetan region of China for
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the purpose of pilgrimage need not hold passports, 
visas or other documents of certification, but 
shall register at the border checkposts or the 
first authorised Government office of the other 
Party, and obtain permits for pilgrimage therefrom.
5 . Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing 
sub-paragraphs in this paragraph, either Govern­
ment may refuse entry to any particular person.
6. Nationals of either country who enter the terri­
tory of the other Party in accordance with the 
forcgoxng sub—paragraphs of this paragraph may 
stay within the territory only after complying 
with the procedures specified by the other Party.
Article 5. This Agreement shall be ratified. It 
shall come into force after mutual notice of ratifications, 
and remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of 
the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties 
if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to 
the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to 
by the other Party.
Done in Kathmandu on the 20th day of September, I9 5 6 , 
in duplicate in the Nepalese, Chinese and English languages, 
all texts being equally authentic.
The Government of Nepal and the Government of the 
People's Republic of China have also agreed to regulate 
the following related matters by an exchange of notes:
1. The two Parties mutually agree to establish Con- 
sulates-General:
The Chinese Government agrees that the Government 
of Nepal may establish Consulate-General at Lhasa 
of the Tibet Region of China.
The Government of Nepal agrees that the Chinese Gov­
ernment may open Consulate-General at Kathmandu of Nepal, 
the date for the establishment of which will be discussed 
and determined at a later date.
2. The Government of Nepal will be pleased to with­
draw completely within six (6) months after the 
exchange of notes its military escorts now in 
Lhasa and other places in the Tibet Region of 
China, together with all their arms and ammuni­
tion. The Chinese Government will render facili-
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3. Nepalese nationals in the Tibet Region of China 
and Chinese Nationals in Nepal shall be subjected 
to the jurisdiction of the Government of the coun­
try of residence, observe the laws and regulations 
of the country of residence, pay taxes to that 
Government and respect the local customs.
All civil or criminal cases or disputes in which 
nationals of one Party in the territory of the other 
may be involved, shall be dealt by the Government of 
the country of residence.
. The Government of either Party will protect and
safeguard the person, property and legitimate 
interests of the other Party in its territory.
5 . (a) The Governments of the two Parties agree
that the nationals of either Party in the
territory of the other Party, under the con­
dition that they pay rents according to 
market prices and sign contract for lease 
with the house owners on a mutually volun­
tary basis, may continue to rent the houses.
(b) Nationals of either Party who have already 
rented houses in the territory of the other 
Party, under the condition that they pay 
rent according to the market prices and 
contracts for lease are or have been con­
cluded with the house owners on a mutually 
voluntary basis, may continue to rent the 
houses.
6 . Both Parties agree to adopt necessary measures
to promote and expand the trade relations between 
the two countries, and to levy customs duty on 
the import and export commodities of the two 
Parties in accordance with the favoured tax- 
rates of each Government.
7 . The range of business engaged in by the traders 
of either Party in the territory of the other 
shall comply v r± * \ the relevant laws and regu­
lations of the country of residence.
8 . The Nepalese primary school in Lhasa in the 
Tibet Region of China shall be changed into a 
primary school for children of Nepalese nationals 
and shall complete registration in accordance 
with the relevant regulations of the Chinese 
government.
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9. The two Parties agree to establish direct wire­
less telegraphic service between Lhasa and 
Kathmandu, the specific arrangements of which 
will be discussed and decided upon at a later 
date by the Governments of both Parties.
10. The Government of either Party will assist the 
Consulate-General and the Trade Agencies of the 
other in its territory in renting houses.
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ance with the laws and regulations of the country 
of residence, have access to their nationals 
involved in civil or criminal cases.
12. The Trade Agents and traders of both countries 
may hire employees in the locality.
1 3 . Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have 
the facility of hiring means of transportation
at normal and reasonable rates.
14. The two Parties agree that any persons residing 
in the Tibet Region of China born of parents 
holding respectively the nationality of the 
People's Republic and China and the nationality 
of the Kingdom of Nepal and of I8 years of age
or above, may, according to their own will, choose 
the nationality of the People's Republic of China 
for themselves and their children who are under 
the age of eighteen (1 8 ) by completing relevant 
procedures of the Chinese Government. After the 
completion of the above-mentioned procedures, 
they and their children under the age of eighteen 
shall be considered to have lost automatically 
the nationality of Nepal.
"Sino-Nepal Treaty (1956)," Texts of Treaties, Agree­
ments, and Certain Exchange of Notes Relating to the 
Sino-lndian Boundary, Indian Society of International 
Law (New Delhi, I962), pp. 44-49»
APPENDIX D
A full text of the Nepal-China Border Treaty,
March 2 1 , 1 9 6 0 , is not available to the Office of the 
Geographer. However, the following has been excerpted 
from Padma Behadur Khatri: "Nepal - China Sima Sandhi"
(Nepal-China Border Treaty), Gor^apatra, Volume 6 3 , 
Issue No. 3 1 3» Pal gun 24, 2018 (>iarch 7, 19^2, pp. 2-3).
"It has been decided to conclude an agreement 
with a view to establishing a definite boundary 
line and formally delineating the boundary between 
the two countries, to set up a Joint Committee 
composed of an equal number of delegates from the 
two sides and to entrust it with powers to discuss 
and solve the concrete problems concerning the Nepal 
China border, under the rules mentioned in Article 3 
of the present Agreement, to install boundary pil­
lars and, lastly, to prepare a draft of the Nepal - 
China Boundary Treaty. The said Joint Committee 
shall hold its meetings in the capitals or other 
places of Nepal and China.
"While studying the boundary lines as shown in 
the exchanged maps and also the information made 
available by each side, concerning the actual 
jurisdiction of the respective countries, the 
contrasting Parties agree, that barring some dif­
ferences over some particular area, their under­
standing of the traditional c vis ternary boundary line 
is basically the same. In order to determine con­
cretely the boundary between the two countries, the 
Contracting Parties agree to act as follows in three 
different cases=
(1 ) Areas where the boundary line between the 
two countries as shown in the maps of both 
the parties is identical.
The boundary line in such areas shall be 
determined according to that shown as 
identical in the maps of both sides. The 
Joint Committee shall send out Joint Survey
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teams composed of an equal number of persons 
from each side to conduct survey and erect 
boundary pillars there.
When the boundary line is determined according 
to the provisions of the above Article, the 
areas to the South shall conclusively belong 
to Nepal, and those to the North to China, 
and subsequent to that neither party shall 
lay claim to any area on the other side.
(2 ) Areas where the boundary line between the 
two countries as shown in the maps of both 
parties is not identical, althou^ the 
actual jurisdiction is undisputed.
The Joint Committee shall send out Joint 
Survey Teams composed of an equal number of 
persons from each side to conduct surveys 
on the spot and install boundary pillars to 
determine the boundary line according to 
the physical features (watersheds, valleys, 
passes, etc.) and the actual jurisdiction 
of the respective party.
(3 ) Areas where the boundary line as shown in 
the maps is not identical and each side has 
its own understanding of such jurisdiction.
In such areas the Joint Committee shall send 
out Joint Suirvey teams composed of an equal 
number of persons from each side in order 
to find out the actual jurisdiction, make 
adjustments according to the principles of 
equality, mutual benefit, friendship and 
mutual accommodation, demarcate the boundary 
and to install boundary pillars."
APPENDIX E
"Boundary Treaty Between the People's Republic of China 
and the Kingdom of Nepal" October 3« 19^1:
The Chairman of the People's Republic of China and His 
Majesty the King of Nepal,
Being of the agreed opinion that a formal settlement of 
the question of the boundary between China and Nepal is 
of fundamental interest to the peoples of the two 
countries,
Noting with satisfaction that the friendly relations of 
long standing between the two countries have undergone 
further development since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries and that the two 
parties have, in accordance with the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence and in a spirit of fairness, reason­
ableness, mutual understanding, and mutual accommoda­
tion, smoothly achieved an over-all settlement of the 
boundary question between the two countries through 
friendly consultations,
Firmly believing that the formal delimitation of the 
entire boundary between the two countries and its con­
solidation as a boundary of peace and friendship not 
only constitute a milestone in the further development 
of the friendly relations between China and Nepal, but 
also are a contribution toward strengthening peace in 
Asia and the world.
Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present 
treaty on the basis of the agreement between the Govern­
ment of the People's Republic of China and His Majesty's 
Government of Nepal on the question of the boundary 
between the two countries of 21 March I96O and have 
agreed upon the following:
Article I.
The contracting parties, basing themselves on the tradi­
tional customary boundary line and having jointly conducted
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necessary on-the-spot investigations and surveys and 
made certain adjustments in accordance with the princi­
ples of equality, mutual benefit, friendship, and mutual 
accommodation, hereby agree on the following alignment 
of the entire boundary line from west to east, Chinese 
territory being north of the line and Nepalese territory 
south thereof:
1—-The Chinese-Nepaiese boundary line starts from the 
point where the watershed between the Kali River and the 
Tinker River meets the watershed between the tributaries 
of the Mapchu (Karnali) River on the one hand and the 
Tinkar kiver on the other hand, thence it runs south- 
eastward along the watershed between the tributaries
of the Mapchu (Karnali) River on the one hand and the 
Tinkar River and the Seti River on the other hand, pas­
sing through the Niumachisa (Lipudhura) Snowy Mountain 
ridge and Tinkarlipu (Kipudhura) Pass to Pehlin (Urai) 
Pass.
2— Prom Pehlin (Urai) Pass the boundary line runs along 
the mountain ridge southeastward for about 500 meters, 
then northeastward to height 5 * 6 5 5 meters, thence con­
tinues to run along the mountain ridge northwestward to 
Tojang (Thgurodhunga Tuppa), then northeastward passing 
through height 5*590.6 meters to Chimala Pass, thence it 
runs generally northwestward, passing through Chimala to 
Lungmochiehkuo (Numoche Tuppa); thence, the boundary line 
runs generally eastward, passing throu^ Paimowetunkuo 
(Kitko Tuppa) and then runs along the Chokartmg (Kitko) 
Mountain spur down to the Chilungpa (Yadangre) stream, 
then it follows the Chilungpa (Yadan^e) str’êîêûn northward 
to its junction with the Mapchu (Karnali) River, then
to Yusa (Hilsa). At Yusa (Hilsa) the boundary line 
departs from the Mapchu (Karnali) River and runs north­
eastward along the mountain spur up to Chialosa (Takule), 
then along the mountain ridge, passing through Kumalatse 
(Kumalapche), Kangpaochekuo (Ghanbochheko), and Main- 
ipaimikuo (Manepamango) to Kangkuona (Kangarje), then 
northward passing through Kangchupeng (Kandumbu) (at?) 
height 6 , 5 5 0  meters to Nalakankar.
3— From Nalakankar the boundary line runs generally 
northeastward along the watershed between the tribu­
taries flowing into Manssarovar Lake and the tributaries 
of the Humla Karnali River passing through Nalakankar 
Pass to Latsela (Lapche) Pass; thence it runs generally 
southeastward along tkewatershed between the tributaries 
flowing into Manasarovar Lake and the tributaries of
the Machuan River on the one hand and the tributaries 
of the Humla Karnali River, the Mugu Kumali River and
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the Panjang Khola on the other hand, passing through 
Changla Mountain, Namja Pass, Khung (Thau) Pass, and 
Marem Pass to Pindu Pass, then it continues to run 
southeastward along the watershed between the tribu­
taries of the Machuan River on the one hand and the 
tributaries of the Barbung River and the Kali Gaudaki 
River on the other hand gradually turning northeastward 
to height 6,214.1 meters.
4--From height 6,2l4.1 meters, the boundary line runs 
northeastward along the mountain spur, passing through 
height 5 , 0 2 5 meters and crossing the Angarchubo (Angarchhu) 
stream to height 5 , 0 2 9  meters; thence it runs generally 
eastward along the Tuchu (Thukchu) Mountain spur, passing 
through height 4,730 meters and Bungla (Panglham) to
the foot of Tingli Bhodho spur at its northwestern end, 
then turns northeastward and runs along the southern 
bank of the Roumachushiu (Rhaunarchhushu) seasonal stream 
to the foot of Tingli Bhodho spur at its northeastern 
end; thence turns southeastward, crosses the junction 
of two seasonal streams flowing northward, and runs to 
the junction of three seasonal streams flowing north­
ward, and then up the eastern stream of the above three 
seasonal streams to height 4,697*9 meters, then turns 
southewestward crossing a seasonal stream to height 
passing through Pengpengla (Phumphula) and then along 
Chukomaburi (Chhukomapoj) Mountain ridge, passing through 
height 4 ,6 7 6 . 6 meters and height 4,754*9 meters to height 
4 ,7 9 8 . 6  meters, thence along the mountain ridge north­
eastward passing through Hsiabala, then generally east­
ward passing through height 5#044.1 meters to Chaklo.
5--Prom Chaklo the boundary line runs generally southward 
along the watershed between the tributaries of the Yalu 
Tsangpo River and the tributaries of the Kali Gandaki 
River, passing through height 6,724 meters tv Lugula Pass, 
thence it runs generally eastward along Lugula Snowy 
Mountain and the watershed between the tributaries of
the Yalu Tsangpo River and the tributaries of the Mar- 
shiyangdi River to Gya (Gyala) Pass.
6--From Gya (Gyala) Pass the boundary line runs along 
the mountain ridge eastward to height 5*782 meters, then 
southeastward to Lajlag Pass, then it runs along the 
Lajing Mountain ridge, passing through height 5*442 
meters and Lachong (Lajung) Pass to height 5*236 meters, 
then turns southwestward to Sangmudo Snowy Mountain; 
thence gradually southeastward and continues to run 
along the Lajing Mountain ridge passing through height 
6 , 1 3 9  meters to height 5*494 meters, and then in a
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straight line crosses the Dougar (Tom) River to height 
5 , 7 2 4  meters; thence the boundary line runs generally 
northeastward along the Snowy Mountain ridge, passing 
through height 6,010 meters, height 5» 3 6 0 meters, and 
height 5 , 6 7 2  meters to Thaple Pass.
7--Prom Thaple Pass the boundary line runs generally 
northeastward along the Snowy Mountain ridge, passing 
through Tsariyangkang Snowy Mountain to Sho.jan; thence 
it continues to run generally southward along the 
Snowy Mountain riuge, passing through Mailatsaehiag 
Pass, Pashuo Snowy Mountain and Lango Snowy Mountain 
to Yangrenkangri (Yangra) Snowy Mountain.
8 - From Yangrenkangri (Yangra) Snowy Mountain the 
boundary line runs along the mountain ridge southward 
to Tsalasungkuo and then generally eastward and then 
northeastward along a dry stream bed and passes through 
Kirapo (Kerabas) to reach the Sangching (Sanjou) River, 
then follows that river southeastward, passes through 
its junction with the Changchish (Bhrangre) River and 
continues to follow the Sangching (Sanjan) River to a 
point where a small mountain spur south of Genjugma 
(Pangschung) Pasture ground and north of Chhabarey 
(pasture?) ground meets with the Sangching (Sanjen)
River; then it runs along the (above all?) mountain 
spur eastward and then southeastward to height 4 ,5 6 5 . 4  
meters, then runs eastward to the Black Top; thence it 
runs along a mountain spur to the junction of the 
Bhurlung River and the Tanghsiaka (Khesadhang) stream, 
then runs eastward along the Bhurlung River to its 
junction with the Kyerong River; thence follows the 
Kyerong River southward and then eastward to its 
junction with the Tungling Tsangpo (Lende) River; then 
runs northeastward up the Tungling Tsangpo (Lcnde)
River, passing through Tasua bridge to the junction of 
the Tungling Tsangpo (Lende) River and the Guobashiachu
(Jambu) stream; thence turns eastward up the Guobashiachu 
(Jambu) stream, passing through the junction of the 
Chusumdo Tsangpo River and the Phuriphu Tsangpo River, 
both tributaries of the upper Guobashiachu ^Jambu) 
stream, to reach the boundary marker-point at Chusumdo.
9--From the boundary marker-point at Chusumdo the 
boundary line runs generally southeastward along 
the ridge of Tsogakangri (Seto Pokhari) Snowy Moun­
tain, Langtang Snowy Mountain, Dorley Mountain, and 
Gulinchiin (jPhurbo Chyachu) Mountain to Chakesumu 
(Kharaney) kountain; thence runs down to reach the 
Changnibachu (Kharaney) River, and then follows that 
river southward to its junction with the Bhochu (Bhota 
Kosi) River; then follows the Bhochu (Thota Kosi)
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River southward, pushing through Dalaima (Bhaise) 
bridge to the junction of the Bhochu (Bhota Kosi) River 
and the Junchu (Jum) River; thence eastward up the 
Junchu (Jum) River to its source at Tsaje Mountain 
(Jum Khola Ko Sir Ko Tuppa); thence the boundary line 
runs generally northward along the mountain ridge to 
Chomo Pamari (height: 6,208.8 meters).
1 0--Prom Chomo Famarl (hei^t 6,208.3 meters) the boundary 
line runs generally northward along the mountain ridge to 
height 5 ,9 1 ^ . 6 meters, then generally northeastward along 
Shondemo Kangri (Sudemo) Snowy Mountain passing through 
height 5,148 meters, and then crosses two tributaries of 
the Shondemo Chu (Shongdemo) Stream, passing through 
Shondemo (Sudemo) which lias between the above two 
tributaries to Gyanbyan; then it runs along Gyanbyan 
Mountain spur downward, crosses the Pinbhu Tsangpo River 
(the western Tributary of the Lapche River--Ed.) and
then along the mountain spur up to height 5 ,3 7 0 . 5 meters 
at Sebobori (Korlang Pari Ko Tippa); thence the boundary 
line turns southeastward along the mountain spur downward, 
crosses the Lapche Khung Tsangpo River (the eastern 
tributary of the Lapche River--Bd.), then it runs along 
Biden Kangri (Piding) Snowy Mountain to height 5,397*2 
meters; thence the boundary line turns westward along the 
mountain ridge to height 5*444.2 meters at Kabobori 
(Baling), then generally southward along Rasuiakungpo 
(Rishinggumbo) Mountain ridge to Niehlu (Niule) bridge.
11--From Niehlu (Niule) bridge the boundary line runs 
generally eastward to Chejenma (Guari Smankar), and then 
eastward along the mountain ridge and then northward 
along the watershed between the Rongshar River and
the Rongbuk River on the one hand and the tributaries 
of the Oudh Kosi River on the other hand to Nagpa
and then rung generally southeastward along the moun­
tain ridge, passing through Cho Oyu Mountain, Pumoli 
Mountain (Gnire Langur), mount (ihomo-lungma (Sagarmatha) 
and Lhotse, to Makalu Mountain; then iruns southeastward 
and "tïïen eastward along the mountain ridge to Popti 
Pass.
12--From Popti PasM the boundary line runs along the 
mountain ridge eastward passing through Tsagala (Kepu 
Dada) to Kiiarala (Khade Dada), and then generally 
no:theaetward passing through Lanapo (Lhanakpu) and 
Chebum (Chhipung) to the source of the Sunchunchu 
(Shumjung) River; then it follows the Sunchunchu 
(Shumjung) River to its junction with the tract leading 
from Kimathangka to Chcntang; then it runs along the 
track to the bridge on the Karma Tsangpo (Kama) River;
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thence it runs generally southeastward along the Karma 
Tsangpo (Kama) River passing through its junction with 
the Pengchu (Arun) River, and then along the Pengchu 
(Arun) River to its junction with the Nadang River, 
then continues to follow the Pengchu (Arun) River 
westward to its junction with the Tsokangchingpo 
(Chhokang) River, thence the boundary line departs 
from the Pengchu (Arun) Rivex* and runs generally east­
ward along a mountain spur passing through Angde and 
Dalai (Tale) Pass to Dalaila (Tale), and then runs 
along the mountain ridgo passing through Jungkan 
(Dukan), Kaijungkan (Khachunkha), Renlangbu (Relinbu) 
and Sulala to reach Rag La (Rakhala) Pass.
13--Prom Rag La (Rakhala) Pass the boundary line runs 
generally eastward along the watershed between the 
tributaries of the Nadang River and the tributaries 
of the Yaru River on the one hand and the tributaries 
of the Ramur River on the other hand, passing through 
Ombolap (Ombak) Pass, the Putala (Tiptala) Pass, Yang- 
makhangla (Kangla) Pass and Chabukla to the terminal 
point where the watershed between the Khar River and 
the Chabuk River meets the watershed between the Khar 
River and the Lhonak River.
The entire boundary line between the two countries 
as described in the present article is shown on the 
1:3 0 0 ,000-scale maps of the entire boundary attached 
to the present treaty; the location of the temporary 
boundary markers erected by both sides and the detailed 
Alignment of certain sections of the boundary are shown 
on the 1:5 0 0 ,000-scale maps of those sections attached 
to the present treaty.
Article II.
The contracting parties have agreed that wherever the 
boundary follows a river, the midstream line shall be 
the boundary. In case a boundary river charges its 
course, the original line of the boundary shall remain 
unchanged in the absence of other agreements between 
the two parties.
Article III.
After the signing of the present treaty the Chinese- 
Nepaiese Joint Boundary Committee, constituted in 
pursuance of the agreement of 21 March I96O between 
the two parties on the question of the boundary between 
the two countries, shall set up permanent boundary 
markers as necessary on the boundary line between the
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two countries, and then draft a protocol setting forth 
in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line 
and the location of the permanent boundary markers, 
with detailed maps attached thereto showing the boun­
dary line and the location of the permanent boundary 
markers. The above-mentioned protocol, upon being 
signed by the governments of the two countries, shall 
become an annex to the present treaty and the detailed 
maps shall replace the maps now attached to the present 
treaty.
Upon the signing of the above-mentioned protocol, the 
tasks of the Chinese-Nepaiese Joint Boundary Committee 
shall be terminated, and the agreement of 21 March 
i960 between the two parties on the question of the 
boundary between the two countries shall cease to be 
in force.
Article IV.
The contracting parties have agreed that any dispute 
concerning the boundary which may arise after the 
formal delimitation of the boundary between the two 
countries shall be settled by the two parties throu^i 
friendly consultations.
Article V.
The present treaty shall come into force on the day of 
the signing of the treaty.
Done in duplicate in Peking on 3 October 1 9 6I in the 
Chinese, Nepalese, and English languages: all three
texts being equally authentic.
Chairman of the People's Republic of China, His Majesty 
the King of Nepal (Signed) Liu Chao-chi, Mahendra Bir 
Bikram Shah Deva.
"Boundary Treaty between the People's Republic of 
China and the Kingdom of Nepal," October 5 , 1 9 6I, 
International Boundary Study No. 30, U.S. Department 
of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 30, 
1 9 6 5, pp. 8-1 2 .
APPENDIX F
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND NEPAL, 1923
Whereas peace and friendship have now existed between 
the British Government and the Government of Nepal since 
the Treaty of Segowlie on the second day of December 
One Thousand and eight Hundred and fifteen; and whereas 
since that date the Government of Nepal has ever dis­
played its true friendship for the British Government 
and the British Government has consistently shown its 
goodwill towards the Government of Nepal; and whereas 
the Governments of both the countries are desirous of 
still further strengthening and commenting the good 
relations between them for more than a century; the two 
High Contracting Parties having resolved to conclude a 
new Treaty of Friendship have agreed upon the following 
articles :
Article 1: There shall be perpetual peace and
friendship between the Governments of Great Britain 
and Nepal, and the two Governments agree mutually to 
acknowledge and respect each other's independence, both 
internal and external.
Article 2: All previous Treaties, Agreements and
Engagements since and including the Treaty of Segowlie 
of 1 8 1 5 t which have been concluded between the two 
Governments, are hereby confirmed, except so far as they 
may be altered by the present Treaty.
Article 3 : As the preservation of peace and friendly
relations between the neighbouring States whose terri­
tories adjoin their common frontiers is to the mutual 
interests of both the High Contracting Parties, they 
hereby agree to inform each other of any serious 
friction or misunderstanding with those states likely 
to rupture such friendly relations and each to exert 
its good offices as far as may be possible to remove 
such friction and misunderstanding.
Article 4 : Each of the High Contracting Parties will
use all such measures as it may deem practicable to 
prevent its territories being used for purpose inimical 
to the security of the other.
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Article 8 : The Treaty signed on part of the British
Government by Lieutenant-Colonel W. F, T. O'Connor, 
C.I.Ë., C.V.O,, British Envoy at the court of Nepal, 
and on the part of the Nepal Government by General His 
Highness Maharaja Sir Chandra Shumshere Jung Bahadur 
Rana, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.V.O., O.C.L., Thong-Lin- 
Pinma-Kokang-Wang-Syan, Prime Minister and Marshal of 
Nepal, shall be ratified and ratifications shall be 
exchanged at Kathmandu as soon as practicable»
Signed and Sealed at Kathmandu, this the Twenty-First 
day of December in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred 
and Twenty-three Anno Domini corresponding with the 
Sixth Samvat Era One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty.
"Treaty Between Great Britain and Nepal, 1923," 
Texts of Treaties, Agreements and Certain Exchanges of 
Notes Relating to the Sino-Indian Boundary, Indian 
Society of International Law, pp. 162-163.
APPENDIX G
TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT 
OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL, 1950
The Government of India and the Government of Nepal 
recognising the ancient ties which have happily existed 
between the countries for centuries;
Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these 
ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries;
Have resolved therefore to enter into a Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship with each other, and have, for this 
purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries the fol­
lowing persons, namely.
The Government of India:
His Excellency Shri Chandreshwar Prassad Narain Singh, 
Ambassador of India in Nepal.
The Government of Nepal :
Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, Maharaja, Prime 
Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal.
Who having examined each other's credentials and 
found them good and in due form have agreed as follows:
Article 1: There shall be everlasting peace and
friendship between the Government of India and the Gov­
ernment of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually 
to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and independence of each other.
Article 2: The two Governments hereby undertake to
inform each other of any serious friction or misunder­
standing with any neighbouring State likely to cause any 
breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the 
two Governments.
Article 5 : In order to establish and maintain the
relations referred to in Article 1: The two Governments
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agree to continue diplomatic relations with each other 
by means of representatives with such staff as is neces­
sary for the due performance of their functions.
The representatives and such of their staff as may be 
agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and 
immunities as are customarily granted by international 
law on reciprocal basis, provided that in no case shall 
these be less than those granted to persons of a similar 
status of any other State having diplomatic relations 
with either Government.
Art cle 4: The two Governments agree to appoint
Consul-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and such Consular 
agents, who shall reside in towns, ports and other places 
in each other's territory as may be agreed to. Consuls- 
General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and other Consular agents 
shall be provided with exequaturs or other valid authori­
sation of their appointment. Such exequatur of authori­
sation is liable to be withdrawn by the country which 
issued it, if considered necessary. The reasons for 
the withdrawal shall be indicated wherever possible.
The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reci­
procal basis all the rights, privileges, exemptions, 
and immunities that are accorded to persons of corres­
ponding status of any other State.
Article 5 : The Government of Nepal shall be free
to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, 
ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary 
for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giving 
effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the 
two Governments acting in consultation.
Article 6: Each Government undertakes, in token of
the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to 
give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, 
national treatment with regard to participation in 
industrial and economic development of such territory 
and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating 
to such development.
Article 7 • The Governments of India and Nepal agree 
to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one 
country in the territories of the other the same privileges 
in the matter of residence, ownership of property, parti­
cipation in the trade and commerce and other privileges 
of a similar nature.
Article 8: So far as matters dealt with herein are
concerned, this Treaty cancels all previous Treaties, 
agreements and engagements entered into on behalf of 
India b} the British Government and the Government of 
Nepal.
Article 9: This Treaty shall come into force from
the date of signature by both Governments.
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Article 10; This Treaty shall remain in force until 
it is terminated by either party by giving one year's 
notice.
Done in duplicate at Kathmandu this 31st day of July 
1950.
(Sd.) Chandreshshwar Prasad Narain Singh,
For the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
(Sd.) Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana,
For the GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL.
"Text of India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friend­
ship," Issued in Kathmandu on July 31» 1950. Texts of 
Documents, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1 9 6 5 , pp. 3 6-
5 8 .
APPENDIX H
THE SINCHULA TREATY OF 1865
Treaty between His Excellency the Right Honorable 
Sir John Lawrence, G.C.B., K.S.I., Viceroy and Governor- 
General of Her Britannic Majesty’s possessions in the 
East Indies, and Their Highnesses the Dhurm and Dab 
Rajahs of Bhootan concluded on the one part by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Herbert Bruce, C.B., by virtue of full powers 
to that effect vested in him by the Viceroy and Governor- 
General, and on the other part by Samdojey Deb Jimpey 
and Themseyrensey Donai according to full powers conferred 
on them by the Dhurm and Deb Rajahs--l865>
Article I.
There shall henceforth be perpetual peace and friend­
ship between the British Government and the Government 
of Bhootan.
Article II.
Whereas in consequence of repeated aggressions of 
the Bhootan Government and of the refusal of the Gov­
ernment to afford satisfaction for those aggressions, 
and of their insulting treatment of the officers sent 
by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council for 
the purpose of procuring an amicable adjustment of dif­
ferences existing between the two States, the British 
Government has been compelled to seize by an armed force 
the whole of the Doars and certain Hill Posts protecting 
the passes into Bhootan, and whereas the Bhootan Gov­
ernment has now expressed its regret for past misconduct 
and a desire for the establishment of friendly relations 
with the British Government, it is hereby agreed that the 
whole of the tract known as the Eighteen Doars, bordering 
on the Districts of Rungpoor, Cooch Behar, and Assam, 
together with the Talook of Ambaree Fallacottah and the 
Hill territory on the left bank of the Teesta up to such 
points as may be laid down by the British Commissioner
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appointed for the purpose is ceded by the Bhootan Gov­
ernment to the British Government for ever.
Article III.
The Bhootan Government hereby agree to surrender all 
British subjects, as well as subjects of the Chiefs of 
Sikkim and Cooch Behar who are now detained in Bhootan 
against their will, and to place no impediment in the 
way of the return of all or any of such persons into 
British territory?
Article IV,
In consideration of the cession by the Bhootan 
Government of the territories specified in Article II, 
of this Treaty, and of the said Government having 
expressed its regret for past misconduct, and having 
hereby engaged for the future to restrain all evil 
disposed persons from committing crimes within British 
territory or the territories of the Rajahs of Sikkim 
and Cooch Behar and to give prompt and full redress for 
all such crimes which may be committed in defiance of 
their commands, the British Government agree to make an 
annual allowance to the Government of Bhootan of a sum 
not exceeding fifty thousand rupees (Rupees 50,000) to 
be paid to officers not below the rank of Jungpen, who 
shall be deputed by the Government of Bhootan to receive 
the same. And it is further hereby agreed that the pay­
ments shall be made as specified below:—
On the fulfilment by the Bhootem Government of the 
conditions of this Treaty twenty-five thousand rupees 
(Rupees 25,000),
On the 10th January following the 1st payment, 
thirty-five thousand rupees (Rupees 35*000),
On the 10th January following forty-five thousand 
rupees (Rupees 45*000),
On every succeeding 10th January fifth thousand 
rupees (Rupees 50,000),
Article V,
The British Government will hold itself at liberty 
at any time to suspend the payment of this compensation 
money either in whole or in part in the event of mis­
conduct on the part of the Bhootan Government or its 
failure to check the aggression of its subjects or to 
comply with the provisions of this treaty.
299
Article VI,
The British Government hereby agree on demand being 
duly made in writing by the Bhootan Government to sur­
render under the provisions of Act VII. of l6$4 of which 
a copy shall be furnished to the Bhootan Government, all 
Bhootanese subjects accused of any of the following 
crimes who may take refuge in British dominions. The 
crimes are murder, attempting to murder, rape, kidnapping, 
great personal violence, maiming, dacoity, thuggee, 
robbery, burglary, knowingly reo^iving property obtained 
by dacoity, robbery or burglary, cattle stealing, break­
ing and entering a dwelling house and stealing therein, 
arson, setting fire to a village, house, or town, forgery 
or uttering forged documents, counterfeiting current 
coin, knowingly uttering base or counterfeit coins, per­
jury, subordination of perjury, embezzlement by public 
officers or other persons, and being an accessory to emy 
of the above offences.
Article VII.
The Bhootan Government hereby agree on requisition 
being duly made by, or by the authority of, the Lieu­
tenant-Governor of Bengal to surrender any British sub­
jects accused of any of the crimes specified in the above 
Article who may take refuge in the territory under the 
jurisdiction of the Bhootan Government, and also any 
Bhootanese subjects who after commiting any of the above 
crimes in British territory shall flee into Bhootan, on 
such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall 
satisfy the Local Court of the district in which the 
offence may have been committed.
Article VIII.
The Bhootan Government hereby agree to refer to the 
arbitration of the British Government all disputes with, 
or causes of complaint against the Rajahs of Sikkim and 
Cooch Behar, and to abide by the decision of the British 
Government, and the British Government hereby engage to 
enquire into and settle all such disputes and complaints 
in such manner as justice may require, and to insist on 
the observance of the decision by the Rajahs of Sikkim 
and Cooeh Zahar.
Article IX.
There shall be free trade and commerce between the 
two Governments. No duties shall be levied on Bhootanese 
goods imported into British territories, nor shall the
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Article VI,
The British Government hereby agree on demand being 
duly made in writing by the Bhootan Government to sur­
render under the provisions of Act VII. of l8s4 of which 
a copy shall be furnished to the Bhootan Government, all 
Bhootanese subjects accused of any of the following 
crimes who may take refuge in British dominions. The 
crimes are murder, attempting to murder, rape, kidnapping, 
great personal violence, maiming, dacoity, thuggee, 
robbery, burglary, knowingly receiving property obtained 
by dacoity, robbery or burglary, cattle stealing, break­
ing and entering a dwelling house and stealing therein, 
arson, setting fire to a village, house, or town, forgery 
or uttering forged documents, counterfeiting curient 
coin, knowingly uttering base or counterfeit coins, per­
jury, subordination of perjury, embezzlement by public 
officers or other persons, and being an accessory to any 
of the above offences.
Article VII.
The Bhootan Government hereby agree on requisition 
being duly made by, or by the authority of, the Lieu­
tenant-Governor of Bengal to surrender any British sub­
jects accused of any of the crimes specified in the above 
Article who may take refuge in the territory under the 
jurisdiction of the Bhootan Government, and also any 
Bhootanese subjects who after commiting any of the above 
crimes in British territory shall flee into Bhootan, on 
such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall 
satisfy the Local Court of the district in which the 
offence may have been committed.
Article VIII.
The Bhootan Government hereby agree to refer to the 
arbitration of the British Government all disputes with, 
or causes of complaint against the Rajahs of Sikkim and 
Cooch Behar, and to abide by the decision of the British 
Government, and the British Government hereby engage to 
enquire into and settle all such disputes and complaints 
in such manner as justice may require, and to insist on 
the observance of the decision by the Rajahs of Sikkim 
and Cooch Behar.
Article IX.
There shall be free trade and commerce between the 
two Governments. No duties shall be levied on Bhootanese 
goods imported into British territories, nor shall the
300
Bhootan Government levy any duties on British goods 
imported into, or transported through the Bhootan ter­
ritories. Bhootanese subjects residing in British 
territories shall have equal justice with British sub­
jects and British subjects residing in Bhootan shall 
have equal justice with the subjects of the Bhootan 
Government.
Article X.
The present Treaty of ten Articles having been con­
cluded at Sinchula on the 11th day of November I8 6 5 , 
corresponding with the Ehootea ye^r Shim Lung 24th day 
of the 9th month, and signed and sealed by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Herbert Bruce, C.B., and Samdojey Dob Jimpey 
and Themseyrensey Donai, the ratifications of the same 
by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of 
His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in 
Council and by Their Highnesses the Dhurm and Deb Rajahs 
shall be mutually delivered within thirty days from this 
date.
(Sd.) H. Bruce, Lieut.-Col.,
Chief Civil and Poltl, Officer.
(Sd.) In Dabe Nagri.
(Sd.) In Ehootea language.
This Treaty was ratified on the 2 9th November I865
in Calcutta by me.
2 3th January I8 6 6. 
2 5th January I8 6 6.
(Sd.) John Lawrence,
Governor-General
(Sd.) W. Muir,
Secy, to the Govt, of India
"The Sinchula Treaty of 1 8 6 3," Texts of Treaties, 
Agreements and Certain Exchanges of Notes Relating to the 
Sino-Indian Boundary, Indian Society of International 
Law, New Delhi, 19&2, pp. 93-94.
APPENDIX I
TREATY WITH IHE MAHARAJA OF BHUTAN REVISING CERTAIN 
ARTICLES OF THE SINCHULA TREATY OF I865
Dated the 8th January I9IO
Treaty between His Excellency the Right Honourable 
Sir Gilbert John Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, P.C., G.M.S.I., 
G.M.I.E., G.C.M.G., Earl of Minto, Viceroy and Governor- 
General of India in Council, and His Highness Sir Ugyen 
Wangchuk, K.C.I.B., Maharaja of Bhutan,--1 9 1O,
Whereas it is desirable to amend Articles IV and VIII 
of the Treaty concluded at Sinchula on the 11th day of 
November I8 6 5 » corresponding with the Ehootea year 
Shing Lang, 24th day of the 9th month, between the 
British Government and the Government of Bhutan, the 
undermentioned amendments are agreed to on the one 
part by Mr. C. A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, 
in virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him 
by the Right Honourable Sir Gilbert John Elliot-Murray- 
Kynynmound, P.C., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., G.C.M.G., Earl of 
Minto, Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, 
and on the other part by His Highness Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, 
K.C.I.E., Maharaja of Bhutan.
The following addition has been made to Article IV 
of the Sinchula Treaty of l8 6$.
"The British Government has increased the annual 
allowance to the Government of Bhutan from fifty thou­
sand rupees (Rs. 50,000) to one hundred thousand rupees 
(Rs. 1 0 0 ,0 0 0) with effect from the 10th January I9IO."
Article VIII of the Sinchula Treaty of I865 has been 
revised and the revised Article runs as follows:
"The British Government undertakes to exercise no 
interference in the internal administration of Bhutan.
On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided 
by the advice of the British Government in regard to its 
external relations. In the event of disputes with or 
causes of complaint against the Maharajas of Sikkim and 
Cooch Behar, such matters will be referred for arbitration
301
302
to the British Government which will settle them in such 
manner as justice may require, and insist upon the 
observance of its decisions by the Maharajas named."
Done in quadruplicate at Punakha, Bhutan, this eighth 
day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand nine 
hundred and ten, corresponding with the Bhutia date, the 
2 7th day of the 11 month of the Earth-Bird (Sa-Ja) year.
C. A. Bell Seal of Dharma Raja
Political Officer Seal of His Highness the
in Sikkim Maharaja of Bhutan
Seal of Tatsang Lamas 
Seal of Tongsa Penlop 
Seal of Paro Penlop 
Seal of Zhung Dronyer 
Seal of Thimbu Jungpen 
Seal of Punaka Jungpen 
Seal of Wangdu Phondrang 
Jungpen 
Seal of Taka Penlop 
Seal of Deb Zimpon
(Sd.) Minto
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.
This Treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor 
General of India in Council at Fort William, on the 
twenty-fourth day of March A.D,, one thousand nine- 
hundred and ten.
(Sd.) S.H. Butler
Secretary to the Govt, of India 
Foreign Dept.
APPENDIX J 
INDIA-BHUTAN 
TEXT OF INDIA-BHUTAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP
Issued in Darjeeling on August 8 , 19^9
The Government of India on the one part, and His 
Highness the Druk Gyalpo's Government on the other part, 
equally animated by the desire to regulate in a friendly 
manner and upon a solid and durable basis the state of 
affairs caused by the termination of the British Govern­
ment’s authority in India, and to promote and foster the 
relations of friendship and neighbourliness so necessary 
for the well-being of their peoples, have resolved to 
conclude the following treaty, and have, for this pur­
pose named their representatives, that is to say Sri 
Harishwar Dayal representing the Government of India, 
who has full powers to agree to the said treaty on behalf 
of the Government of India, and Dob Zimpon Sonam, Tobgye 
Dorji, Yang-Lop Sonam, Chho-Zim Thondup, Rin-Zin Tandin 
and Ha Drung Jigmie Palden Dorji, representing the Gov­
ernment of His Highnefs the Druk Gyalpo, Maharaja of 
Bhutan, who have full powers to agree to the same on 
behalf of the Government of Bhutan.
Article I
There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between 
the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan.
Article II
The Government of India undertakes to exercise no 
interference in the internal administration of Bhutan.
On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided 
by the advice of the Government of India in regard to 
its external relations.
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Article III
In place of the compensation granted to the Govern­
ment of Bhutan under Article 4 of the Treaty of Sinchula 
and enhanced by the treaty of the eighth day of January 
1 9 1 0 and the temporary subsidy of Rupees one lakh per 
annum granted in 1942, the Government of India agrees 
to make an annual payment of Rupees five lakhs to the 
Government of Bhutan. And it is further hereby agreed 
that the said annual payment shall be made on the tenth 
day of January every year, the first payment being made 
on the tenth day of January 1950. This payment shall 
continue so long as this treaty remains in force and its 
terms are duly observed.
Article IV
Further to mark the friendship existing and con­
tinuing between the said Governments, the Government 
of India shall, within one year from the date of sig- 
niture of this treaty, return to the Government of 
Bhutan about thirty-two square miles of territory in 
the area known as Dewangiri. The Government of India 
shall appoint a competent officer or officers to mark 
out the area so returned to the Government of Bhutan.
Article V
There shall as heretofore, be free trade and com­
merce between the territories of the Government of India 
and the Government of Bhutan; and the Government of 
India agrees to grant the Government of Bhutan every 
facility for the carriage, by land and water, or its 
produce throughout the territory of the Government of 
India, including the right to use such forest roads as 
may be specified by mutual agreement from time to time.
Article VI
The Government of India agrees that the Government 
of Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance 
and approval of the Government of India, from or through 
India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, 
warlike material or stores may be required or desired 
for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this 
arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the 
Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of 
the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is 
no danger to India from such importations. The Govern­
ment of Bhutan, on the other hand, agrees that there
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shall he no export of such arms, ammunition, etc,, 
across the frontier of Bhutan either by the Government 
of Bhutan or by private individuals.
Article VII
The Government of India and the Government of 
Bhutan agree that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian 
territories shall have equal justice with Indian sub­
jects, and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall 
have equal justice with the subjects of the Government 
of Bhutan,
Article VIII
(1) The Government of India shall, on demand being 
duly made in writing by the Government of Bhutan, take 
proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the 
Indian Extradition Act, 1903 (of which a copy shall be 
furnished to the Government of Bhutan), for the surrender 
of all Bhutanese subjects accused of any of the crimes 
specified in the first schedule of the said ACT who may 
take refuge in Indian territory,
(2) The Government of Bhutan shall, on requisition 
being duly made by the Government of India, or by any 
officer authorised by the Government of India in this 
behalf, surrender any Indian subjects, or subjects of a 
foreign power, whose extradition may be required in pur­
suance of any agreement or arrangements made by the 
Government of India with the said power, accused of any 
of the crimes specified in the first schedule of Act XV 
of 1 9 0 3, who may take refuge in the territory under the 
jurisdiction of the Government of Bhutan, and also any 
Bhutanese subjects who, after committing any of the 
crimes referred to in Indian territory, shall flee to 
Bhutan, on such evidence of their guilt being produced 
as shall satisfy the local court of the district in 
which the offence may have been committed.
Article IX
Any differences' and disputes arising in the appli­
cation or interpretation of this treaty shall in the 
first instance be settled by negotiation. If within 
three months of the start of negotiations no settlement 
is arrived at, then the matter shall be referred to the 
Arbitration of three arbitrators, who shall be nationals 
of either India or Bhutan, chosen in the following manner :
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{1) One person nominated by the Government of 
India ;
(2) One person nominated by the Government of
Bhutan;
(3) A Judge of the Federal Court, or of a High
Court in India, to be chosen by the Govern­
ment of Bhutan, who shall be Chairman.
The judgment of this Tribunal shall be final and 
executed without delay by either party.
Article X
This Treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity 
unless terminated or modified by mutual consent.
DONE in duplicate at Darjeeling this eighth day of 
August, one thousand nine hundred and fortynine, cor­
responding with the Bhutanese date the fifteenth day 
of the sixth month of the Earth-Bull year.
HARISHWAR DAYAL DEB ZIMPON SONAM
Political Officer in Sikkim TOBGYE DORJI
yANG-LOP SONAM 
CHHO-rZIM THONDUP 
RIN-ZIM TANDIM 
HA DRUNG GIGMIE 
PALDEN DORJI
"Text of Indian-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship," 
Issued in Darjeeling on August 8, 19^9, Texts of Docu­
ments, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, I9 6 5 , pp. 4-6.
APPENDIX K
CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA 
RELATING TO SIKKIM AND TIBET (I8 9O)
Whereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His 
Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirous to 
maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and 
good understanding which now exists between their 
respective Empires; and whereas recent occurrences have 
tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and 
it is desirable to clearly define and permanently settle 
certain matters connected with the boundary between Sik­
kim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty 
the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Con­
vention on this subject and have, for this purpose, named 
Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:
Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland,
His Excellency the Most Hon'ble Henry Charles Keith Petty 
Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.M.I.E., Marquess of 
Lansdowns, Viceroy and Governor-General of India.
And His Majesty the Emperor of China, His Excellency 
Sheng Tai, Imperial Associate Resident in Tibeg, Mili­
tary Deputy Lieutenant-Governor.
Who having met and communicated to each other their 
full powers, and finding these to be in proper form, 
having agreed upon the following Convention in eight 
Articles : —
(1) The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the
crest of the mountain range separating the waters 
flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents 
from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu 
and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The 
line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan 
frontier and follows the abovementioned water- 
parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.
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(2) It is admitted that the British Government, 
whose protectorate over the Sikkim State is 
hereby recognised, has direct and exclusive con­
trol over the internal administration and foreign 
relations of the State, and except through and 
•with the permission of the British Government, 
neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its 
officers shall have official relations of any 
kind, formal, or informal, with any other country.
(3 ) The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and 
the Government of China engage reciprocally to 
respect the boundary as defined in Article (i), 
and to prevent acts of aggression from their 
respective sides of the frontier.
(4) The question of providing increased facilities 
for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will 
hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually 
satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting 
Powers.
{5 ) The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of 
the frontier is reserved for further examination 
ana future adjustment.
(6) The High Contracting Powers reserve for discus­
sion and arrangement the method in which official 
communications between the British authorities
in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be 
conducted.
(7 ) Two Joint Commissioners shall, within six months 
from the ratification of this Convention, be 
appointed, one by the British Government in 
India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. 
The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the 
questions which by the last three preceding Arti­
cles have been reserved.
(8) The present Convention shall be ratified, and the 
ratifications shall be exchanged in London as 
soon as possible after the date of the signature 
thereof.
In witness whereof the respective negotiators have 
signed the same affixed thereunto the seals of their 
arms •
Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta this seventeenth 
day of March in the year of our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred apd ninety, corresponding with the Chinese date 
the twenty-seventh day of the second moon of the six­
teenth year of Zuahg Hsu.
LANSDOWNE 
Chinese Seal and Signature
APPENDIX L
THE TEXT OF THE INDIA-SIKKIM PEACE TREATY ISSUED 
IN GANGTOK OK DECEMBER 5, 1950
Tlie President of India and His Highness the Maharaja 
of Sikkim, being desirous of further strengthening the 
good relations already existing between India and Sik­
kim, have resolved to enter into a new Treaty with each 
other, and the President cf India has, for the purpose, 
appointed as his plenipotentiary Shri Harishwar Dayal, 
Political Officer in Sikkim, and His Highness the 
Maharaja having examined Shri Harishwar Dayal's creden­
tials and found them good and in due form, the two have 
agreed as follows:—
Article I
All previous treaties between the British Government 
and Sikkim which are at present in force as between 
India and Sikkim are hereby formally cancelled.
Article II
Sikkim shall continue to be a Protectorate of India 
and, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall 
enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal affairs.
Article III
(l) The Government of India will be responsible for 
the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim. It 
shall have the right to take such measures as it con­
siders necessary for the defence of Sikkim or the secur­
ity of India, whether preparatory or otherwise, and 
whether within or outside Sikkim. In particular, the 
Government of India shall have the right to station 
tx oops anywhere within Sikkim.
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(2) The measures referred to In paragraph (1) will 
as far as possible be taken by the Government in con­
sultation with the Government of Sikkim.
(3 ) The Government of Sikkim shall not import any 
arms, ammunition, military stores or other warlike 
material of any description for any purpose whatsoever 
without the previous consent of the Government of India.
Article IV
(1 ) The external relations of Wikkim, whether poli­
tical, economic or financial, shall be conducted and 
regulated solely by the Government of India| and the 
Government of Sikkim shall have no dealings with any 
foreign power.
(2 ) Subjects of Sikkim travelling to foreign coun­
tries shall be treated as Indian protected persons for 
the purpose of passports, and shall receive from Indian 
representatives abroad the same protection and facili­
ties as Indian nationals.
Article V
The Government of Sikkim agrees not to levy any 
import duty, transit duty or other impost on goods 
brought into, or in transit through, Sikkim; and the 
Government of India agrees not to levy any import or 
other duty on goods of Sikkimese origin brought into 
India from Sikkim.
Article VI
(1 ) The Government of India shall have the exclu­
sive right of constructing, maintaining and regulating 
the use of railways, aerodromes and landing grounds and 
air navigation facilities, posts, telegraphs, telephones 
and wireless installations in Sikkim; and the Government 
of Sikkim shall render the Government of India every 
assistance in their construction, maintenance and pro­
tection.
(2 ) The Government of Sikkim may, however, construct, 
maintain, and regulate the use of, railways and aero­
dromes and landing grounds and air navigation facilities 
to such extent as may be agreed to by the Government of 
India.
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(3) The Government of India shall have the right to 
construct and maintain in Sikkim roads the strategic 
purposes and for tho purpose of improving communications 
with India and other adjoining countries and the Gov­
ernment of Sikkim shall render the Government of India 
every assistance in the construction, maintenance and 
protection of such roads.
Article VII
( 1 ) Subjects of Silckira shall have the right of entry 
into, and free movement within, India, and Indian nation­
als shall have the right of entry into, and free movement
A  ^  C f A
(2 ) Subject to such regulations as the Government of 
Sikkim may prescribe in consultation with the Government 
of India, Indian nationals shall have:--
(a) the right to carry on trade and commerce in
Sikkim; and
(b) when established in any trade in Sikkim, the
right to acquire, hold and dispose of any 
property, movable or immovable, for the 
purpose of their trade or residence in 
Sikkim.
(3) Subjects of Sikkim shall have the same right--
(a) to carry on trade and commerce in India, and
to employment there-in; and
(b) of acquiring, holding and disposing of prop­
erty, movable and immovable, as Indian 
nationals.
Article VIII
(1) Indian nationals within Sikkim shall be subject 
to the laws of Sikkim and subjects of Sikkim within 
India shall be subject to the laws of India.
(2 ) Whenever any criminal proceedings are initiated 
in Sikkim against any Indian national or any person in 
the service of the Government of India or any foreigner, 
the Government of Sikkim shall furnish the Representative 
of the Government cf India in Sikki!»' (hereinafter referred 
to as the Indian Representative) with particulars of 
charges against such person.
If in the case of any person in the service of the 
Government of India or any foreigner- it is so demanded
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by the Indian Representative, such person shall be 
handed over to him for trial before such court as may 
be established for the purpose by the Government of 
India either in Siklcim or outside.
Article IX
(1) The Government of Sikkim agrees to seize and 
deliver up any fugitive offender from outside Sikkim 
who has taken refuge therein on demand being made by 
the Indian Representative. Should any delay occur in 
complying with such demand, the Indian police may fol­
low the person whose surrender has been demanded into 
any part of Sikkim, and shall, on showing a warrant 
signed by the Indian Representative, receive every 
assistance and protection in the prosecution of their 
object from the Sikkim officers.
(2) The Government of India similarly agrees, on 
demand being made by the Government of Sikkim, to take 
extradition proceedings against, and surrender, any 
fugitive offender from Sikkim who has taken refuge in 
the territory of India.
(3) In this Article, "fugitive offender" means a 
person who is accused of having committed an extradition 
offence and defined in the First Schedule to the Indian 
Extradition Act, 1903, or any other offence which may 
hereafter be agreed upon between the Government of India 
and the Government of Sikkim as being an extradition 
offence.
Article X
The Government of India, having in mind the friendly 
relations already existing between India and Sikkim 
and now further strengthened by this Treaty, and being 
desirous of assisting in the development and good 
administration of Sikkim, agrees to pay the Government 
of Sikkim a sum of rupees three lakhs every year so 
long as the terms of this Treaty are duly observed by 
the Government of Sikkim.
The first payment under this Article will be made 
before the end of the year 1 9 5 0% and subsequent payments 
will be made in the month of August avery year.
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Article XI
The Government of India shall have the right to 
appoint a Representative to reside in Sikkim; and the 
Government of Sikkim shall provide him and his staff 
with all reasonable facilities in regard to their 
residential and office accommodation and generally in 
regard to their carrying out their duties in Sikkim.
Article XII
If any dispute arises in the interpretation of the 
provisions of this Treaty which cannot be resolved by 
mutual consultation » the dispute shall be referred to 
the Chief Justice of India whose decision thereon shall 
bo final.
Article XIII
This Treaty shall come into force without ratifica­
tion from the date of signature by both the parties.
"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Issued in 
Gangtok on December 5» 1950t Texts of Documents, Lok 
Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, I9 6 5 , pp. 169-173*
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